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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation examines the politics of expertise in the United States through the case of 
climate skepticism.  Growing consensus on the reality and drivers of global climate change 
within the scientific community coincides with an intense political polarization over climate 
change beliefs and support for policy responses in the United States.  In this case, challenges to 
scientific authority are not reducible to informational deficits or levels of formal education.  
Utilizing multiple methods, this dissertation explores climate skepticism through the content 
analysis of literature produced by climate skeptics, formal statements made by politicians 
regarding climate change, and the analysis of public opinion on climate change risk.  Climate 
skeptic organizations embed their opposition to climate policy within an ideological framework 
equating environmental regulation with attacks on free markets, refusing to accept scientific 
authority as a legitimate form of expertise regulating market activity.  Likewise, conservative 
politicians equate hydrocarbon energy with the creation of wealth itself, strategically allowing 
them to oppose climate policies without having to deny the science of climate change.  Relative 
to other environmental problems, political polarization characterizes the risk perception 
associated with climate change.  Analyzing this further after controlling for the influence of race, 
gender, income, and political orientation, and individual’s attitudes about market regulation and 
economic inequality are closely correlated with their beliefs about the dangers posed by climate 
change.  The connection between economic ideology and climate change beliefs can be 
understood by the fact that, unlike many types of environmental problems, mitigating the drivers 
of climate change requires an unprecedented regulation of carbon-based energy—the very 
building blocks of conventional capitalist development.  Climate skepticism does not result from 
anti-scientific attitudes per se, but from normative values regarding the balance between state 
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and market in negotiating collective risk mitigation versus organizational and consumer choice.  
This project helps contextualize climate change beliefs in the United States and explains why 
actors politicize some scientific controversies but not others along partisan and ideological lines.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Introduction: A Sociological Approach to Climate Skepticism in the United States 
 
 
 
 
“The credulous Americans have long flattered themselves that by the great progress of 
cultivation and by the destruction of the forests of the country, their climate has been rendered 
much milder and the severity of the winters have been moderated.” 
- Dr. Johann David Schoepf, 1780s1 
 
“[I]t is known with some certainty that North America and Europe have...experienced climates 
that have averaged several degrees warmer than the present...[A]lthough some of the natural 
climatic changes have had locally catastrophic effects, they did not stop the steady evolution of 
civilization.” 
- National Research Council, 19662 
 
“[H]uman activities, including the burning of fossil fuels, land-use change and agriculture, are 
increasing the atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases (which tend to warm the 
atmosphere) and, in some regions, aerosols (microscopic airborne particles, which tend to cool 
the atmosphere). These changes in greenhouse gases and aerosols, taken together, are projected 
to change regional and global climate and climate-related parameters such as temperature, 
precipitation, soil moisture and sea level.” 
- Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 19953 
 
"By framing the debate as a sustainable development problem rather than only as climate 
mitigation, the priority goals of all countries and particularly developing countries are better 
addressed, while acknowledging that the driving forces for emissions are linked to the underlying 
development path."   
- Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 20074 
 
 
 
The above epigraphs serve a twofold purpose. First, to demonstrate that climate change has been 
a topic of discussion and controversy for centuries, that it is not a problem originally identified at 
the onset of computer modeling; in other words, climate change discourse has a history.  Second, 
                                                 
1  Quoted in James Rodger Fleming (1998), Historical Perspectives on Climate Change, p. 31. 
2  National Research Council (1966), Weather and Climate Modification: Problems and Prospects, p. 88. 
3  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Second Assessment Report.  Available at  
     http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/climate-changes-1995/ipcc-2nd-assessment/2nd-assessment-en.pdf 
4  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth Assessment Report, Working Group III.  Available at     
     http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg3/en/ch12s12-1-1.html 
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to show that while this discourse does have a long history, it is only in the last few decades that 
climate change has been framed as a global threat, and that such a threat has taken on a new 
political meaning. 
 This dissertation concerns the controversy over climate change as a case study of 
legitimate expertise in American politics.  In particular, I am interested in how some groups 
perceive scientific knowledge as advancing certain normative agendas that affect the regulation 
of market activity or the state’s role in economic development.  Climate skepticism in the United 
States is animated by a neoliberal agenda of deregulation, minimal taxation, and a near-
elimination of the state’s role in economic development.  In its political organization, climate 
skepticism grew out of the intellectual tradition that views markets as providing spontaneous 
order for societies.  This tradition is uncomfortable with the role of experts in state capacities, 
because it allows human discretion to make top-down decisions that may contradict the wisdom 
offered by decentralized consumer choices.  The fight over mitigating the effects of 
anthropogenic climate change thus represents two clashing approaches to governance:  one that 
identifies decentralized economic actors acting in their short-term interest as ideal experts versus 
approaches that believe some expert knowledge can provide guidance for long-term collective 
interests.   
 In discussing this controversy, we might identify three communities in American climate 
politics.  There are, of course, climate scientists, a group of highly educated individuals in the 
natural sciences located at universities or government agencies who for the last forty years or so 
have called attention to the fact that global climate patterns are shifting in ways only explicable 
by reference to human activity.  They identify its cause, mainly, in the combustion of fossil fuels 
and changes in land use (deforestation, for example, which diminishes the number of natural 
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sinks that absorb carbon dioxide, an element identified as key in causing global warming).  
Within this scientific population, there is little controversy regarding the basic premise of 
anthropogenic climate change (Anderegg et al 2010; Cook et al 2013).   
 Over the last twenty to thirty years, we can identify climate activists as another 
community.  This includes some scientists, but also many individuals without higher education 
credentials.  This community is responsible for popularizing climate change as a collective 
problem and calling political attention to it.  In the U.S., this has led to an outcome of 
establishing climate change mitigation policies (such as carbon emissions trading).  While 
everyone recognizes such policies will not “solve” the problem of climate change once and for 
all, many may view them as a practical first step. 
 Then there are those who want to argue that the climate scientists are all wrong.  People 
articulating this view can range from “climate skeptics” to “climate deniers” to “climate 
contrarians,” and may pejoratively refer to climate activists as “climate alarmists” while 
admirably framing themselves in contrast as “climate realists.”  Each of these terms—denier, 
contrarian, skeptic—refers to different epistemological positions.  Deniers represent the most 
certain of these positions, referring to those who deny the reality of anthropogenic climate 
change and/or its harmful consequences.  The term contrarian requires a little more nuance, 
referring to those outspoken individuals attacking the mainstream scientific consensus on 
anthropogenic climate change.  This community (along with deniers), has received considerable 
money from the fossil fuel industry and conservative think tanks and foundations to popularize 
views challenging the mainstream scientific consensus on climate change (McCright 2007).   
 We may ambiguously interpret both “activists” and “realists” as skeptics, since 
skepticism constitutes an integral aspect of the scientific process (thus covering the climate 
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scientists as well; O’Neill and Boykoff 2010).  However, the term “climate skeptic” popularly 
refers to anyone who challenges the scientific consensus on climate change, whether through 
outright denial or contrarianism.  While the above distinctions are important for reminding us 
that we should avoid binary reductions when interpreting climate change politics (for example, 
whether climate change is a serious threat and whether human activity causes climate change 
represent two different questions; see Boykoff 2008), for the purpose of this dissertation, I use 
“climate skeptics” as an umbrella term covering all those who challenge the mainstream 
scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate change (that humans activity causes it and that its 
consequences represent a serious threat) regardless if they deny its reality or remain 
unconvinced.   
 The skeptics’ struggle against scientific knowledge of climate change represents a battle 
over popular opinion and political reform.  Generally speaking, public opinion trends can 
influence the trajectory of political reforms, and broad changes of opinion and concern within the 
general public constitutes a primary focus for public opinion scholarship on climate change 
(Leiserowitz 2005; Nisbet and Myers 2007; McCright and Dunlap 2011; Scruggs and Benegal 
2012).  In theory, the inability of climate activists to convert a sufficient number of “climate 
moderates” to their way of thinking is what makes for a political stalemate regarding mitigation 
policy.  If a majority or sufficient plurality of Americans could be convinced of the reality of 
climate change, then perhaps they would demand policy addressing its causes and consequences.  
 It can be tempting to reduce climate politics to epistemological disagreement or 
informational deficits.  Thus, climate scientists could view skeptics as naïve, scientifically 
illiterate, or dishonest shills for the fossil fuel industry.  This purpose of this dissertation is to 
explore the climate skeptic community and understand how their opposition to climate science 
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represents a larger political project.  While it is undeniably true that many prominent skeptics 
routinely receive financial support from conservative think tanks and foundations (and, to 
varying degrees, have received in the past or continue to receive such support from the fossil fuel 
industry), this does not exhaustively explain why climate skeptics form a community.  They are 
more than just shills for the fossil fuel industry, misrepresenting scientific claims in order to 
protect profits.   
 As McCright and Dunlap (2003) pointed out, climate skeptics primarily exist in a 
political context as part of the conservative movement.  Of course, “conservative” can refer to an 
array of political, cultural, and philosophical positions.  The organizations actively promoting 
climate skepticism also advocate the deregulation of health care, the privatization of education, 
and the minimization of taxes.  They do not, however, build alliances with conservative groups 
passionate about social issues such as abortion rights or marriage equality. Climate skeptic 
organizations primarily represent aspects of the conservative movement that focuses on 
economic issues, state power, and individual rights.  By recognizing the political and ideological 
structure of the climate change debate, we can take a sociological approach to climate skepticism 
that does not reduce it to epistemological difference of informational deficits.   
 It is important to recognize that among the organizations populating the climate skeptic 
environment, religious conservatives do not play a prominent role.  This makes climate change 
politics very different from the debates concerning evolution and creationism.  Unlike 
creationists, climate skeptics do not wish to attack science so much as to claim science (though I 
would argue that climate skepticism does represent an anti-scientific and anti-environmental 
practice).  Discursively, climate skeptics wish to marginalize climate science as an unproductive 
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form of knowledge that does not contribute anything to society the way that ideas from physics 
or chemistry have been applied to improve the human condition.     
 Although it may be distinct from other types of anti-scientific movements, climate 
skepticism is a modern manifestation of past movements attacking scientific research.  Climate 
skeptic tactics parallel those used to attack Rachel Carson for her work on DDT or anyone 
challenging the tobacco industry (Oreskes and Conway 2010).  Whenever scientific knowledge 
threatens the economic interests of an industry, we should not be surprised that scientists become 
the target of such attacks.  
 However, climate change and the policy focus on regulating carbon-based energy 
constitute something unprecedented in environmental problems.  Denying the reality of climate 
change carries with it a much greater political connotation than denying the adverse health 
effects of pesticides or tobacco consumption.  Not only does climate change imply issues of 
personal health (asthma, for example), but it concerns issues of energy extraction and 
consumption, how we measure economic productivity (measurements of GDP growth versus 
environmental well-being, for example), what type of transportation infrastructure societies 
should invest in (highways for individualized automobiles versus more energy efficient and 
centralized high-speed rail systems), agricultural production, biodiversity, shoreline erosion, 
ocean acidification, and access to freshwater resources.  At the level of international political 
economy, taking notions of sustainable development seriously challenges not only the practice of 
free market capitalism idealized by Ludwig von Mises or Friederich von Hayek but also the mix 
of capitalism and state socialism that characterizes contemporary China.   
 As a social problem, climate change represents a large challenge to modernization 
processes.  Past and current industrial development leaves collective populations with a built 
7 
 
environment that continues to enhance the carbon-based drivers of global climate change.  One 
aspect of this was well illustrated by global levels of carbon emissions after the financial crisis of 
2007-08.  While some economies may be able to point to reduced emissions in isolated regions, 
global emissions continued to rise as developing economies not impeded by the recent financial 
crisis expanded the material wellbeing of their populations using conventional carbon-based 
energy (Peters et al 2012).  Further, the problem is more complicated than simply developing 
alternative forms of energy.  York (2012) demonstrated that introducing alternative energy into 
existing economic structures does very little to displace fossil fuel use.   
 
ESTABLISHING THE SCOPE OF RESEARCH 
Studying the history of each community involved in American climate politics reaches beyond 
the scope of this dissertation.  As I assume the reality of anthropogenic climate change as 
generally stated by mainstream scientists, I believe there will come a time when a plurality of 
American climate activists will successfully push mitigation policy beyond regional enclaves, 
though I am not interested in speculating when that time may come.  Instead, the scope of this 
dissertation is restricted to the climate skeptic community contributing to the delay of this 
outcome.  Climate policy scholars have long been aware of the inherent contradiction of climate 
change politics:  climate change is a long-term process whose consequences will be fully known 
in a distant future, while politics exists within a more immediate context of short-term incentives 
(Michaelowa 2011).  Sociologist Anthony Giddens took the opportunity to encapsulate this 
contradiction by coining it as the “Giddens paradox” (2009).  This reality helps us understand 
what prevents climate moderates from politically demanding action on climate change.  In this 
regard, understanding the climate change controversy from an epistemological standpoint is 
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crucial, as education constitutes a key front for creating new political constituencies who will 
demand a collective response to global warming.   
 But what instills the conviction that passionately animates this controversy along 
ideological cleavages?  Climate scientists, no doubt, will refer to their expertise on the matter as 
affording them a privileged view that can anticipate the dire consequences of climate change, 
and want to urge policymakers to address this issue out of a sense of civic and humanitarian 
duty.  Skeptics accuse these scientists of holding an agenda, whether it is to advance an anti-
capitalist mode of development or a more plainly self-interested position of creating a problem 
whose solution will require filling scientific research coffers with money.   
 Of course, climate skeptics carry an agenda themselves.  In short, they seek to protect and 
further an agenda of market liberalism committed to minimizing social safety nets and 
deregulating capitalist markets (Antonio and Brulle 2011).  Exploring the ideological agenda of 
market liberalism, and how its proponents view climate change mitigation as an aggressive 
attack on its basic tenets, comprises the focus on this dissertation.  In particular, I am interested 
in not only how the advocacy of market liberalism operates within a climate skeptics public, but 
the ways in which skeptics frame climate change, “alarmists,” and hydrocarbons as a means of 
furthering a movement, not simply obstructing policy reform. 
 The next chapter considers the American climate skeptic community as a public centered 
on shared concern for how carbon regulation would affect consumer objects and lifestyles.  
Considering the social meaning attached to the scientific facts of climate change can lend insight 
into why some individuals, even if they are well educated and scientifically literate, reject expert 
consensus.  The meaning of participating in “carbon capitalism” lines up with normative 
standards of markets as institutions coordinating behavior in society.  The radical individualism 
9 
 
present in climate skepticism that refuses to sacrifice self-interest for collective benefit provides 
an essential component for understanding the ideological roots of the climate skeptic movement.   
 This research is laid out as follows.  Chapter 2 considers the American climate skeptic 
community as a public centered on shared concern for how carbon regulation would affect 
consumer objects and lifestyles.  Considering the social meaning attached to the scientific facts 
of climate change can lend insight into why some individuals, even if they are well educated and 
scientifically literate, reject expert consensus.  The meaning of participating in “carbon 
capitalism” lines up with normative standards of markets as institutions coordinating behavior in 
society.  The radical individualism present in climate skepticism that refuses to sacrifice self-
interest for collective benefit provides an essential component for understanding the ideological 
roots of the climate skeptic movement.   
 Chapter 3 considers why climate skeptics reject market-based policy mechanisms.  
Climate policy must always negotiate a balance between economic growth and environmental 
improvement.  In the U.S., both regional practice and national proposals for climate mitigation 
utilize market mechanisms in order to minimize costs for major emitters of greenhouse gases.  
Presumably, this should win over some climate change skeptics who are primarily concerned 
with free markets and economic growth.  Yet climate skeptics and free market activists are as 
staunchly opposed to market-based climate policy as they are any other form of climate 
mitigation, framing market-based policy as socialist control over economics.  In order to 
understand why climate skeptics reject market-based policy proposals, an archive of free market 
environmental newsletters was analyzed for themes of economic opposition.  This analysis 
revealed how climate skeptics rely upon the concept of a regulatory cartel to connect economic 
opposition to climate policy with attacks on scientific evidence.  Because professional scientists 
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do not operate under normal market incentive structures, climate skeptics attack their knowledge 
as a form of socialist control when utilized to guide policy affecting environment-economy 
relationships. 
 Chapter 4 then looks at the overlap of climate skeptic narratives and climate discourse 
within historically important committees of the U.S. Senate.  The introduction of carbon markets 
as a policy instrument reflect a general transition within environmental governance away from 
centralized regulatory regimes that impose uniform standards across all entities toward 
decentralized approaches that allow actors to use market incentives to comply with regulatory 
standards.  Although this idea has long been championed by political conservatives, examining 
U.S. Senate hearings regarding climate change reveals a consistent conservative rejection of 
carbon markets.  We can make sense of this by understanding how conservatives frame carbon as 
a source of wealth creation.  As such, conservatives articulate any attempt to regulate carbon 
pollution as an attack on economic development and an infringement on the appropriate balance 
between state and market.  In order to distance their position from criticism of ignoring 
environmental problems, conservative Senators frame the natural environment in the same way 
they do markets—as self-regulating mechanisms that policy intervention can only harm.  
 Chapter 5 then compares concern over the consequences of several environmental issues 
(global warming, air pollution, pesticides, genetically modified organisms, and population 
growth) among American adults across the years 1994, 2000, and 2010, using General Social 
Survey data.   It tests claims about the impact of political orientation as well as educational and 
income interaction effects on environmental concern, specifically risk perceptions regarding 
temperature rise from climate change.  The results speak to trends in environmental skepticism 
within the American public both over time and across issues.  Over time, I argue that the social 
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bases of environmental skepticism have intensified along ideological but not partisan predictors.  
Across issues, rather than finding a uniform set of anti-environmental attitudes across politically 
conservative individuals, skepticism to different environmental issues is predicted by different 
categories of conservative values.  In the case of climate change, the results demonstrate that the 
ideological determination of beliefs about climate change risk has changed over time, and that 
these patterns are unique when compared with other environmental issues.  This analysis 
considers attitudes about income redistribution as a specific conservative value predicting skeptic 
beliefs, suggesting that the ideological character of climate change denial overlaps with fears that 
mitigation will violate norms regarding social stratification. I conclude with a consideration of 
why ideology plays such a different role in predicting concern about global warming compared 
with other environmental issues.   
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Carbon Publics:  Consumer Objects, Market Boundaries, and Climate Skepticism 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
On the surface, climate skeptics are concerned with refuting facts produced by climate scientists.  
This alone, however, tells us very little about what motivates climate skeptics.  In a classic 
statement of American pragmatism, John Dewey instructed that “if one wishes to realize the 
distance which may lie between ‘facts’ and the meaning of facts, let one go to the field of social 
discussion” (1927:3).  Experts may attach social meaning to facts, but these meanings are 
contested across discursive context.   The significance of this statement lies in understanding that 
while climate skeptics devote the greatest amount of their attention to refuting the evidentiary 
basis of climate change, this aspect of their opposition does not explain why they might come 
together as a social group.   
For Dewey, a public is far more than a collection of associative ties.  Only when a group 
of strangers from different social worlds organize themselves through an “integrative principle” 
to address a problem that affects them all will a collection of actors constitute a “public” 
(1927:38). Facts, in and of themselves, do not spur people into action.  Rather, groups may arrive 
at opposing conclusions on an issue by attaching different social meanings to the same fact.  In 
the case of “carbon publics,” we find disparate communities forming according to different 
meanings attached to the increased use of carbon-based energy and products.  While some 
identify the correlation between increased atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide with 
rising temperatures as evidence of anthropogenic climate change, others emphasize the greater 
quality of life afforded by energy-intensive consumer lifestyles, and seek to protect market 
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transactions that allow individual consumers to determine the future availability of such products 
and services. 
In order to understand climate skepticism beyond the refutation of scientific evidence, we 
must seek what principle integrates climate skeptics into a group.  Clearly, they typically share a 
conservative political orientation primarily concerned with economic issues and individual 
rights.  But why should such an orientation lead an individual to refute scientific consensus or 
reject market-based policy proposals for dealing with the drivers of climate change?   
From the standpoint of social action, I argue that a key aspect that integrates climate 
skeptics into a social group is a shared meaning attached to material participation in “carbon 
capitalism.”  Carbon capitalism here simply refers to modes of economic production and 
consumption that rest upon cheaply available hydrocarbons that systematically privilege the 
satisfaction of individual desires over collective concerns of environmental sustainability.  These 
are economic systems that seek to maximize profit margins through the full exploitation of a 
natural energy economy regardless of the negative externalities associated with a particular type 
of energy use.  Making the goods produced within these economic systems cheaply available 
places the consumer and the producer—rather than the scientist or regulator—in position to 
determine future courses of development relative to collective concern over environmental 
sustainability. 
The notion of a “material” participation refers to the ways in which individual identity is 
sustained through consistent interaction with material objects.  In this case, I argue that climate 
skeptics perceive a moral threat in climate change policy precisely because it threatens to 
withhold or alter a variety of material objects key to sustaining particular types of (carbon-
intensive) lifestyles.  As such, climate skeptics must refuse any tradition of scientific inquiry that 
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threatens a system of human-object lifestyles that maximizes consumer comfort at the cost of 
environmental degradation.  
The concept of sacrifice offers one way of thinking about threats to material participation 
in carbon capitalism.  Lieberman (2009) reminded that the process of state-mandated sacrifice 
turns private resources into public resources.  Taxes are the most obvious and common example, 
but sacrifice could also include military service, speed limits, or—in the present case—altering 
the carbon-content of consumption.  Societies with porous social boundaries are more successful 
in pursuing policies based on sacrifice toward a common good because national identities can 
more easily precede specific group identities.  Lieberman pointed to the success of Brazil’s 
AIDS policy compared with South Africa, where the latter is characterized by strict social 
boundaries preventing whites from seeing AIDS in black communities as a problem that 
concerns them.  
Thinking about sacrifice and social boundaries can help us make sense of climate politics, 
particularly when considering how actors justify ignoring climate change or confronting it as a 
collective problem.  How actors coordinate action in the face of uncertainty is a primary concern 
of conventions theorists (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006).  In part, conventions theory considers 
how actors converge around normative institutional boundaries when they agree upon 
appropriate experts able to evaluate evidence.  Explaining why people within a social group 
work to maintain carbon-intensive consumer practices or reconsider strategies of economic 
growth in response to scientific research should not ignore the concept of sacrifice.  Market 
conventions—which justify institutional boundaries that evaluate action based solely on price 
signals and consumer decisions—prohibit the state’s role in demanding citizen sacrifice.  
15 
 
Market conventions detail a normative institutional configuration that protects certain 
group interests through the minimization of sacrifice.  Those groups benefiting the most from 
minimally regulated markets thus have a structural interest in organizing against efforts to 
demand greater sacrifice among citizens.  Skeptics are not just individuals, but a group who 
share certain characteristics. As displayed in prior research and in a later chapter, skeptics are 
disproportionately white, male, conservative, and affluent.  Within climate skeptic political 
discourse, this group identity is not explicitly articulated.  Instead, climate skeptics employ 
rhetoric equating individual liberty and freedom with consumer choice and the levels of sacrifice 
demanded citizens.   
 This essay explores connections between the evaluations of material objects that concern 
carbon emissions with group preferences for institutional boundaries defining market activity.  
Neo-pragmatic conventions theory offers an explanation for how and why human subjects 
evaluate the worth of their identity and performance according to selected objects.  We can 
interpret climate politics as a struggle over the social meaning attached to regulating consumer 
objects by their climate impact.  The next section will review pragmatist understandings of 
public debate, followed by a theoretical framework of how neoliberals recognize the individual 
in relation to society.  It will then consider how framing hydrocarbons in terms of their economic 
utility and consumer choice (rather than the collective risk produced by greenhouse gas 
emissions) connect to a neoliberal identity based upon an oppositional stance toward collective 
action instituted by actors from outside the private sector.    
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THE CLIMATE SKEPTIC COMMUNITY 
In March 2008, the International Conference on Climate Change (ICCC) held its first meeting to 
discuss the science, economics, and politics of climate change.  The ICCC meets annually to 
bring together an international (though mostly American) audience of climate skeptics.  The 
keynote speaker at the first meeting was Vaclav Klaus, former president of Czech Republic.  
During his speech, which included references to Hayek’s Road to Serfdom and drew upon his 
experience living under communism, Klaus warned the audience that  
 
 [Global warming] alarmists display a fatal conceit, they believe in rationing millions of 
 lives, their ability to know all data, possibility to give adequate instructions to millions of 
 institutional actors, ability to manage compliance with instructions.  This is about the 
 fundamental relationship between the individual and society.
5
 
 
Emphasizing the relationship between individuals and collective society, Klaus clearly 
articulated the social and political stakes of confronting climate change.  His invitation as a 
keynote speaker for the inaugural climate skeptics conference suggests a political strategy of 
building a coalition around libertarian individualism and neoliberal economic policy.  The 
individualism expressed by actors within the think tanks promoting climate skepticism is often 
extended to issues beyond climate skepticism (taxes, health care, public education, etc.), 
connecting the drivers of climate policy to a host of other perceived attacks on the individual 
liberties.  
Recent analysis characterizes climate skepticism as a defense of industrial capitalism 
(Jacques 2006; McCright and Dunlap 2010; Dunlap and McCright 2011).  This should come as 
little surprise, as the connection between anti-environmental movements and capital interests has 
a history in the U.S. (see Austin 2002).  Other analysts identify a reflexive mode of capitalist 
development that confronts the unintended consequences evident in the realms of environmental 
                                                 
5
 Videos from the inaugural ICCC meeting found at http://climateconferences.heartland.org/iccc1 
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sustainability and health (Beck 1992; Mol 1995; Mol and Sonnenfeld 2000).  Climate change 
clearly constitutes one such unintended consequence of natural resource exploitation that forces 
collective society to assess new courses of action that could mitigate further consequences.  
Thus, climate denial organizations represent an effort of “anti-reflexivity” seeking to defend the 
status quo order of industrial capitalism (McCright and Dunlap 2010).  “Reflexive” market-based 
policy efforts such as carbon trading do not call systems of private property ownership into 
question, but simply attempt to reform extant economic systems in light of scientific knowledge.  
As such, reformist efforts hardly constitute an ontological threat to industrial orders of capital 
accumulation, yet climate skeptics remain steadfastly opposed to any effort to recognize carbon 
emissions as pollutants in need of regulatory action.  
 However, we could consider how even modest policy reforms aimed at mitigating 
climate change could threaten the ontological security of certain forms of consumption.  
Norgaard’s work (2006, 2011) demonstrated the emotional components of denying climate 
change.  In her ethnographic work on climate change denial, individuals keep information on 
climate change at a distance not out of ideological drive, but as a way of coping with an external 
threat to a way of life.  In this spirit, we can understand the political organization around climate 
change through conservative-libertarian think tanks as deflecting perceived attacks on a 
particular way of life.  In this case, however, participants (those active in the think tanks but also 
receptive audiences) do not ignore the issue of climate change as an emotional coping 
mechanism, but identify climate change mitigation as an attack on individual liberty and a free 
market-oriented way of life.  More specifically, skeptics identify climate policy efforts with an 
attack on individual freedom to consume objects free of consideration of their environmental 
impact.  
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 When the climate skeptic movement was organized through the ICCC, its founders 
likened themselves to carrying on the tradition set forth by the Mont Pèlerin Society.  Founded in 
1947, the Mont Pèlerin Society was the first attempt to “organize individualism” in a postwar 
world, led by neoliberal intellectuals such as F.A. Hayek (Plehwe 2009).  Thus we must 
understand climate skepticism within a broader political trajectory committed to libertarian 
values.  As such, it is no surprise that climate skeptics established connections to the emerging 
Tea Party movement – a movement itself primarily aimed at capturing state power in order to 
minimize federal roles in governing.  The organizers of the ICCC distributed at least 60,000 
copies of The Patriots Toolbox at Tea Party rallies, applying free market policy solutions to 
environmental problems as well as health care, education, telecommunications, taxes, and 
insurance.  In the preface, leaders from The Heartland Institute identify the Tea Party movement 
as a reaction to bank and insurance company bailouts, state spending, and government takeovers 
of private business.  As discussed further below, this political movement draws upon a market 
convention that normatively identifies market self-regulation through the movement of price 
signals and consumer reactions as the ideal institutional arrangement to confront collective 
problems.    
 
CARBON PUBLICS 
Climate skeptics create a public in part through their discursive representation of carbon in 
society and the types of relationships (both between people and between consumers and objects) 
affected by environmental regulation.  In order to speak of “carbon publics” we must consider 
how human relationships are evaluated in light of objects defined by their “carbon content,” 
which could refer to either carbon emissions or concentrated levels of combustible energy.  
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Research on the politicization of objects within environmental contexts offers an interesting 
insight.  In a recent experiment, subjects were presented with the opportunity to purchase 
incandescent versus energy-efficient light bulbs.  In one group, the energy-efficient light bulbs 
were labeled as environmentally friendly, while no such labeled was presented to the other 
group.  Political conservatives were far less likely to purchase energy-efficient light bulbs when 
they came attached with environmental messages (Gromet et al 2013).  This type of research 
identifies ideological orientation as a substantial barrier to behavioral change.   
Shove (2003; 2010) critiqued behavioral approaches to sustainability as analytically 
isolating material objects on their own terms, rather than looking at the larger technological 
systems they constitute—systems of convenience and comfort that themselves may be 
environmentally unsustainable.  By contrast, I suggest that a critical reading of behavioral 
research can offer a different insight.  While behavioral research may overlook holistic 
approaches to mitigating climate change or other questions of environmentally unsustainable 
systems, it may also hint at an understanding of what motivates environmental skepticism: an 
ideological rejection of environmentalism, even “liberal environmentalism” premised upon 
privileging economic growth above environmental mitigation (Bernstein 2000, 2001). Skeptics 
reject market-based environmentalism not simply because it imposes some costs on business, but 
because environmental reforms might threaten a system of consumer objects constellating 
consumer systems within “carbon capitalism.” 
 Considering how climate skepticism defends particular lifestyles threatened by climate 
mitigation brings motivation into the analysis.  Taber and Lodge (2006) sought to understand 
different types of motivations driving skepticism.  They referred to two broad categories that 
motivate individuals to engage in reasoning—accuracy goals and partisan goals.  The former 
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refers to situations where an individual weighs evidence and derives conclusions, while the latter 
refers to situations where an individual uses reasoning skills to defend a preconceived 
conclusion.  If we think of ideological worldviews as a coherent set of preconceptions about the 
social world, then ideological disposition often influences individuals to see different types of 
problems given a common set of facts (Martin and Desmond 2010).  Given their marginality 
within the broader scientific community, it is reasonable to think of climate skeptics as motivated 
skeptics, applying rational critiques to scientific evidence in order to advance ideological goals. 
Climate skeptics typically fall outside the established network of scientific experts.  They 
provide an interesting case of participatory science, though not contributing to scientific 
discourse as a means of social change or environmental preservation as much as they create an 
alternative discourse to defend dominant institutional orders (Martin 2006; Moore 2006).  
Concerning science and politics, climate skeptics might view themselves as politically 
sophisticated lay persons committed to freedom and opposed to the economic burdens imposed 
by alarmist science.  Moreover, they express concern that mitigating the proposed problems 
caused by hydrocarbon extraction will infringe upon favored subject-object relationships.  
Specifically, they fear that a variety of consumer objects and lifestyles afforded by certain 
technological systems will no longer be available if regulatory restraints are imposed on the 
extraction and consumption of hydrocarbons.   
In her engagement with Dewey, Marres (2012) went further into the topic of publics by 
more directly considering the role of nonhuman objects in democratic discourse.  In a 
conventional, “pre-object” understanding, individuals were required to possess a certain 
intellectual faculty as a prerequisite for discursive participation.  With a “post-object” turn, 
however, Marres considered how subjective autonomy is always bound up in a particular 
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material network of object relations.  As such, individual engagement with nonhuman objects 
offers a political engagement through material rather than discursive participation.  Considering 
material participation, then, forces us to acknowledge the political symbolism displayed by 
climate skeptics when they excitedly defend consumer choice over the use of incandescent light 
bulbs, plastic shopping bags, energy-inefficient automobiles and residential homes, or air 
conditioning.  Climate skeptics frame any climate-oriented policy that seeks to restrict the use or 
alter the form of these consumer objects as an attack on an individual autonomy and the lifestyles 
made possible by these objects.     
Yet in order to understand what motivates a public, Dewey insisted that we must identify 
an “integrating principle.”  For climate skeptics, individualism constitutes this integrating 
principle.  Discussed further below, neoliberals posit individuals as the basic building block of 
social order, recognize individualism expressed through consumer choice, and identify the 
aggregation of atomized consumers as the ultimate expert in evaluating institutional boundaries.  
Skeptics reference each aspect of this individualism through human-object relationships affected 
by scientific knowledge of climate change.   
Although climate skeptics frequently speak of “socialism” in the context of climate 
policy, what really are at stake are not free markets per se but the institutional boundaries that 
structure markets and state.  All activity proposed by the U.S. government and major 
environmental organizations essentially preserves capitalist markets in the general sense.  What 
is at stake—and what skeptics rightly fear—is the ability to ignore the negative externalities 
produced by the consumption of hydrocarbon materials whose consequences are absorbed by the 
global community.   
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 Climate skeptics articulate a perceived threat to particular lifestyles whose social 
boundaries map onto political ideologies.  It is common, for example, for audience members at 
climate skeptic conferences to be greeted with “carbon indulgences” forgiving them for the sin of 
utilizing carbon-fueled transportation to attend the conference, mocking the practice of carbon 
offsets that finance mitigation projects.  Looking at the premier conference organizing climate 
skeptics from around the world reveals that climate skepticism defines a specific type of market 
boundary that insists upon defining economic activity absent reference to pollution and 
environmental externalities.  While a multiplicity of market boundaries exist that would all 
preserve what could commonly be recognized as “capitalism,” the exact market configuration 
specified by climate skeptics privileges a particular configuration of consumer materials made 
possible by cheaply available hydrocarbons.   
 Hydrocarbons play a particularly important role in the American economy.  According to 
World Bank data
6
, fossil fuels are used to meet about 80-85% of total energy demand in the  
United States.  This measures places the carbon-dependence of the American economy between 
other advanced economies such as Germany and the United Kingdom, though fossil fuels 
account for a minority of total energy consumption in Sweden and Finland.  However, looking at 
measures of total energy consumption per capita reveals that the average American consumes 
about twice as much energy as their counterparts in Germany or the United Kingdom.  
Ultimately, carbon is “special” in an American (and Canadian) context because it affords a 
particular lifestyle characterized by urban sprawl, individualized automobility, and large homes.  
If Americans converted half of their collective fossil fuel consumption to renewable resources 
over the next five years, people would have to start living closer to their place of work, they 
would have to rely on a mass transit infrastructure (which doesn’t yet exist in many parts of the 
                                                 
6
 Data retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org.  Last accessed February 15, 2014.   
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country), and they would have to live in areas that are built “upwards” rather than “outwards.”  
The cultural politics involved in such lifestyle changes are very important factors to keep in mind 
when considering attacks on climate science.    
   
CONVENTIONS THEORY 
Boundaries defining exclusive and overlapping realms of state and market are never pre-given, 
but the result of human struggle, negotiation, and compromise.  Environmental activists often 
aim their efforts at changing these boundaries in ways that minimize environmental impact 
(Gibson-Graham 2008).  Pragmatic approaches consider how institutional routines are 
challenged when confronted with failure (Overdevest 2011).  To the degree political actors 
consider climate change as a market failure, we can understand efforts of climate mitigation as 
efforts to renegotiate boundaries of state and market, concerned with who holds power to make 
decisions and evaluate progress.   
 Conventions communicate norms for routine action.  Biggart and Beamish defined 
conventions as “shared templates for interpreting situations and planning courses of action in 
mutually comprehensible ways that involve social accountability, that is, they provide a basis for 
judging the appropriateness of acts by self and other” (2003:444).  The routine of interest for this 
essay is the consumption of objects that devotes minimal attention to atmospheric impact, either 
consciously in terms of consumer choice, systematically in terms of consumer price, or 
holistically in terms of the quotidian patterns made possible by certain consumer objects.
7
  Neo-
pragmatists Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot argue that conventions offer insight into how 
                                                 
7
 For example, the patterns of activity and comfort involved in affordably commuting between work and home on a 
regular basis provides one example of a subject-object constellation.  The routine performance of a subject’s 
professional identity and visceral comfort rests upon the availability of several affordable consumer objects that 
result in disproportionate environmental impact, most obviously individually-utilized automobiles and cheap 
gasoline.   
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action is coordinated in the face of uncertainty according to competing “economies of worth” 
that place people and objects into spatial, temporal, and ethical frames.  Such categories of worth 
may connect with work from political sociology that analyzes how understandings of the rich or 
poor as “deserving” can influence attitudes toward policy (Steensland 2006; Prasad et al 2009). 
 With categories of worth, conventions theorists hope to articulate a “sociology of 
complex political and moral ordering,” understand how notions of “the good” structure 
conditions of possibility in constructing “the real” (Thévenot 2002: 54).  Analyzing the 
evaluation of legitimacy becomes central to understanding how actors converge around common 
action, eschewing traditions that want to view behavior as determined by latent class ideology.  
In general agreement with science and technology studies, this requires understanding the role of 
non-human objects in sustaining inter-subjective systems of coordination, or the “operations 
needed to move toward commonality and generality” (2002: 56).  
 The most systematic treatment of conventions theory was Boltanski and Thévenot’s On 
Justification (2006).  They identified six prototypical economies of worth commonly found in 
western political philosophy: inspired, domestic, fame, civic, market, and industrial.  Each one of 
these categorical worlds formulates a natural order framing actors and objects in relation to 
qualities of worth or “higher common principles” upon which action will ultimately be judged.  
The six respective higher common principles identified by Boltanski and Thévenot are 
inspiration (inspired), concordance with tradition (domestic), public opinion (fame), the 
collective good (civic), competition (market), and efficiency (industrial); since this original 
typology, Thévenot, Moody, and Lafaye (2000) have added the emergent convention of green 
orders of worth emphasizing sustainability as an equivalency standard.  Actors with conflicting 
points of view often compromise on conventions, brokering hybrid standards of action that may 
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combine concern with price competition and environmental sustainability (as in the case of 
carbon markets).  
Boltanski and Thévenot particularly focused on what they called “critical moments”—
moments of crisis demanding critical capacities of individual rationality for resolution.  It is 
precisely a political moment when involved actors recognize the antecedent assemblage of 
people and non-humans (the prevailing way of doing something) as unsustainable. The call to 
attention over climate change is precisely one of these moments.  We might speculate that 
contentious justifications regarding carbon boil down to attempts to impose societal boundaries 
onto economic order premised around the individual—an order of worth of liberty, qualified 
through the individual as consumer.  The process of justification determines a set of “rules” that 
must be followed, generally a structure lending logical coherence to a given frame of analysis, 
which itself should have the potential power to disrupt a situational order.  
An important aspect of the moment at which people enter into disputes involves the 
establishment of equivalence (Boltanski and Thévenot 1999), wherein a standard is applied to 
persons and objects to demonstrate what they have in common.  No agreement can be reached if 
disputing parties fail to transcend subjective singularity, making conventions of equivalence 
prerequisite to rational resolution (particularly if violence is to be avoided).  Relevant objects 
must be identified, with a common standard applied to them so analytical points can be agreed 
upon.  Calculation in this sense is central to making an argument, which asks us to pay attention 
to what type of justification regime is selected.  Standards of equivalence provide an analytical 
key in evaluating human-object relationships, as skeptics equate attacks on individual freedom 
with attacks on objects because they equate individualism with the opportunity to purchase 
carbon-intensive consumer objects.  
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Justification regimes are not a natural or pre-given way of coordinating action, but 
emerge only when conventions of personal relationships or utility fail to resolve a critical 
moment.  This implies the importance of paying attention to action between anonymous actors. 
Conventions are necessary for the sustainability of a given arrangement, whether this is the 
convention involved in serving a dinner party or the extraction of energy sources.  Disputes often 
revolve around which type of equivalent worth should be the common standard used in a regime 
of justification.   
The shortcomings of this theoretical tradition appear to be twofold.  First, it is limited in 
the types of ontological claims it could make regarding the performance of carbon markets as a 
mitigation scheme.  Although it lends great insight into political mobilization surrounding 
various proposals, it will not settle the regulatory debate of whether carbon trading, carbon taxes, 
command and control, or any other option is the most effective or desirable means of climate 
change mitigation.  Second, conventions theory will be open to criticism from anyone (especially 
from a marxist tradition) interested in tracking the material interests of discourse participants.  Its 
focus on public, political grammar in this context will not pay attention to the financial sources 
underpinning climate skeptic organizations or any entity which stands to gain under carbon 
trading markets.   
 
ANTI-SOCIAL CONVENTIONS 
Before inspecting the ways climate skeptics communicate market conventions and represent 
material objects, it is useful to review the intellectual tradition that climate skeptics operate 
within.  Their commitment to free markets grew out of the postwar neoliberal intellectual 
thought.  The economist and philosopher F.A. Hayek was a prominent figure in this movement, 
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writing extensively on the topic of markets, individual freedom, and state totalitarianism.  As an 
intellectual movement, neoliberal thought was formally organized in 1947 at the first meeting of 
the Mont Pèlerin Society.  Through archival research, Plehwe (2009) identified Hayek as key 
figure organizing the movement from the 1940s to 1960s.  Reviewing major themes in Hayek’s 
writing is not intended to exhaustively cover the origins of neoliberal thought.  However, his 
writing provides a useful framework to understand the moral critique of regulatory action from 
the perspective of neoliberals and climate skeptics alike.  By reviewing crucial themes in 
Hayek’s writing, we can better understand how individualism as a normative political order is 
manifested in consumerism, and why attacks on material objects can be interpreted as attacks on 
individual liberty or the usurpation of freedom by a political class of experts.  
An incredibly prolific writer, Hayek’s work spanned several decades and ideas, making 
this review partial at best.  His use of the word “social” provides one place to start, however.  For 
Hayek, this word signified the emergence of a mid-nineteenth century discourse wherein elite 
classes discussed how to take care of the problems in the collective (Hayek 1967).  In the past, 
Hayek claimed, “ethical behavior” referred to concrete situations wherein the consequences of 
action were immediately perceptible.  In his view, the construction of “social behavior” requires 
individuals to consider consequences beyond their immediate perception; this requires them to 
locate action within a blueprint of society, providing a new social status for the knowledge 
produced by experts.   
Against “the social,” Hayek differentiated between spontaneously existing “society” and 
the more deliberate “state” to which the modern use of “social” referred.  For Hayek, the “social” 
corrupts a universal sense of justice in that it promotes programs that cannot be objectively 
applied to all parts of a population equally (a position, we can note, that leaves little room for 
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addressing historical, structural inequality).  Mapping the meaning of “social” as given by Hayek 
for spontaneous society versus the planned state looks like the following: 
 
 
 Society State 
Origin Spontaneous Designed, Deliberate 
Evidence of Existence Social Structures Bureaucracies 
Method of Organization Non-rational (evolutionary) Logical 
Mantra / “aim” “Service to Society” “Control of Society” 
Substantive critique “Anti-social” is social “Social” is anti-social 
 
 
 Understanding the differential conceptualization of the social between a spontaneous 
society and the state provides insight into Hayek’s moral critique of expertise.  While all 
economic activity requires some degree of planning, “central planning” based off of expert 
knowledge was a frequent target throughout Hayek’s writing.  He located this problem within the 
Cartesian tradition, as DesCartes claimed that because civilization is deliberate, societies must 
pursue reforms to ameliorate social problems.  Despite whatever good intentions may underlie it, 
the roots of totalitarianism grow out of this “rationalist constructionism” (1967:85) that collapses 
the social sphere to the sphere of technology and centralized expertise.  He alternatively referred 
to this tradition as a “particularist utilitarianism” (1967:88) demanding that actions be judged by 
their foreseeable results, such that the details of complex society may be manipulated.  This 
helps us understand why modern organizations that adhere to Hayek’s normative philosophy 
oppose carbon markets.  It is not enough that carbon markets transcend command and control 
regulatory practice, because carbon markets still pursue a utilitarian practice meddling with the 
spontaneous order of rational actors planning activity according to their immediate needs and not 
the needs of an externally defined society.  
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 Hayek devoted a lot of attention to the relationship between economy and society.  To 
differentiate between a spontaneous economic structure and an economic structure derived by 
experts, Hayek labeled the “economy” of a farm, household, or enterprise as the “catallaxy,” a 
word derived from the Greek verb katallattein, dually meaning to exchange and to admit into a 
community or turning an enemy into a friend.  Actors within a catallaxy are not motivated by a 
hierarchy of ends defined by experts from a social distance, but possess the liberty to self-define 
their needs and meet them as they see fit.  For Hayek, the moment that state planning enters the 
realm of the catallaxy, expert knowledge begins to infringe upon individual liberty and political 
opposition becomes necessary and justified.   
 In order to build a normative political philosophy, Hayek (1948) proposed 
“individualism” as a replacement for democracy, capitalism, or socialism. With individualism, 
Hayek sought to resurrect the principles of the Scottish Enlightenment as a tradition opposing 
Cartesian rationalism that could inspire a movement to counter socialism.  Hayek insisted that 
his individualism was a social theory first and a normative philosophy second (1948: 6).  
Ontologically, individualism explains the development of human institutions through 
spontaneous growth rather than intentional design, with the market offering a key example.  
Individuals are not conceptualized as isolated, but do act with strict economic calculus during 
market interactions made advantageous by efficiency.  In pursuing their self-interests, 
individuals are not “selfish” in an egotistic sense, but able to self-define their interests while 
tending to the immediate concerns of family, friends, and neighbors.   
 A social order based on individualism was desirable for Hayek precisely because 
individuals can only ever possess partial knowledge about their social and economic context.  
This allows no privileged status for the role of the expert in shaping social order, as experts are 
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deluded by the pursuit of “total” knowledge on a subject.  Expert knowledge (whether derived 
from social scientists or natural scientists) defines best practices that require individuals to 
consider the impact of their action beyond their immediate network of relationships, and often 
imposes coercive policies that open a space for totalitarianism.  Rather than maximize the good, 
Hayek advocated the proper role of the state to be one that minimizes harm.   
 At this point, we can wrap several themes together.   Environmental regulatory culture in 
the U.S. was formerly characterized by the centralization of expert knowledge creating standards 
of business conduct universally applied across firms, while current climate policy focuses on 
utilizing market mechanisms to give more liberty to individual firms in meeting compliance 
standards.  Yet climate change skeptic organizations influenced by free market ideology attack 
these regulatory mechanisms as fiercely as any other type of proposed climate solution.  
Observing how the normative themes found in Hayek’s philosophy parallel themes found in 
literature produced by climate skeptics will help explain what type of social meaning climate 
skeptics attach to carbon markets and climate mitigation more generally.   
 
ORGANIZED CLIMATE SKEPTICISM 
Figure 2.1 visualizes some of the major organizations involved in climate change skepticism (see 
Appendix A for details of how this representation was produced).  This hyperlink map presents a 
“sociological, as opposed to epistemological” issue-network visualization of the online 
relationships between climate skeptic organizations (Whatmore 2009:591).  Larger nodes on the 
map indicate a greater volume of incoming links, while centrality indicates a wider diversity of 
incoming hyperlink sources. Outgoing and incoming arrows indicate which websites are linking 
to other websites; a bidirectional arrow indicates that the two websites are both linking to each 
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other, implying a discursive relationship. Of interest is examining unidirectional and 
bidirectional arrows connecting entities.  Many government websites, for example, only display 
incoming but not outgoing links.  Examining the bidirectional links can give insight into the 
organizations that define issues within a particular network.  Thus, this is not public debate in the 
sense of a Habermasian public sphere, but an issue-public conducted within a specific network 
(Marres and Rogers 2005).   
Looking at this hyperlinks map based off of the given starting points, six organizations 
appear to communicate the bulk of climate skeptic information online:  American Enterprise 
Institute, Cato Institute, Competitive Enterprise Institute, Foundation for Economic Education, 
The Heartland Institute, and The Heritage Foundation. This map visualizes a social structure 
present in the online world of climate skepticism centered around think tanks, a key aspect of the 
“echo chamber” distributing climate skeptic information (Dunlap and McCright 2011).  
Inspecting each of these major think tanks reveals a shared ideological affinity, as each 
organization is committed to advocating free market solutions to a host of policy issues. 
Favorable references to Hayek can be found on the websites of all six of these think tanks, 
demonstrating a shared set of norms regarding economy and society that we may characterize as 
neoliberal, libertarian, or individualist.  Several examples demonstrate the influence of Hayek’s 
writing on the perspectives found within modern libertarian think tanks:  the American 
Enterprise Institute ran a series on their website called “This week’s applied Hayek;” the 
Heritage Foundation hosted a talk on Hayek versus Keynes in explaining remedies to current 
economic crises; the president of The Heartland Institute cited Hayek as a “pioneer” of the free-
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market movement while framing his own organization as a think tank advancing the cause of 
liberty and free markets.
8
   
 Organizers intended the ICCC to carry on an intellectual tradition started by Hayek.  
When a key organizer directly likened the ICCC to the Mont Pèlerin Society, he noted that 
“we may have ended up launching an intellectual movement…it is my hope…that public 
policies that impose enormous costs on millions of people, in the United States and also 
around the world, will not be passed into law before the fake ‘consensus’ on global 
warming collapses.  Once passed, taxes and regulations are often hard to repeal.  Once 
lost, freedoms are often very difficult to retrieve.”9   
 
Individualism as the basis for social order was also on display during the inaugural keynote 
address, when speaker Vaclav Klaus implored the audience to consider the relationship between 
the individual and society, which requires them “to look at the canonically structured theoretical 
discussion about socialism (or communism) and to learn the uncompromising lesson from the 
inevitable collapse of communism 18 years ago.  It is not about climatology.  It is about 
freedom.”10   
 All of this points to a traditional participation in social debates via references to abstract 
political philosophy.  Going beyond this perspective through a pragmatist interpretation of 
climate skepticism as a public can allow us to identify other types of commitments that climate 
skeptics defend in the process of refuting scientific consensus.  Such commitments include the 
availability of particular consumer objects that would be directly affected by various types of 
climate policies.  Figure 2.2 visualizes how objects and actors can be simultaneously evaluated in 
ways consistent with normative definitions of market boundaries.  This model provides a guide 
                                                 
8
 Bast, Joseph.  2005.  “A Think Tank for the 21st Century.”  The Heartland Institute.  Accessed September 9, 2013 
at http://heartland.org/policy-documents/february-2005-think-tank-21st-century. 
9
 Environment and Climate News (2008, Issue 5) 
10
 Ibid.  
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in thinking about how competing frames of hydrocarbons reflect a competition to establish one 
convention of social action over another. 
Whether actors choose to emphasize the emissions quality of hydrocarbons or its energy 
productivity quality provides a key element differentiating competing carbon publics in the 
United States.  Actors can insert each of these objects into different orders of worth, which can in 
turn be used to justify action through compromise or isolation.  For example, actors pushing for 
carbon markets will emphasize how carbon emissions offer an operational compromise to satisfy 
the goals of both green and market conventions, in that organizations can trade carbon emission 
permits between each other in pursuit aggregate carbon emission reduction.  This market-based 
strategy of climate mitigation has won over many climate scientists, economists, environmental 
policymakers and mainstream activists.   
It is important to note, however, that carbon markets are not justified by pure market 
conventions.  Green orders of worth—justifying environmental sustainability as an end in 
itself—must be present in policy discourse in order for carbon trading to be legitimate.  By 
contrast, a “pure” market convention (one that does not compromise with other standards of 
evaluating worth) privileges the ability of consumers to dictate human-object relationships solely 
through price signals unconcerned with environmental externalities.  This is generally the 
convention found among climate skeptics, and has support from conservative and libertarian 
policymakers.  Within this order of worth, alternative energy technologies are free to compete 
with fossil fuels for market share, but the state must not affect price signals, allowing the 
evolution of deregulated energy markets to spontaneously satisfy consumer demand and 
determine appropriate action to confront climate change mitigation.  For climate skeptics, if 
competing orders of worth are allowed to mediate the relationship between humans and 
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hydrocarbons, then institutions will alter the availability of objects otherwise possible via action 
exclusively determined by market conventions.  Such compromises invite the wrong type of 
expert, replacing the wisdom of atomized, rational consumer decisions with scientific experts 
positioned atop aggregated data who make decisions that structure the options available to all 
consumers.  
Evaluating carbon-related objects in terms of their emissions content or their economic 
utility has serious consequences for governing them within broader institutional contexts.  
Specifically, neoliberals and climate skeptics understand the utilization of fossil fuels 
unrestrained by metrics of carbon emissions as foundational to economic growth and evidence of 
functioning free markets.  In a document linked through multiple climate skeptic web sites and 
published by the Cato Institute, Indur Goklany identified natural forces as a direct threat to 
human wellbeing.  Only human ingenuity, freer markets, and technologies fueled by 
hydrocarbons were able to generate enough wealth to increase the quality of life, sustain longer 
life expectancies, and provide food and clothing.  Although this “cycle of progress” did not begin 
with fossil fuels, this perspective views fossil fuels as accelerating it, “critical for the 
technologies that allowed humanity’s numbers to increase and its well-being and living standards 
to advance.  But technologies are born from ideas, and fossil fuels have helped increase the 
quantity and quality of ideas.”11  For example, combusting hydrocarbons allows standards of 
comfort (through heating and air conditioning) that allows human capital to create ideas that lead 
to other technologies and services.   
The content motivating climate skepticism can be explored through the objects of 
comfort commonly affected by new facts coming out of scientific discourse on climate change.   
                                                 
11
 Goklany, Indur M.  2012.  “Humanity Unbound: How Fossil Fuels Saved Humanity from Nature and Nature from 
Humanity.”  Cato Institute.   
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For example, references to the alteration or availability of light bulbs, automobiles, or air 
conditioning in light of climate policy can be found across all of the major climate skeptic think 
tanks.
12
  For example, we can consider how climate skeptics defend automobiles on the grounds 
of materially participating in individual freedom.  Commenting on the Obama administration’s 
fuel economy policy change requiring 35 miles per gallon for all cars and light trucks by 2016, a 
writer from the Heritage Foundation framed the politics in terms of consumer choice:  
Americans use larger vehicles for practical reasons: to take their kids to soccer practice, 
to tow their boat to the shore, or on small farms to haul equipment or produce.  At first 
glance, more miles-per-gallon may sound like a good thing, but not when it obliges 
consumers to make sacrifices elsewhere.
13
 
 
 Elsewhere, in a book review published by The Heartland Institute regarding Green Hell 
by the Competitive Enterprise Institute’s Steve Milloy, the uneasiness climate skeptics feel 
around the governance of objects according to their carbon footprints was on display:  “Make no 
mistake…living green is really about someone else micromanaging you, downsizing your 
dreams, and plugging each of us into a brand-new social order for which we never bargained.”14  
A similar sentiment was expressed in an advertisement published by The Heartland Institute for 
The Vanishing Automobile and Other Urban Myths: How Smart Growth Will Harm American 
Cities by Randal O’Toole, a self-described “anti-planner” affiliated with the Cato Institute.  The 
blurb refers to “smart growth” as aiming “to destroy the American Dream of homeownership and 
mobility.  Its advocates believe Americans should ride mass transit instead of drive cars and live 
in high-density apartments instead of low-density suburbs.”15  Status resentment was brought 
into the conversation through the critique of smart cars as automobiles that no rational consumer 
                                                 
12
 A simple way of gathering data on climate skeptic online communication regarding consumer objects could use 
the Google site filter option with a systematic search running as follows:  site:[think tank homepage] “climate 
change” [consumer object].  
13
 http://blog.heritage.org/2009/05/19/dude-where%E2%80%99s-my-truck-it%E2%80%99s-been-hijacked-by-
obama%E2%80%99s-new-emission-standards/ 
14
 Environment and Climate News (2009, Issue 10).  
15
 Environment and Climate News (2002, Issue 5).  
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would desire.  The caption in Figure 2.3 reads “Scientists are seeking the revenge they could not 
get in high school, by jamming us all into dorkmobiles.”16 
 Understanding conventions as a mediating element in human-object relationships is 
important for understanding why almost all climate skeptics are neoliberals.  If human wellbeing 
and progress is defined by standards of available consumer products—and if fossil fuels are 
understood to accelerate both the quantity and quality of available consumer products—then 
regulating hydrocarbons according to an order of worth that compromises pure market 
conventions would in turn concede the prospect of a sociopolitical order based upon 
individualism.   
 
CONCLUSION 
In the economic realm, conventions theory suggests that organizations will emphasize different 
ways of evaluating material quality as a way of protecting market entry and value chains that rest 
upon a shared set of values (Ponte and Gibbon 2006; Cidell and Alberts 2006).  This easily 
translates to the political realm, where organizations can mobilize sentiments attached to the 
material quality of objects in support of particular institutional norms.  While advocates of 
climate mitigation will point to activities associated with high-carbon footprints as human-object 
relationships to avoid, skeptics point to the same relationship as evidence of the freedom granted 
by consumer choice and the comfort afforded by carbon capitalism.  In line with the work of 
Norgaard (2006, 2011), the differential social meanings attached to carbon offer an insight into 
climate skepticism not reducible information deficits.   
Climate skeptics approach the climate policy debate as a matter of individual liberty and 
the institutional boundaries of regulating market transactions.  While neoliberal think tanks 
                                                 
16
 Environment and Climate News (2009, Issue 6).  
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devote much of the content they communicate about climate change to a refutation of the 
evidentiary basis of climate change, focusing on the types of human-object relationships made 
possible by minimally regulated markets offers another mode of skeptic communication.  A 
discussion of objects can then lead to a discussion of social and political relationships.  If 
particular energy-intensive consumer lifestyles are framed as deviant in light of scientific 
knowledge, then neoliberal think tanks can connect the issue of climate policy to the more 
general concern of market regulation, unrestrained consumer freedom, and behavioral regulation 
by the state.  Under a Hayekian framework, pro-environmental becomes anti-individual, meaning 
that in order to acknowledge climate change, libertarians would have to acknowledge “society” 
as a legitimate sphere of action.   
 In a Deweyian understanding of publics, climate skeptics are a social community reacting 
to the material consequences of regulating capitalist transactions toward the consideration of 
carbon emissions.  Recalling Shove’s critique of isolating material objects in analysis, skeptic 
objections that point toward how climate policy affects consumer choice must be understood as 
attacks on the lifestyle that a network of particular objects makes possible.  A carbon-intensive 
consumer lifestyle makes a particular type of social order possible.  Without having to consider 
the collective impacts of carbon pollution, individuals are free to rely upon energy-inefficient 
automobility, develop land “outwards” through urban sprawl rather than a dense “upwards” form 
of development, and physically segregate from socially engaging with urban centers.  Given the 
disproportionate representation of conservative white men within the climate skeptic movement, 
we may even consider whether rebuffing a language of individual sacrifice for the environment 
may offer a form of identity politics for a population sitting atop power structures in the twenty-
first century.   
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 Returning to the notion of sacrifice, applying convention frameworks to carbon as either 
a source of environmental risk or a source of productive energy used to create wealth and satisfy 
consumer wants holds significant implications for the boundary between public and private.  We 
should not forget that the consequences of climate change will place a heavier burden upon 
marginalized populations.  Given that climate skeptics represent a privileged demographic, they 
have far less to lose by being wrong than their counterparts in both the scientific and activist 
communities.  Lieberman’s analysis demonstrated how racial and class boundaries can determine 
the limits of collective sacrifice in a society.  Applying a conventions analysis of carbon offers 
the prospect for understanding class-ideological boundaries within a culture of consumerism that 
offers market solutions to environmental problems.  Setting institutional boundaries within one 
convention versus another differentiates between climate change as “our problem” and a stance 
that is skeptical toward its scientific veracity and only politically accepting of a consumer-based 
market uninvolved with public resources as a policy response.  Recognizing the social 
boundaries emerging out of conventions politics can make sense of why climate skeptics have no 
choice but to reject the scientific consensus on the consequences of climate change for collective 
society.  They must reject climate change because to accept its reality is to accept society as a 
legitimate sphere of action and reject individualism as the basis for sociopolitical order.  At stake 
with any sort of carbon regulation is whether atomized, rational individuals will be forced to 
consider the consequence of their action beyond their immediate moment in social space and 
time.  
The next chapter will delve into the sources of the ideological opposition to climate 
change science and mitigation.  With an understanding of the broad social structural contours 
determining climate skepticism distinct from environmental skepticism in general, we can 
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attempt to understand the worldviews providing justification for opposition scientific authority 
on this issue.  This will further our understanding of the political and ideological context of 
climate skepticism by seeing how scientific facts are embedded within social meanings (Jasanoff 
2010), specifically exploring ideological norms regarding state power and the individual. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
The “Climatism” Cartel:  
How Climate Skeptics Connect Climate Science with Fears of Socialism  
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Climate skepticism in the U.S. is organized through neoliberal think tanks committed to free 
markets.  These organizations consistently oppose all proposed solutions to the problem of 
climate change, framing their argument in scientific, political, economic, and moral terms.  Even 
liberal environmentalist proposals seeking to pair economic growth with environmental 
mitigation (Bernstein 2000; 2001) in the form of carbon markets—utilizing market exchanges to 
efficiently mitigate carbon emissions among major emitters—fail to win political support from 
climate skeptics.  Focusing on the normative understanding of markets embedded in content 
produced by climate skepticism, this chapter will explain why organized climate skepticism—
driven by a commitment to unregulated free markets—refuses to accept market mechanisms as 
policy responses to climate change.  
 Two arguments are made in this chapter.  First, despite their status as a politically 
conservative force, climate skeptics oppose environmental policy that relies on market 
mechanisms for carbon mitigation precisely because such mechanisms do not meet the normative 
standard of market activity held by skeptics.  Specifically, rather than recognizing varieties of 
capitalist modes of activity (neoliberal capitalism versus regulatory capitalism, e.g.), climate 
skeptics normatively differentiate between “true” and “false” markets by whether a particular 
market developed to satisfy spontaneous and decentralized consumer demand.  Skeptics frame 
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carbon markets as “false” markets imposed on business and consumers through the state’s 
capacity to artificially create a scarcity of allowed carbon emissions.  
 The second argument concerns the fear that climate skeptics associate with science and 
regulation.  Climate skepticism reflects a tension over the appropriate role for scientific 
knowledge in guiding state policy.  Organized opposition often emphasizes the “impact science” 
status of climate change science, noting that it does not produce tangible objects the way that 
other scientific traditions have, but is primarily concerned with the consequences of human 
interventions in the natural world (see Schnaiberg 1980).  As such, skeptics view climate science 
as enmeshed in politics, a process captured by Jasanoff’s notion of “co-production” where 
scientific practice is inseparable from political norms (2004).  Thus, if neoliberals organized 
against the threat of socialism during the Cold War, climate skepticism provides a case today 
where neoliberals organize their cause against a particular form of scientific knowledge used to 
justify and structure environmental and economic policy.  This does not suggest that skeptics 
view socialism as conquered; rather, the neoliberals organizing climate skepticism see a co-
production between science, state, and (in some cases) business as a contemporary manifestation 
of socialism, both in terms of valuing “society” over the individual and privileging centralized 
planning over the wisdom of entrepreneurial ambition and consumer choice.  
Framing carbon markets as “false” or policy guided by scientific knowledge as socialism 
allows think tanks to connect climate skepticism to an ideological sentiment pool concerned with 
state interventions into market activity.  Social movement organizations mobilize support by 
aligning organizations and individuals through shared interpretative frames (Snow et al 1986).  
Organizations can utilize frames in order to diagnose what the problem is and which actors share 
responsibility for its existence (Benford and Snow 2000).  In the framing contest of global 
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warming (McCright and Dunlap 2000), climate skeptics align frames that transform scientific 
expertise into a coercive entity dictating entrepreneurial and consumer decisions, turning climate 
mitigation (market-based or otherwise) into a question of individual liberty and freedom for 
ideological conservatives. 
Climate skeptic organizations make this frame transformation coherent through the 
concept of the regulatory cartel.  Regulatory cartels refer to situations where regulation does not 
reflect public interests, but rather the interests of powerful firms in an industry that exploit 
regulatory policy to restrict market entry from competitors and provide certainty for profits 
(Stigler 1971; Posner 1975).  This distorts ideal competition and creates monopoly rents that 
translate to social costs that do not benefit society more generally (in the form of unnecessarily 
high-priced consumer goods, for example).  Regulatory standards enforced by the state may 
contribute toward the creation of cartels by barring access to potential competitors unable to 
endure regulatory costs.   
Climate skeptics view scientists, regulators, and business entities as sharing mutual 
interest in creating a “climatism cartel” that unnecessarily imposes social costs on all citizens by 
increasing energy prices and distorting energy market competition.  By regulating carbon 
emissions—regardless of whether regulations utilize market mechanisms—climate skeptics 
argue that “climate alarmists” utilize bad science to justify a regime of regulations that increases 
the costs associated with fossil fuels.  They argue that carbon markets violate the norms of “true” 
markets precisely because they steer economic actors away from the energy sources dictated by 
unregulated market activity.  Modern forms of scientific authority are thus threatening to climate 
skeptics because it violates neoliberal norms about the self-regulating ability of market actors to 
adequately address the negative externalities of anthropogenic greenhouse gases that cause 
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climate change.  “Internalizing” the negative externalities associated with generating wealth 
through fossil fuel combustion creates a threatening political space for neoliberals and climate 
skeptics, where broad societal interests are privileged over the immediate interests of private 
actors 
 The next section will review concepts and trends relevant to climate regulation before 
reviewing prior research on the politicization of climate change science.   I then describe data 
collected from an archive of climate skeptic newsletters and the coding schemes that guided the 
content analysis used to explicate key themes animating climate skeptic opposition to market-
based regulatory mechanisms.  These themes include an articulation of the inherent qualities of 
free markets versus regulatory intervention, the flawed outcomes of climate policy, the morality 
of subjugating markets to regulatory oversight, and the conspiracy between key actors to create 
cartels premised upon the perpetuation of climate change alarmism. 
 
CLIMATE REGULATION 
In his study of nursing home regulations in the United States, Braithwaite (1994) showed that 
regulatory structures can privilege large firms over small, using the example that only large (and 
impersonal) nursing homes had sufficient resources to comply with various regulatory standards, 
excluding smaller care providers from market access.  Whether by design or not, this type of 
regulatory situation potentially facilitates the creation of cartels where larger firms can crowd out 
competition.  Marxian perspectives on regulation reduce state oversight of market activity as 
merely symbolic (Edelman 1964).  Capture theory (Bernstein 1955) argues that firms potentially 
hold enough influence over their public regulators to secure favorable rules, such that regulations 
serve narrow rather than collective interests.  While capture theory has been refuted by pointing 
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out instances where regulations are implemented against industry-wide opposition (Noll 1987; 
Kagan 2004), this perspective remains popular within conservative economic philosophies 
seeking to bolster arguments supporting minimal regulatory oversight over market activity.  
 The broad transition from centralized forms of regulatory oversight to decentralized 
forms of regulation that rely on market mechanisms constitutes a prominent trend within U.S. 
environmental regulatory policy.  In the context of climate mitigation, the practice of carbon 
emissions trading has gained wide adoption both internationally and in the U.S.  Replacing 
“command and control” approaches to environmental regulation that universally apply standards 
of practice across all firms within an industry, emissions trading regulation instead focuses on 
defining an industry-wide pollution target and allows for differential contributions across firms.  
Pollution emissions allowances are then distributed (either granted for free based on historical 
emissions records or auctioned to the highest bidder), allowing firms to trade among each other 
so that mitigation takes places at the site of least cost.  So, if Company A can double its 
reductions at lesser cost than Company B can make any reductions, Company B can purchase the 
emissions allowances owned by Company A, giving Company A incentive to reduce its 
emissions beyond its initial reduction target.  Although this practice dates back to the 1960s, 
many recognize the mitigation of acid rain through sulfur dioxide emissions trading during the 
1990s as a major success for environmental regulatory markets.  
 Commenting on the ascendency of emissions trading within policy circles as a popular 
means to approach sustainability goals, Baldwin (2008) referred to emissions trading as 
“regulation lite,” meaning cost-effective regulation that does not severely draw the ire of 
powerful industry interests.  Baldwin identified several characteristics of emissions trading that 
make the practice attractive to multiple actors involved in regulatory formation, including its 
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ability to offer cost-effective mitigation options for individual firms, its flexibility of operational 
design, its predictability of mitigation outcomes (through the imposition of a cap on total allowed 
emissions), control over the distribution of allowances, ability to stimulate technological 
innovation, coordinate pollution mitigation efforts across political borders (by attaching price 
signals to emissions), and the political advantage of allowing policymakers to grandfather 
entrenched polluters into the system.  
 While labeling liberal environmental policy as socialism may seem farfetched, carbon 
trading as a regulatory regime may fit some of the characteristics of what Braithwaite (2008) 
characterized as regulatory capitalism.  This perspective recognizes re-regulation rather than de-
regulation, where markets still require state resources to ensure stable transactions.  Braithwaite 
identified a paradox in that regulation both creates wealth and confronts the risk engendered by 
wealth creation.  This means that nations around the world are unable to simply “deregulate,” as 
ensuring market stability through standards of acceptable behavior is essential for both economic 
growth and political stability.   
Of course, regulatory standards are not neutral entities.  Busch (2000) argued that 
standards are not simply mechanisms that help coordinate action in market settings, but 
normative reflections of how humans and objects should interact in the modern world.  Popular 
(and academic) inattention to standards shadows the fact that standards serve as conduits of 
expert knowledge and action.  When experts define standards of behavioral interaction between 
humans and objects, they create a moral economy signifying what is good and what is bad.  
Understanding the disciplinary nature of regulatory standards is crucial in understanding the 
intensity of climate skeptic opposition to what may seem to outsiders like modest proposals for 
regulating the drivers of anthropogenic climate change. 
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CLIMATE SCIENCE AND POLITICS 
Many social scientists have studied the organization of climate skepticism.  Documenting key 
figures within climate skepticism, Lahsen (2008) argued that the most prominent physicists 
legitimating the backlash position held the ultimate aim of advancing anti-environmentalism 
(defined as organized efforts to advance capital accumulation and managing discontents 
regarding industrial production and mass consumption; see Austin 2002) through the promotion 
of their political understanding of modernity.  Many prominent skeptics are physicists, a 
“productive” discipline of high status within the natural sciences during the Cold War, while 
climate scientists tend to come from “impact” training.  Schnaiberg (1980) distinguished between 
“productive” and “impact” science traditions.  The former refers to the application of scientific 
knowledge to produce tangible commodities, while the latter applies scientific knowledge to 
understand the consequences of technological applications (and consequently relies on 
institutional financial support).   
Although theories of climate change date back centuries (Fleming 1998), more recent 
consensus among scientists identifying anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions as the cause of 
climate change likely prompted the organization of a skeptic countermovement, as advocates of 
mitigation started achieving policy goals (Zald and Useem 1987).  Early research on climate 
skepticism as a countermovement identified its connection with conservative ideological agendas 
(McCright and Dunlap 2000), verified by much subsequent research (Dunlap and McCright 
2011; Dunlap and Jacques 2013; Elsasser and Dunlap 2013; Jacques, Dunlap and Freeman 2008; 
McCright and Dunlap 2003, 2010; Oreskes and Conway 2010).   
Neoliberal think tanks promoting free market solutions to social and economic problems 
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originally organized the message of climate skepticism with financial backing from the fossil 
fuel industry and conservative foundations, although direct involvement from the fossil fuel 
industry has waned in recent years (Dunlap and McCright 2011).  This alliance has formed an 
“echo chamber” made up by conservative media, politicians, and websites, strategizing to 
produce uncertainty and doubt in public discourse.  For the purposes of this chapter, it is 
important to note that conservative foundations and think tanks are motivated to participate in 
climate skepticism out of ideological commitment, not financial incentive (as would be the case 
with certain actors in the fossil fuel industry).   
Oreskes and Conway (2010) documented the small network of contrarian scientists 
providing counterclaims to the mainstream evidentiary basis for recognizing anthropogenic 
climate change.  They demonstrated that many prominent climate skeptics were also major 
figures disputing past environmental and health controversies, such as the link between tobacco 
smoking and cancer or sulfur dioxide emissions and acid rain.  Tactically, they often 
overemphasize degrees of uncertainty to eschew the best scientific explanation for the case at 
hand (Oreskes 2007; Wynne 2010).  One of the key insights provided by Oreskes and Conway 
(2010) concerned how climate skeptics mobilize support for their arguments.  Dubbing it the 
“tobacco strategy,” Oreskes and Conway argued that skeptics obfuscate scientific knowledge in 
public discourse as a means of obstructing the regulation of harmful entities.   
 Yet opposition to environmental regulation does not always emanate directly from the 
economic interests of industry.  For example, the interests of local labor communities and 
industry have overlapped to oppose preservationist policies regarding timberlands (Switzer 
1997).  Schnaiberg (1980) argued that labor and capitalists have a mutual interest in exploiting 
natural resources, perpetuating a “treadmill of production.”  Extractive commodities theory 
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argued that rural economies rely more heavily upon extractive industries (agriculture, mining, 
forestry, etc.), engendering more utilitarian relationships with the natural environment among 
rural residents that may diminish environmental concern more generally (Tremblay and Dunlap 
1978).  Other research on conservative antagonism to environmentalism has attributed opposition 
to either social group position within industrial capitalism, or a commitment to traditional values 
subjugating nature to human exploitation (Dunlap and Van Liere 1984; Brulle 2000).   
Looking at the modern development of climate change skepticism, McCright and Dunlap 
(2000) demonstrated that 1996-97 were key chronological turning points in the history of 
conservative opposition to climate change (predominately referred to as global warming at the 
time).  More opposition think tank publications were produced in 1996 alone than the cumulative 
total of 1990-1995, and the output in 1997 was over five times that of 1996.  Within the lexicon 
of counterclaims, three dominant themes were identified:  challenges to the evidence of global 
warming, that global warming produces net benefits, and that mitigation policies create more 
harm than good.   
McCright and Dunlap (2003) extended their analysis of the conservative climate change 
countermovement by responding to Freudenburg’s (2000: 106) call for analyzing the “social 
construction of non-problematicity,” or the attempt to re-define global warming as a non-
problem.  As their earlier work focused on the “what” of counter-claims, McCright and Dunlap 
(2003) approached the “how” of counter-claims in terms of conservative movement actors taking 
advantage of political opportunity structures afforded by the 1994 “Republican Revolution” in 
Congress.  This led to an extensive analysis of Congressional witness testimonies from 1990-
1997 (the year the Senate unanimously opposed joining the UN Kyoto treaty to commit to 
emissions reductions throughout industrialized economies) and produced notable changes in 
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composition.  Prior to the Republican takeover, a much larger percentage of testimonies came 
from “conventional scientists” (such as James E. Hansen or the late Stephen Schneider, both 
prominent climate scientists) whereas “climate change skeptics” achieved parity after 1994, both 
in terms of Congressional testimonies and citations in mainstream newspaper articles.   
In more recent research, McCright and Dunlap (2010) analyzed the climate skeptic 
movement in terms of its “anti-reflexivity,” characterized by skeptic attacks on two key domains 
of reflexive modernization—the gains of the environmental movement and the knowledge 
produced by impact science.  They claim that anti-reflexive forces operate within the second 
dimension of power (Lukes 1974), where decision-making is contained within issues that do not 
challenge subjective interests, a common focal point for scholarship on anti-environmentalism.  
McCright and Dunlap (2010) identified four key tactics used by climate skeptics:  the 
misrepresentation of scientific evidence, the intimidation of individual scientists, procedural 
tricks within the political system, and an exploitation of the media (such as “balancing norms” in 
reporting).   
Looking at public controversies over scientific evidence necessarily draws our attention 
to the values that mediate scientific knowledge and policy.  Carolan (2008) noted that 
controversies over climate change go far beyond disputing scientific consensus, encompassing 
social, political, and economic concerns.  Erroneous predictions by seismologists do not draw 
political ire because they have few if any social, political, or economic influence, but theories of 
anthropogenic climate change points directly at the meeting of nature, markets, and politics by 
asking us to reconsider energy extraction, residential patterns, transportation, and quotidian 
consumption.  Resolution to these types of disputes necessarily involves an open discussion of 
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the values contained in the production of scientific knowledge, leading into discussions of what 
role science should play in guiding political courses of action. 
Given the politicized nature of representing climate change and challenging regulatory 
solutions, Jasanoff’s (2004) co-production perspective can contextualize climate skeptic 
opposition to regulating carbon emissions through market mechanisms.  The idiom of co-
production refers to how “we gain explanatory power by thinking of natural and social orders as 
being produced together,” such that the way we “represent the world (both nature and society) 
are inseparable from the ways in which we choose to live in it” (2004:2).  Even if carbon trading 
is a far more “market-friendly” regulatory approach compared with command-and-control, 
affirming scientific claims about anthropogenic climate change upsets the modern notion of 
human place in nature by forcing a reflexive examination of how we collectively satisfy needs 
and desires in a globalizing world with finite resources and carrying capacity.  In order to 
understand climate skeptics, we must illustrate how they direct attention to ideological values by 
contextualizing scientific facts within social meaning (Jasanoff 2010).  Climate skeptics 
associate modes of regulatory capitalism with reliance upon standards justified by scientific 
knowledge, turning scientific questions into political and moral questions.  
 
DATA AND CODING 
During the spring of 2010, I attended the fourth meeting of the International Conference on 
Climate Change (ICCC), an event organized by The Heartland Institute that brings climate 
skeptics from around the world together to discuss the science, economics, and politics of 
climate change.  Representatives from many prominent climate skeptic organizations spoke at 
this conference, as well as a handful of Republican elected officials and political candidates.  At 
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this conference I was introduced to Environment and Climate News (ECN), a newsletter 
published ten times a year by The Heartland Institute “devoted to sound science and free-market 
environmentalism.”  According to internal estimates, copies of ECN are distributed to all elected 
officials at the national and state level, as well as most locally elected officials, in addition to the 
approximately 20,000 lay readers.   
 An archive of ECN issues was collected from 2002 to 2012.  The ECN archive provides 
an attractive collection to analyze because voices from nearly all of the major climate skeptic 
organizations are represented within its pages.  Each issue contained approximately 20 articles, 
and a total of 2,045 unique articles were reviewed.  During the spring of 2013, each of these 
2,045 articles was initially filtered according to whether or not they specifically dealt with the 
issue of climate change.  This yielded 590 articles discussing climate change (either its scientific 
basis, climate policy, or social or economic action intending to affect climate change).  A 
modified coding scheme based on previous content analysis of climate skeptic materials guided 
the next stage of coding, allowing me to assess ECN climate change themes in relation to 
research on the broader climate skeptic epistemic community.  This coding scheme was based on 
the coding used by McCright and Dunlap (2000) who identified three broad themes of claims 
countering climate science and policy:  (1) the evidentiary basis of global warming is weak or 
wrong; (2) global warming would be beneficial if it were occurring; (3) global warming policies 
would do more harm than good.  
A total of 198 articles concerned the economic consequence of climate change policies.  
A second round of coding was then conducted for these 198 articles in order to assess important 
subthemes animating the economic opposition to climate change.  Following a strategy of 
inductive analysis used in prior research (Babbie 2013; McCright and Dunlap 2000), an initial 
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coding scheme was derived during this phase of research based upon 40 randomly selected 
articles (20% of the climate-economic articles). Consistent themes emerged around market 
process characteristics, adverse policy outcomes, moral concerns over climate mitigation, and the 
network of actors involved in implementing action on climate mitigation. This coding scheme 
did not require modification when applied to the full sample.  Each article was coded according 
to whether or not it discussed one of these four themes, giving a proportional sense of how 
climate skeptics paid attention to each of these while discussing the economics of climate change 
policy and action.  Articles that spoke directly to more than one theme were coded in multiple 
categories.  Outlining the specific counter-claims that skeptics make against climate change 
policy can help researchers understand how skeptics frame climate science as a coercive entity 
used to infringe upon individual liberty in making economic decisions.  This provides a depth of 
analysis previously not applied to climate skeptic materials, and lends insight into the ideological 
mobilization of climate skeptic movements.  
 
RESULTS 
Figure 3.1 shows the yearly frequency of articles concerning climate change contained within the 
ECN archive.  Two trends stand out.  First, environmental skeptics were paying a relatively 
constant amount of attention to climate change from 2002 – 2006 with about 40-50 article per 
year dedicated to the topic.  A huge break occurred in 2007 as the number of articles devoted to 
climate change doubled.  Al Gore’s An Inconvenient Truth documentary was released the 
previous year and created a popular conversation around the topic of climate change.  The British 
government also financed the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, which 
concluded that an immediate implementation of climate mitigation policy will save money 
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versus the cost of inaction on confronting climate change.  In 2007, the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) released its Fourth Assessment Report, unequivocally declaring the 
anthropogenic sources of climate change.  Therefore it is no surprise that during this intersection 
of popular, academic, and policy attention to the mitigation of anthropogenic climate change that 
market fundamentalists increased their attention to climate skepticism relative to other 
environmental issues.  Attention to climate change within ECN remained heightened through 
2010, but declined in 2011 and 2012.   
  The broad themes characterizing the climate skeptic articles are presented in Table 3.1, 
modified from a coding scheme developed by McCright and Dunlap (2000).  Comparing these 
results with their research on the themes contained in literature produced by climate skeptics in 
the 1990s, the ECN archive produced a relatively comparable representation of themes in their 
discussion of climate change.  About three-fourths of articles challenged the evidentiary basis of 
climate change, clearly showing the importance of attacking scientific knowledge in mobilizing 
opposition to climate change policy.  About 40% of articles challenged climate change policy 
directly, with a third focusing on economic consequences.  This is a smaller proportion of 
economic and policy themes than observed in the majority of materials analyzed by McCright 
and Dunlap, but still constitutes a significant amount of dedicated attention.   
The articles containing themes regarding the economic consequence of climate change 
policy provide the main focus of this analysis.  An analysis of the themes present in the 198 
articles concerning the economic consequences of climate change policy is displayed in Table 
3.2.  Four themes were identified:  market qualities, policy outcomes, the morality of markets 
and regulation, and regulatory cartels.  Market qualities and policy outcomes commanded greater 
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overall attention than did the focus on regulatory cartels or moral critiques, although both of 
these were also consistently present.   
Trends in the attention paid to these themes over time are presented in Figure 3.2.  The 
proportional balance between themes changed from year to year.  Spikes in the theme of specific 
policy outcomes corresponded with increases in the overall frequency of articles dedicated to the 
economic consequences of climate change policy more generally, suggesting that increased 
attention to policy outcomes drove variation in overall attention to climate change among 
environmental skeptics.  Influxes of proportional attention given to regulatory cartels occurred 
when overall attention to climate change policy decreased; the theme of regulatory cartels 
received constant attention in absolute terms, but was overshadowed by policy outcomes or 
market qualities at various points in time.  The following sections will review each of these 
themes and provide illustrative quotes. 
 
Market Qualities 
Exploring the content of each of these codes illustrates the economic norms and fears that shape 
the climate skeptic discourse around mitigation policy.  The “market qualities” code was 
assigned to articles that discussed the inherent qualities of minimally regulated market activity.  
Climate skeptics conceptualized “pure” markets as an inherently efficient means of managing 
economic transactions.  This efficiency derived from the fact that in optimal settings, market 
transactions reflect voluntary decisions made by a decentralized set of rational actors making 
free choices.  Given the inherent efficiency of markets, skeptics argue that regulatory policy is 
counterproductive to the goal of climate change mitigation.  John Castellani, president of the 
Business Roundtable, argued that “CEOs will apply their best management thinking to make 
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American companies among the most greenhouse-gas efficient in the world,” proving that 
“voluntary actions can deliver continued economic growth, minimize the risks of climate change, 
and foster innovation and investment in new technologies—without costly government mandates 
and rigid compliance timetables” (ECN 2003, Issue 4).   
This type of thinking reflected a common theme running throughout the articles 
characterized by the market qualities code – that even if climate change were resulting from 
anthropogenic action, entrepreneurs and corporate managers (not bureaucratic regulators) 
possess the best insight into meeting the challenge of confronting environmental problems while 
maintaining economic growth.  Hence, “the solution to the climate issue is technology, not 
energy rationing” (ECN 2008, Issue 5).  Commenting on a U.S. Energy Information 
Administration report showing larger reductions in the carbon intensity of economic activity 
within the U.S. compared to the European Union, Jay Lehr of The Heartland Institute argued that 
the report “shows once again that free markets are the best means of providing environmental 
stewardship in a manner that does not impoverish people” (ECN 2012, Issue 3).   
Since skeptics conceive of unregulated markets as a realm coordinating decentralized 
decisions to deliver efficient results, they view markets as a filtering mechanism that identifies 
the actors best capable to assess balances between economic growth and environmental impact.  
Joel Schwartz of the American Enterprise Institute decried the conclusion of California Governor 
Arnold Schwarzenegger’s Climate Action Team that American entrepreneurs and venture 
capitalists are missing an opportunity to earn money in emerging alternative energy markets, 
framing climate activists as  
 
Claiming to know better than businesses and investors how they should spend their 
money.  The activists even have university scientists with sophisticated computer models 
of California’s economy to “prove” it.  And they’re going to get the government to make 
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sure the rest of us start acting in our own self-interest, whether we like it or not. (ECN 
2006, Issue 8) 
 
Reacting to government subsidies for alternative energy industries, Jerry Taylor of the Cato 
Institute argued that  
 
The federal government is in no position to intelligently dictate capital flows in energy 
markets. This exercise of “picking winners” has never before yielded anything positive 
and probably never will…If [alternative energy companies] are not economically viable 
on their own merits, then no amount of subsidy or mandate will make the investment 
worthwhile from an economic perspective.  (ECN 2009, Issue 4; emphasis added) 
 
These quotes reflect the hubris that climate skeptics attribute to activists and bureaucrats 
attempting to impose regulatory policy on market actors.  Taylor framed the efforts of Senator 
John McCain’s to address carbon emissions through automobile standards as presuming “to 
know exactly how we can most efficiently reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  Market actors, 
however, are in a better position to sort out alternative emission control plans than a politician” 
(ECN 2007, Issue 3).  Through their qualification of markets, climate skeptics identify the 
appropriate agents to oversee economic productivity, which is prioritized above environmental 
concern but also offered as normative guidance for approaching environmental problems more 
generally. 
Putting all of these qualities together, climate skeptics elevate unregulated markets to an 
almost mystical level impervious to long-term failure.  By definition, they view markets as self-
correcting.  What others frame as failures of capitalism to deliver collective goods, skeptics 
identify as regulatory distortion.  In environmental terms, perhaps the biggest market failure in 
recent American history was the BP-Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.  James Taylor of 
The Heartland Institute uncritically reported the views of ExxonMobil and Chevron executives 
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that “the Gulf of Mexico oil spill would not have happened if BP had followed established 
industry safety procedures,” and that the incident represented ‘a dramatic departure from the 
industry norm for deepwater drilling procedures” (ECN 2010, Issue 5).  Insisting that an 
environmental tragedy like the BP oil spill is not an example of market failure was reiterated by 
several speakers at the 2010 ICCC (which took place within weeks of the oil rig explosion).  
They rationalized that regulatory intervention into offshore drilling would unnecessarily make 
energy extraction more costly but fail to prevent future environmental problems.  Moreover, free 
markets will self-correct by giving consumers the free choice to boycott BP products, rewarding 
more responsible oil companies.  In fact, climate skeptics attribute indirect causality of the oil 
spill to regulatory intervention itself, because oil companies were forced into offshore drilling 
due to restrictions placed on proven oil reserves on interior lands such as the Arctic National 
Wildlife Refuge. 
The normative construction of market activity by climate skeptics gives insight into why 
they reject market-based regulatory mechanisms.  For them, policies such as carbon emissions 
trading that utilize market mechanisms are only markets in a semantic sense.  Substantively, they 
are “fake” markets, because they do not conform to key characteristics of “true” markets.  
Carbon emissions trading markets center around a contrived product whose value derives from a 
state-imposed cap on total allowed emissions, handing out “massive taxpayer dollars to 
companies that comply in reducing CO2 emissions, and allows companies to trade their suddenly 
valuable CO2 permits” (ECN 2002, Issue 4).  Both international carbon trading markets in 
Europe and regional markets in the US were explicitly characterized as “fake markets” at various 
points in time by contributors to ECN.  Commenting on the carbon price volatility associated 
with the European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), Iain Murray of the Competitive Enterprise 
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Institute insisted that “the ETS is most emphatically not an example of market failure.  The 
uncertainties have all been results of government action” (ECN 2006, Issue 6).  Thus, markets 
created not through spontaneous demand for products that meet practical consumer needs, but 
through centralized bureaucratic planning are essentialized as “fake” and prone to failure.  
Government failures—not market failures—loom as the prime danger associated with climate 
change in the mind of skeptics. 
 
Policy Outcomes 
Articles coded with the theme of policy outcomes addressed specific consequences or estimated 
calculations of climate policy results in terms of job losses and costs imposed on families and 
consumers.  Skeptics paid attention to estimated costs of various climate mitigation policies as a 
means of expressing opposition across several years.  In 2002, ECN writers reported that 
participation in the Kyoto Protocol would have cost the American economy between $125 and 
$300 billion annually (Issue 3).  Many of these articles translated climate policy cost in terms of 
consumer expenditures.  For example, a 2004 estimate of the Climate Stewardship Act proposed 
by Senators McCain and Lieberman framed it as more expensive than the Iraq War and would 
cause gasoline prices to rise between 9 and 19 percent by 2010 to 2025 (ECN 2004, Issue 6).  A 
Heartland Institute study concluded that the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (a carbon cap-
and-trade regulatory regime covering states in the American northeast) would cost households 
between $4,500 and $6,300 annually (ECN 2006, Issue 2).  Senator James Inhofe opposed the 
Sanders-Boxer and McCain-Lieberman climate mitigation bills on the basis that they would 
create equivalent tax burdens of $4,500 and $3,500 on families of four, respectively (ECN 2007, 
Issue 6).   
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 Not only would pursuing climate mitigation impose costs onto American taxpayers and 
consumers, but it would result in economic insecurity.  In a separate ECN issue, the same 
McCain-Lieberman Climate Stewardship Act was estimated to result in 39,000 job losses by 
2010 and 190,000 job losses by 2020 (ECN 2004, Issue 7), while Kenneth Green of the 
American Enterprise Institute warned that President Obama’s cap-and-trade regulatory scheme 
would eliminate “83,000 mining related jobs, 60,000 coal-energy power plant jobs, 31,000 coal 
transportation jobs,” and tens of thousands of other jobs related to coal (ECN 2009, Issue 1).  
Margo Thorning of the American Council for Capital Formation warned that carbon emission 
caps in California would result in “higher energy costs, millions of dollars in lost business 
production, and widespread job losses” (ECN 2006, Issue 7).  These types of viewpoints in the 
ECN archive consistently framed environmental regulation as presenting an either/or decision 
regarding economic growth and security, where environmental mandates can only be met at the 
cost of economic benefits.   
 
Morality of Markets and Regulation 
A key justification of rejecting market-based regulation concerns the morality of intervening in 
market transactions.  Although skeptics devote more attention to the inherent qualities of markets 
and policy outcomes than to other economic aspects, moral concern over regulatory action was 
consistently invoked throughout the ten years of ECN articles.  Looking at these moral concerns 
reinforces why climate skeptics rationalize minimal regulation as beneficial to collective 
populations despite any observable inequality within contexts of capitalist economies.  Skeptics 
argue that both environmental and human welfare benefit from “more markets” and “less 
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regulation,” leading them to question the morality of regulating economic activity toward 
environmental ends.  
 Commitment to deregulated free markets requires the belief that aggregated decisions 
made by decentralized rational consumers provide superior guidance than centralized expert 
opinion.  This belief in free markets calls into question the morality of restricting consumer 
choice.  For example, restricting the ability of car dealers to set appropriate prices because of 
mandates for low-carbon emission automobiles forces some consumers to subsidize others, 
imposing additional costs on consumers who cannot afford gasoline-efficient or electric vehicles.  
Policy initiatives such as California’s attempt to regulate the climate impact of automobiles not 
only restricts consumer rights to choose between products, but coerces them into assuming added 
risk as manufacturers comply with regulatory standards by reducing car size, resulting in 
thousands of additional deaths on the road (ECN 2005, Issue 6).   Myron Ebell of the 
Competitive Enterprise Institute recollected how “Americans suffered through WWII with 
rationing coupons for food and fuel,” warning that “if [former Vice President Al] Gore has his 
way, rationing coupons will soon be back” to address concern over climate change (ECN 2007, 
Issue 4).  Reacting to policy proposals in the United Kingdom, Donn Dears (a retired General 
Electric executive) speculated that the environmental policy goals of Senators Barack Obama, 
Hillary Clinton, and John McCain would necessitate something like “personal carbon 
allowances, where everyone is given a fixed amount of carbon to use each year” (ECN 2008, 
Issue 6).   
 Invoking something like a “carbon rationing coupon” or “personal carbon allowances” 
allows skeptics to argue that regulatory solutions will only impose unnecessary sacrifice.  
Moreover, the burdens of this “carbon sacrifice” will be unevenly distributed.  For example, the 
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costs of meeting a cap on CO2 emissions “would be regressive in that poorer household would 
bear a larger burden relative to their income than wealthier households would,” (ECN 2007, 
Issue 6).  Todd Wynn of the American Legislative Exchange Council reiterated this point when 
he noted that American households that earn less than $50,000 spend much larger portions of 
their budget on food, health care, and energy, such that imposing additional costs through carbon 
regulation would particularly harm their wellbeing (ECN 2012, Issue 8).  Deneen Borelli of the 
National Center for Public Policy Research argued that “since minorities are disproportionately 
represented among the poor households, these global warming regulations are racist because they 
will harm poor blacks, Hispanics, and other minorities the most” (ECN 2008, Issue 6).  More 
generally, Steve Lonegan of Americans for Prosperity (and former Republican Senate candidate 
in New Jersey) referred to carbon trading as an  
 
 immoral scam that will make the mortgage backed derivatives scheme look like child’s 
 play…[cap-and-trade regulation] is a regressive, stealth tax on electricity that destroys 
 jobs, does nothing whatsoever to address so-called global climate change, and is being 
 exploited by insiders and speculators who see the potential to make massive profits on the 
 backs of ratepayers. (ECN 2011, Issue 7) 
 
 
 Comments on the unequal burdens borne from carbon regulation also extended to the 
international scale.  Either through ignorance of how corporations operate in the developing 
world or following the conviction of an anti-human environmental ideology, Steven Milloy of 
the Cato Institute insisted that “environmental activists seem to be doing their best to make sure 
poor countries stay poor” when they support international regulations on carbon emissions or 
campaign against western business interests in the developing world (ECN 2005, Issue 1).  
Unsurprisingly, skeptics offer free market solutions to balance environmental management and 
economic development around the world.  Presenting an either/or dilemma, Robert Bradley of 
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the Institute for Energy Research accused environmental regulators of ignoring the material 
needs of the “1.5 billion people who do not have access to modern forms of energy. The solution 
for them is market capitalism and fossil fuel abundance, not environmental socialism, windmills, 
solar panels, and ‘negawatts.’” (ECN 2007, Issue 8)   
 
Regulatory Cartels 
Skeptic tie all of their opposition to carbon regulation together with a common understanding 
that regulators are using climate science knowledge to justify standards that will benefit energy 
giants and harm consumers and the national economy more generally.  Responding to the failure 
of the EU emissions trading scheme to yield substantial carbon mitigation results, Iain Murray of 
the Competitive Enterprise Institute argued that European policymakers essentially “legalized a 
cartel” that gave windfall profits to the utilities industry (ECN 2007, Issue 5).  One tactic 
frequently deployed by writers in ECN is to reflexively frame problems that some may 
characterize as market failures or an “excess of capitalism” into a problem of regulatory cartels.  
Skeptics identify the source of market failures in the political alliances between regulators and 
dominant firms, whose solutions are found in opening access to markets to smaller organizations 
by lessening regulatory burdens to which only big firms can afford to comply.  As such, these are 
not market failures, but government failures because state authority is exploited by companies to 
gain uncompetitive advantages that only increased market entry and freedom of economic 
practice could correct.  For example, both Enron and BP were identified as companies supportive 
of carbon trading because they knew they could exploit regulatory standards to increase market 
share over companies ill prepared to immediately take advantage of alternative energy markets.  
Skeptics accused several other major companies of colluding with climate scientists and activists 
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as a means of furthering their interests, including Ford Motor Company, Toyota, Duke Energy, 
Alcoa, General Electric, Dupont, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Deutsche Bank, and several 
others.  
 Although the theme of regulatory cartels does not always receive the greatest amount of 
direct attention on an annual basis, it was consistently present in literature produced by climate 
skeptics.  Perhaps more than any other theme, concern over regulatory cartels represents the 
climate skeptic concern over the co-production of climate science and climate policy.  In order to 
understand how this all fits together, skeptics refer to insidious interests of actors involved in 
“climatism” or “climate alarmism.”  These terms refer to the perception found in climate skeptic 
literature of the constellation of actors promoting the veracity of climate science knowledge in 
order to secure selfish interests.   
 What makes climate alarmism unique as a regulatory cartel is the variety of actors 
involved.  Usually, critiques of regulatory cartels focus on powerful firms within an industry.  
Skeptics argue that the climate cartel goes beyond big business, extending to scientists, activists, 
and bureaucrats as well.  An outline of the actors and interests constituting climate alarmism as 
perceived by climate skeptics is presented in Table 3.3.  The perceptions outlined in this table 
underline the importance for skeptics to attack the evidentiary basis of climate change.  The 
knowledge produced by climate change experts justifies action taken by other parties that 
threatens the operation of free markets.  Select energy and financial firms want to exploit 
concern over climate change in order to secure their existing investments in alternative energy—
which can only be profitable in competition with conventional fossil fuels if regulation imposes 
scarcity by limiting carbon emissions.  Unproductive bureaucrats must have problems in need of 
regulatory oversight in order to justify their organizational existence and expansion.  Likewise, 
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professional activists must justify the purpose of their organization and drive membership 
through fear of climate change consequences.   
 Of course, in this view, climate scientists themselves have material interest in creating a 
body of knowledge articulating the impact of human action on the global environment.  While 
“productive” scientists may have enjoyed dominant status positions in the past, ascendant 
“impact” scientists—whose knowledge does not lead directly to commodifiable products or 
services—must depend upon public funding to carry out their research.  Skeptics frame this type 
of knowledge as deviant precisely because it does not conform to their normative understanding 
of market incentives.   
 Climate skeptics criticize professional climate science in similar fashion as criticizing 
corrupt public administration, pointing out perverse incentive structures that encourage climate 
scientists to falsely report their findings.  For example, Pat Michaels of the Cato Institute 
complained that “so long as governments hand out billions of dollars each year for climate 
research, there is no incentive to report the truth” (ECN 2005, Issue 4).  In a book review of 
author Steve Goreham’s Climatism—which characterized climate science models as “garbage in, 
garbage out”—Jay Lehr of The Heartland Institute noted that  
 
Climatism is big business.  It financially supports modeling scientists and their 
multimillion-dollar supercomputers, environmental editors at newspapers, entire 
university departments, environmental vice presidents at thousands of companies, and 
huge government bureaucracies of climate regulators, enforcers, and consultants. (ECN 
2010, Issue 3) 
 
If scientists hope to advance within the academic incentive structure, they must conform to 
disciplinary norms.  For skeptics, this means that individual scientists must violate a dedication 
to truth in order to justify claims of anthropogenic climate change.  Skeptics do not trust the 
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scientific consensus because it operates within a culture of “publication bias” caused by “heavy 
government funding of the search for one result, but little or no funding for other results” (ECN 
2012, Issue 6).   
Climatism refers to a network of actors, each of whom have a structural interest in 
perpetuating perceived realities of climate change in order to secure material benefits.  It all 
starts with climate scientists whose intellectual practice has little to no value in private market 
transactions, and only serves to impose unnecessary social costs on economic activity through 
regulatory standards that result in less efficiency and undesirable outcomes.  In short, skeptics 
accuse climate scientists of creating a problem where there is not one, whose remedy can only be 
found in the professional network of climate scientists.  Powerful members of this community 
coerce all other scientists to confirm results that derive not from an unbiased search for truth, but 
a commitment to controlling human-environment interactions and free market institutions.  The 
alarmist character of this knowledge then allows other actors—bureaucrats looking to expand 
their budgets and power, activists seeking larger organizations, and business leaders hoping to 
monopolize new markets—to coordinate action toward mutually beneficial ends.  According to 
the climate skeptic worldview, this network of actors constructs climatism by producing unsound 
scientific knowledge identifying market failures on the basis of environmental impact.  Activists 
amplify this alarm to create public concern.  Bureaucrats exploit this knowledge and concern to 
justify new forms of market regulation, and big businesses seek to manipulate regulations to both 
prevent competitors from market entry and create new sources of value for their investments in 
alternative energy. 
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CONCLUSION 
Climate skeptics are not necessarily poorly educated or scientifically illiterate.  Instead, climate 
skeptics possess neoliberal commitments to free markets that lead them to view professional 
climate science as operating under perverse incentive structures.  Such incentives encourage 
action that deviate from the expectations of market-defined utility.  Skeptics construct a narrative 
where scientific knowledge, policy mandates, and big business investments co-produce a world 
that violates the norms of minimal regulation and infringes upon the consumer’s right to base 
decisions upon immediate and self-defined needs.  Thus, to accept the reality of climate change 
is to validate the insertion of collective concerns into rational decision making processes, leading 
consumers to not act in their self-interest and businesses to not serve the interests of their clients, 
communities, or stockholders.   
In the context of climate policy, skeptics argue that allowing decentralized consumer 
decisions to dictate how a society addresses collective problems yields an efficiency that is lost 
when collective problems are instead addressed through expert opinion.  Coercive carbon 
regulation in turn creates opportunity for waste—regardless of whether regulatory standards 
utilize market mechanisms—precisely because standards of action determined by expert opinion 
perverts the inherent efficiency of unregulated market transactions.  In a radical commitment to 
the neoliberal worldview, rational entrepreneurs and consumers must select goods and services 
with the lowest price signals dictated by free markets.  The climate scientist threatens this 
process by insisting that decisions incorporate a non-productive entity (carbon emissions) into 
price signals.  Thus, climate skeptics must attack the scientific basis of climate change in order to 
protect free individuals from the coercive power of the state to intervene in market activity under 
the guise of societal interest. 
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 This chapter explored an eleven-year climate skeptic newsletter archive that included a 
wide range of voices from the skeptic community.  Applying previously used coding schemes 
demonstrated that the ECN archive contained a proportional set of themes (attacking the 
evidence of climate change, questioning the outcomes of climate change, and opposing climate 
change policy) generalizable to prior research on climate skeptic publications.  As popular (An 
Inconvenient Truth documentary), scientific (the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report and the Stern 
Review), and policy (various climate mitigation bills) attention to climate change grew, so did 
the share of attention devoted to climate change within the broader context of environmental 
skepticism.  As the prospect for substantial policy change has subsided in recent years (and in the 
absence of a major IPCC report release), so too has the amount of attention environmental 
skeptics have devoted to climate change within the ECN newsletters.  As such, we should expect 
a resurgence of attention paid to climate change within the “free market environmentalist” 
literature as the IPCC prepares to release its next major report. 
 Focusing additional attention to the economic-ideological opposition to climate change 
provides a more in-depth understanding of what animates climate skepticism.  Here we can see 
how skeptics challenge policy by calling upon particular norms.  They devoted substantial 
attention to articulating the inherent qualities of unfettered markets as efficient mechanisms of 
coordination meeting the spontaneous demands of human desire.  Skeptics motivate their 
audience to oppose climate policy by providing a vision of society where businesses are 
restrained only by the court of consumer decisions and where environmental resources are 
defined within the nexus of human desires.  Only in such a market society, free from the shackles 
of regulatory oversight and protected from government failures, could the spontaneous decisions 
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of private actors prioritize economic and environmental concerns while maintaining individual 
liberty. 
Climate skepticism does not narrowly apply to specific claims regarding the veracity of 
anthropogenic climate change, but also toward a structure of expertise not beholden to market 
incentive structures that determine environmental and economic policy.  Private actors are more 
trustworthy in the minds of climate skeptics precisely because spontaneous market mechanisms 
account for their action.  This is why the pursuit of scientific knowledge that potentially 
facilitates the commodification of products or services fails to draw opposition from skeptics, 
because this type of scientific practice conforms to normative definitions of capitalist economies.  
Climate scientists, however, operate under an “impact” tradition, and skeptics see their 
knowledge as perverting the rational decisions made by consumers, entrepreneurs, and managers.  
According to organized environmental skepticism, this type of intellectual practice co-produces a 
world where scientific knowledge justifies the expansion of state regulatory oversight.   
In the years following World War II, neoliberals primarily organized their intellectual 
community in opposition to socialism.  Modern inheritors of the neoliberal tradition, organized 
into a network of libertarian think tanks, have identified various forms of expertise as a threat to 
the institution of free markets.  Even if regulators incorporate economic norms regarding the 
efficiency of market mechanisms to set up carbon trading markets, these markets do not develop 
from a spontaneous demand for climate mitigation.  As such, trading carbon emission allowances 
in order to minimize the costs of regulation does not qualify as true market activity because it 
does not conform to the inherent characteristics of free markets.  If the additional costs of carbon 
mitigation are not voluntarily paid by consumers making decisions not coerced by expert 
knowledge and political mandates, skeptics claim these additional costs will fail to produce 
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environmental benefits and only perpetuate a culture of regulation that burdens consumers and 
citizens with new taxes.  As not everyone necessarily shares their economic norms, it makes 
sense that climate skeptics devote the most attention toward attacking the evidentiary basis of 
climate change, as no climate policy is justifiable if it is not based upon a sound scientific 
consensus.  Recognizing the perception among skeptics that climate science knowledge co-
produces a system of regulatory infringement on market activity provides one key to 
understanding the modus operandi of climate skepticism.  
The previous two chapters have examined the ideas produced by climate skeptic 
organizations.  Underneath the critiques of climate science, we can both identify a defense of 
particular lifestyles contingent upon an intensive use of hydrocarbons as well as an ideological 
commitment to individualism and deregulated markets.  While these think tanks represent a mix 
of elite networks and grassroots audience, what should we expect to find when looking at formal 
political discourse surrounding climate change mitigation?  The next chapter will consider how 
U.S. Senators differentially frame carbon according to their normative worldviews of market 
activity.  Importantly, while the denial of climate change can be found in such settings, denying 
climate change is far from a requirement to bridge political rhetoric with the goal of maximizing 
hydrocarbon extraction and sustaining systems of consumption reliant upon access to cheap 
energy.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Managing Carbon from “Within” and “Without”:   
Regulatory Discourse around Energy and Climate Change among American Political Elites 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Within climate change discourse over the last few decades, political elites have discussed 
appropriate governing strategies to sufficiently and efficiently manage hydrocarbons to balance 
environmental and economic development goals.  The popular policy instrument to address 
pollution emissions to date, both in the U.S. and around the world, has been market-based 
trading mechanisms, which allow organizations to trade emissions allowances with one another 
in order to mitigate pollution at the site of least cost, reducing overall emissions across the 
regulated territory.  Setting a cap on carbon emissions and allowing firms to trade carbon credits 
or fund sequestration projects to offset their emissions creates a new type of market, whose 
purpose is to “civilize” carbon by drawing scientific, economic, and political expertise together 
to mitigate global warming and maintain the social fabric embedding modern economic and 
cultural practices (Callon 2009).  
The development of the trend in market-based instruments has often been contextualized 
as a transition away from command and control regulatory regimes that impose uniform 
performance standards across a population of regulated organizations (Stavins 2002; Baldwin 
2008).  Command regimes have been criticized as inflexible, unnecessarily creating 
inefficiencies while securing regulatory goals.  In somewhat of a paradox, ideological 
conservatives in the US remain staunchly opposed to utilizing market mechanisms in pursuit of 
climate mitigation.  However, we can resolve this seeming paradox by examining the 
significance attached to carbon within political discourse.  While we may attribute some of this 
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opposition to emergent political opportunity structures, I argue that environmental sociological 
debates regarding environment and development can aid our understanding.  
This chapter has four goals.  First, I seek to outline the cultural strategies available to 
political actors in linking concern over carbon to norms regarding markets.  Second, I will 
outline mechanisms that link different strategies to concrete goals.  Third, different carbon 
regulatory options will be evaluated in light of these strategies and linking mechanisms.  Lastly, I 
will offer this interpretation of carbon regulatory politics as validating interpretations of 
environmental reform offered by two perspectives in a longstanding debate between Ecological 
Modernization Theory and the Treadmill of Production.  
The regulatory debate focuses on the mechanisms of these instruments, asking questions 
about economic efficiency, environmental sufficiency, and political feasibility.  While these are 
important questions in their own regard, this paper takes a broader look at the signification of 
carbon by American political elites within the larger regulatory discourse.  By doing this, I hope 
to resolve the apparent paradox that ideological conservatives are opposed to a market-based 
regulatory mechanism by showing how framing Nature parallels their frames of market 
institutions. In doing this, I will ask the following questions:  How have senators framed the risks 
and opportunities around "carbon" in both energy and environmental contexts?  What can these 
frames teach us about the politics surrounding mitigation and market ideology?  And finally, 
how does this further our understanding of the old debate between the treadmill of production 
(TOP) and ecological modernization (EM) regarding the reflexivity of modernizing processes in 
the US? 
Rather than a dichotomy of centralized regulation vs. market mechanisms, I argue that 
conceptualizing environmental reform politics around a binary of what I call governing carbon 
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“from without” versus governing carbon “from within” offers a better explanation of 
environmental reform debates regarding hydrocarbons.  Governing carbon from without is an 
attempt to internalize environmental externalities to the price attached to hydrocarbon energy 
recognized in market activity.  These policy frameworks typically work by defining an 
acceptable level of emissions and population of emitters, and/or attaching a price signal via 
emissions trading or taxes.  This definition would cover both command regimes and market 
mechanisms applied to the governance of carbon.  In contrast, governing carbon from within 
does not require imposing a price through regulation that reflects environmental costs, but 
instead facilitates technological innovation as a means of making clean energy cost competitive 
with conventional fossil fuel use.  These binaries can illuminate some of the cultural strategies 
(Pedriana and Stryker 1997) available to political actors in making rhetorical connections 
between the essential qualities of nature and markets.   
This chapter will begin with a review of EM theory and the TOP in order to understand 
competing perspectives over how to interpret environmental reform.  In order to analyze how 
carbon is framed by American political elites, I turn to an archive of Senate hearings.  This 
analysis produced three distinct frames of carbon that allow for thinking about within versus 
without strategies of environmental management, as well as connect to ideological forms 
dictating the appropriate balance of market and state.  It will then consider how these competing 
strategies play out in the international coordination of climate change mitigation, arguing that the 
TOP best characterizes American policy action.  
 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION & REFORM 
The last several decades of American environmental regulation has witnessed a broad shift away 
from command-and-control regimes toward market-based regimes that emphasize price signals.  
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This development is consistent with the “governance turn” where state regulation becomes less 
hierarchical and more flexible, enabling economic actors to govern some activities (Bailey, 
Gouldson, and Newell 2011).  In practice, this means articulating environmental goals within 
prevailing economic norms, referred to as the emergence of “liberal environmentalism” 
(Bernstein 2000; 2001).  Prior to this shift, environmental policy was often centrally coordinated, 
wherein all firms were held to a common standard of practice (command and control).  Instead, 
with market-based regulation, price signals are utilized as incentives to direct firm behavior, 
allowing for more flexibility and economic efficiency through emissions trading or taxes.  
Baldwin (2008) viewed the emergence of market-based emissions trading as the means toward 
sustainability that possessed legitimacy within policy circles primarily due to its ability to be 
framed as “regulation lite,” in the sense that it offers low-cost regulation that does not draw the 
ire of powerful industry interests.    
At the international scale, the Kyoto Protocol represents the mainstream approach to 
governing carbon.  This agreement set up the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD), market-based 
mechanisms that commit participants to objective GHG emissions reductions by set target dates.  
In the case of the CDM and REDD, actors in the global North can finance sustainable 
development projects in the global South in order to meet their emissions reduction 
commitments where mitigation costs are lowest; in a sense, this is the outsourcing of climate 
mitigation. Of course, the United States is notably absent from committing to any internationally 
negotiated GHG reduction targets.   
Mol (2010) identified three generations of environmental reform scholarship within 
sociology.  The first focused on the establishment of environmental policy and agencies within 
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the nation-state during the 1970s, as well as the development of nongovernmental environmental 
groups within civil society.  These provided institutional homes to command and control 
regulatory regimes.  Many sociological engagements with these developments were concerned 
with analyzing how state reform existed within a context of further environmental degradation 
(Schnaiberg 1980; Buttel 2003; Mol 2010).   
During the 1980s and 1990s, a focus on ecological improvement emerged, collected 
under the banner of EM.  These theorists argued that environmental reforms in advanced 
economies within state, firm, and household practices constituted major progress in the balance 
between modernity and environmental impact.  Modern actors in advanced nations appeared 
reflexively aware of ecological consequence actively took these concerns into government and 
industry.  For the purpose of analyzing the signification of carbon by American political elites, 
this chapter will focus on EM as an explanatory framework for the governance of carbon, 
considering the challenges posed by the TOP.   
 
ECOLOGICAL MODERNIZATION & THE TREADMILL OF PRODUCTION 
The EM perspective broadly argues that, within some advanced economies, growth is no longer 
dependent upon ecological degradation due to reforms within various practices that reflexively 
incorporate environmental concern.  This suggested the possibility of “delinking” material from 
economic flows within advanced economies, ushering in an era of ecological modernization 
(Weizsäcker, Lovins and Lovins 1997).  EM theorists recognize that the environmental problems 
societies grapple with today are the outcome the industrialization processes that characterized 
modernization throughout the twentieth century.   However, they see solutions to environmental 
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problems lying in further modernization developing sustainable forms of capitalism (Spaargaren 
and Mol 1992; Mol 1995; Buttel 2000).   
At the core of EM theory is the belief that environmental concerns actively shape 
modernity.  This leads to a primary research concern with the institutionalization of ecologically-
conscious rationality.  This rationality could be manifested in things such as polluter pay laws or 
by informing the design process of technology.  EM recognizes the faults inherent in modern 
society, but challenges any notion that environmental transformation requires a radical social 
transformation; rather, modernity gains new life with its newfound rationality.   
While not attacking the basics of social relations, EM does call for a greening of business 
as usual.  Importantly, this theory does not see capitalism as an inherently unsustainable system; 
rather, industrialism itself is viewed as the main culprit of environmental degradation.  Mol and 
Spaargaren (2002) outlined the EM position toward capitalism: a) it is a dynamic system with 
environmental concerns as a major source of change; b) significant improvements in production 
are possible; and c) all major alternatives to capitalism are unfeasible.   
In this view, science and technology are no longer the tools of environmental 
degradation, but potential saviors in preventing and curing future problems.  In the case of 
carbon emissions trading markets, proponents of EM would hope these lead by example, 
providing the nation-state with maneuverability to address climate change with market-friendly 
policy.  EM argues that such reforms could attract flows of investment into environmentally 
innovative technology and diffuse across borders (Jänicke and Jacob 2004).   
While EM has faced criticism from multiple perspectives, a persistent critique comes 
from scholars in the TOP tradition who challenge the reality of decoupling economic structures 
from environmental impacts. The “treadmill” metaphor refers to how social relations affect 
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environmental outcomes.  Specifically, it describes an economic growth coalition made up of 
capital, labor, and the state that deals with the problem of surplus allocation.  The major needs of 
each group within the coalition run as follows:  for capital, the need to ensure that expanded 
production gets consumed and that sufficient profits are available to stave off competitors; for 
labor, the need for access to jobs, proper income, as well as the improvement in standards of 
living; for the state, the need to ensure a constant flow of revenue through taxes and the ability to 
satisfy the demands of constituencies (Schnaiberg 1980: 211).  The visual metaphor of the 
treadmill then implies that if any one group stops “running” on economic growth, they will “fall 
off,” failing to satisfy their major needs. 
This treadmill comes in two different forms: the ecological and the social (Schnaiberg, 
Pellow, and Weinberg 2002).  The ecological treadmill shows that profits made from increased 
efficiency are then reinvested into more technology which then expands the system of 
production, leading to both greater additions of pollutants and greater withdrawals of natural 
resources.  The social treadmill shows that after each business cycle the profits reinvested into 
more efficient technology displace workers, gradually displacing workers from the production 
process.  These types of economic growth strategies help manage class conflict at the cost of the 
environment, assuring forward motion on the TOP.  This leads political and economic elites to 
support policies of deregulated energy extraction in order to supply low-priced consumer goods 
and remain competitive in globalized markets (Gould, Pellow, and Schnaiberg 2004).   
The treadmill perspective is skeptical of all three generations of environmental reform.  
Mol (2010) countered that neo-Marxist perspectives are too dismissive of all environmental 
reforms as mere “window dressing,” ignoring significant change where it does take place.  Foster 
(2012) criticized EM for not coming out of a tradition of classical sociology concerned with 
77 
 
questioning the connection between ecological and societal rifts but out of postwar 
modernization theory, leading EM to its concern with technocratic institutional reform (also see 
Foster 1999, 2000; Foster and Holleman 2012).   
 
THE DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTION OF CARBON 
American environmental sociology has largely avoided the “Science Wars” debate pitting strict 
material rationalists against poststructuralists, though a tension has long existed between realists 
and social constructionists.  Moderating positions have been explicated, such as the stratified 
ontology put forward by critical realism (Carolan 2005a; 2005b), differentiating between 
experiences, events, and mechanisms.  Similarly, York and Clark (2010) offered critical 
materialism as mediating an unreflexive materialism that optimistically assumes technology will 
solve environmental problems and a radical rejection of scientific epistemology altogether.   
Realist accounts of the mechanisms underlying climate change and society are necessary 
to some degree in order to uphold the systems-level theories of EM and the TOP.  This 
necessitates understanding the mechanisms underlying quantitative levels of GHG emissions.  
However, a narrow focus on quantitative drivers limits our ability to understand political 
strategy.  Exploring how the discursive constructions of nature are qualitatively differentiated 
can give us insight into how political elites strategically fuse political demands for environmental 
reform with imperatives of economic growth.  Differentiating between the discourse around 
“carbon” as opposed to “climate change” or the “greenhouse effect” exposes how elites 
rhetorically affirm the environmental concerns expressed by the overwhelming majority of 
scientists studying climate change while still satisfying the demands of economic growth 
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coalitions.  In this regard, I hope to connect this with past research on anti-environmentalism in 
the U.S. (Austin 2002; McCright and Dunlap 2003, 2010).   
 
DATA AND METHODS 
U.S. Senate hearings were collected and analyzed in order to assess the different frames of 
carbon circulating among American political elites and what this can tell us about market 
approaches to governing climate change.  Hearings were limited to those conducted within two 
committees: Environment and Public Works, and Energy and Natural Resources.  The former 
committee should provide elite perspectives on carbon within a general context of climate 
change and environmental problems, while the latter committee should provide perspectives on 
carbon within a general context of energy production (though, of course, overlap exists).  These 
committees were selected because they have been historically important sites of formal climate 
change debates in the U.S., going back to a famous testimony delivered by scientist James 
Hansen in 1988 where he declared with near certainty that global warming was the consequence 
of human activity.   
 Analysis focused on comments from Senators in order to understand the cultural 
strategies available to politicians to deflect or justify action on climate change relative to 
normative understandings of market institutions.  This can provide insight into some of the 
discursive strategies available to certain political elites in carbon regulatory discourse.  Senators 
offer an example of establishment power, where officeholders serve longer terms, run more 
expensive election campaigns, and must win over more diverse electorates than their 
counterparts in the House of Representatives.     
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Senate hearings were searched at the U.S. Government Printing Office website
17
 from the 
years 2000-2010.  Hearings concerning agency nominations were excluded from analysis.  The 
following search terms were used to collect hearings:  global warming; climate change; carbon; 
CO2; Kyoto; greenhouse.  This search yielded a total of 353 hearings across the two committees.  
As many of these hearings ran several hundred pages, a random sample was taken using a skip 
number of 7, leaving 49 hearings for analysis.   
Analysis took place in two parts.  First, the coding scheme used in analysis was 
constructed along four axes (Table 4.1).  Attention was paid to identifying instances of political 
elites offering a definition of carbon primarily a source of ecological risk or the basis of 
economic growth by offering inexpensive energy.  As EM suggests an eco-rationality shaped by 
scientific knowledge, a more parsimonious coding of science was created, assessing whether 
senators privileged “impact” or “production” sciences.  This binary was identified by Schnaiberg 
(1980:280-1).
18
   When exploring the obstacles to understanding the environmental impacts of 
technology production.  He categorized modern scientific practices into a tension between 
conventional “technological-production” science—producing technological applications of 
scientific knowledge amenable to economic commodification—and the more deviant 
“environmental-social impact” science, focusing more on the externalities of technological 
production, which requires a great deal of institutional support.  
Next, in order to locate carbon regulatory discourse within normative assertions of state 
intervention in market activity (as reviewed by Antonio and Brulle’s market versus social 
variants of liberalism [2011]), attention was also paid to how elites represented Nature (in the 
                                                 
17
 US Government Printing Office website found at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/search/home.action.  Accessed March 
19, 2013.   
18
 Schnaiberg claimed that “it is because the ‘nonproductive’ portions of the environment are ‘nonproductive’ (in the 
views of large-scale capital interests) that such institutional support is lacking” (1980:281).  
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form of carbon) and Markets.  Table 4.2 outlines the cultural strategies (Pedriana and Stryker 
1997) available for positioning carbon to market norms.  The co-presence of carbon and market 
frames were noted and re-read several times before classifying statements within a particular 
strategy.  On a substantive note, it is important to recognize that these strategies are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive (with the exception of Climate Leviathan and Climate Denial), 
and that any single Senator may draw upon multiple strategies in support of the same goal—
whether this is the blocking of state-mandated carbon  emission reduction or state subsidies for 
alternative energy.  This does not represent a contradction, but rather recognizes that actors 
routinely use multiple justifications to achieve goals—an insight consistent with conventions 
theory (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006).  Since the context of economic and political interests 
within which these strategies can be deployed can shift over time, the primary goal of this work 
is to identify these strategies, rather than quantifying their frequency.  
Framing environmental problems as knowable through scientific inquiry and resulting 
from improper regulation allows actors to define them as particular types of market failures.  
These framings can then be used in support of social liberalism where states rightly intervene to 
offer protection from market excesses.  Conversely, market liberals seek to minimize state 
regulation and social safety nets, and may be expected to attack the ability of impact science to 
sufficiently define environmental problems.  This allows them to challenge whether 
environmental problems constitute market failures and the legitimacy of state intervention 
through environmental regulation.  
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CULTURAL STRATEGIES OF CARBON 
This analysis of the regulatory discourse around carbon in the US Senate over the last decade 
suggests  several cultural strategies available for positioning carbon to market norms.   Climate 
Denial, Spontaneous Order, Climate Leviathan, and Carbon Innovation all refer to different 
strategic combinations of Nature/Market framings.  Previous chapters have already outlined the 
context of climate denial, and it remains relatively straightforward in the context of Senate 
hearings:  if the existence of anthropogenic climate change is denied, then a denial of mitigation 
policy easily follows.  Within the strategies of Sponatenous Order, Climate Leviathan, and 
Carbon Innovations, political elites are posing distinctly different problems related to the 
experience of carbon:  securing wealth through energy development, confronting the risks born 
by greenhouse gases, and positioning American competitiveness within global markets.   
 
Spontaneous Order 
More interesting than recognizing a strategy of climate denial is the strategy of Spontaneous 
Order, where carbon mitigation policy is denied without having to deny the possibility of 
anthropogenic climate change. Proponents of defining carbon as a source of wealth commonly 
point to it as an explanatory factor leading to the superior American standards of living.  For 
example, in 2006, prior to the great financial collapse, Senator James Inhofe of Oklahoma said 
the following: 
Abundant growing energy has been and will continue to be a major driving force behind 
our economy here in the United States. Our stock market is nearing record highs today. 
The wages and salaries are increasing 10 percent annually. The gross domestic 
production is expanding faster than any other major industrialized nation, up 20 percent 
since President Bush’s 2003 tax cut. And our energy use is also quickly expanding. The 
fact is, energy and economic growth go hand in hand.  (emphasis added.) 
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This comment came within the context of debating the merits of the Asia-Pacific Partnership on 
Clean Development and Climate (APP), which seeks to set goals regarding climate change and 
clean energy in terms of technology development obtained through opening up markets, rather 
than setting objective targets measured by emissions reductions as in the Kyoto Protocol.  
Senator Inhofe, a vocal opponent of the Kyoto Protocol and self-proclaimed climate skeptic, 
looks favorably upon the APP because it primarily incentivizes the development of energy 
technology and increasing wealth production through efficiency gains.  Though not implicitly 
stated, the assumption here is that relatively unregulated (and somewhat subsidized) energy 
markets provide the basis for overall economic growth.  State intervention would only result in 
higher energy prices, cascading into stagnant or declining profits and wages—in line with the 
assumptions of neoclassical economics.  
 There is also an obverse fashion in how elites express their concern with securing wealth 
through hydrocarbons.  If allowing economic actors to exploit hydrocarbons as they see fit 
results in rising standards of living for all, then according to this thinking, re-directing economic 
development in order to minimize environmental impact will cause growth to stagnate.  Elites 
often articulate this by emphasizing that some groups will bear the burden of carbon regulation 
more heavily than others.  An example of this was offered by Senator Kit Bond of Missouri in 
2004 when he acknowledged the utility of market-based regulation in some contexts but opposed 
punishing coal due to its high level of GHG emissions:  
“I am glad the Administration is pursuing a cap-and-trade strategy.  Cap-and-trade was a 
success in the Bond-Byrd amendment on acid rain. I applaud the application of that to 
mercury pollution as well.  But recent four-pollutant and climate change proposals would 
have some very serious affects [sic] on our economy. It will continue to raise electricity 
bills, perhaps by another 50 percent. Right now, we are seeing…the disastrous impact the 
forced switching from coal to natural gas has had on our communities, on our economy. 
People on low and modest incomes are finding their natural gas heating bills going out 
the roof.  Family budgets are being destroyed. (emphasis added.) 
83 
 
 
This passage illustrates two themes present in the framing of carbon as wealth.  First, it 
demonstrates a normative balance between Schnaiberg’s impact and productive sciences.  
Opponents of climate mitigation policy frameworks leave some room for a reflexive 
consideration of scientific knowledge in regulatory decision-making.  However, this reflexive 
space is confined to narrower sites, such as the acid rain market of the 1990s or cleaner diesel 
standards.  The legitimacy of climate change mitigation is only recognized within a context of 
“technological optimism,” creating a boundary between scientific knowledge and ideological 
commitment (York and Clark 2010).  Opposition to impact science—or more broadly, in the 
words of McCright and Dunlap (2010), the forces of anti-reflexivity—comes to the forefront 
when decisions affect core directions of capitalist development.  Regulating sulfur dioxide 
emissions (as with acid rain markets) has a marginal impact on capitalist development compared 
with the regulation of carbon emissions, which have potential to directly impact the price of 
electricity, heating, or gasoline.   
The second theme concerns the framing of market regulation, the environment, and 
justice.  Recalling Fraser’s (2009; 2012) critique of feminism and capitalism is useful here.  
Rather than understanding justice as always contained within a politics of taming markets in 
order to protect society (as commonly understood in Polanyian double movements), she 
conceptualized a “triple movement” wherein markets could tame politics through claims of 
justice, as in the case of incorporating women’s waged labor into capitalist accumulation.  
Polanyian analysis commonly notes that liberalizing labor markets undermined “family wages,” 
a form of social protection that minimized inequality.  However, this form of social protection 
was premised upon gender hierarchy.  Despite their divergence on gender subordination, Fraser 
argued that the goals of second-wave feminists were instrumentalized within neoliberal discourse 
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around a critique of traditional authority, allowing capitalists to confront challenges on the more 
favorable terms of earnings distribution.   
Likewise, reformers seeking environmental protection through market mechanisms do so 
in isolation from the economic inequalities produced by the same form of development that 
creates ecological contradictions.  This allows anti-reflexive opponents of environmental reform 
to rearticulate economic justice as antithetical to the regulation of carbon externalities.  Empirical 
analysis of the limited experience with carbon trading in the U.S. suggests that low-income 
people do not bear a heavier burden for mitigation than other groups in society (Hibbard and 
Tierney 2011).  Still, regions that are more dependent upon coal for their energy needs are more 
vulnerable to price fluctuations resulting from the regulation of stationary emissions sources than 
are non-coal dependent regions such as the Northeast where carbon trading has been practiced, 
since coal has a higher global warming potential than does natural gas.  This creates a particular 
opportunity for opponents of climate mitigation policy to frame carbon in terms of economic 
justice, articulating the unmitigated exploitation of carbon as beneficial to the most vulnerable in 
society.   
 
Climate Leviathan 
Conversely, while political elites will define carbon as a source of wealth, there are numerous 
examples of framing carbon as a source of risk.  This is commonly found among statements 
made by the minority of senators who serve as strong proponents of strict environmental 
regulation, giving priority to the consideration of GHG emissions as a guiding principle.  
Without challenging the legitimacy of capitalist markets, such positions are consistent with 
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mainstream environmentalism that seeks commitment to the Kyoto Protocol or some type of 
emissions trading system.  
 More interesting are instances where opponents of mitigation policy opportunistically 
emphasize the production of risk as a key quality found in carbon.  This is a common strategy 
when wanting to promote nuclear energy into the national energy mix.  For example, Senator 
Inhofe made the following statement in 2001, extending an olive branch to environmentalists 
while subtly maintaining his climate skepticism: 
 
As the Nation takes steps to increase our nuclear capacity, we’ll put our Nation in a 
position to address greenhouse gases in the atmosphere should that science become a 
reality. A lot of people don’t realize that nuclear doesn’t emit any CO2, so this is 
something that we have out there that we can talk to various organizations who otherwise 
might have found some objection to it.” 
 
 
During the same hearing, Senator George Voinovich of Ohio praised nuclear energy for its lack 
of pollution emissions: 
 
Since 1973 nuclear energy has avoided over 62 million tons of sulfur dioxide, over 32 
million tons of nitrogen, and over 2.6 billion tons of carbon, which would have been 
released by fossil fuel plants producing the same amount of electricity. 
 
 
Taking the opportunity to frame carbon as a source of risk in promoting nuclear energy is 
consistent with the governing “from without” position, in that it evaluates environmental 
outcomes in terms of externalized emissions.  Rather than framing the risk associated with 
nuclear energy in terms of waste storage, intense water consumption, or radiation (Kuletz 1998), 
nuclear is framed as “carbonless” and thus a climate-friendly source of affordable energy.  
However, the carbonless framing obscures the many “upstream” GHG emissions that are 
produced in the nuclear energy supply chain that occur prior to electricity generation (emissions 
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from energy used for resource extraction, e.g.) when few measurable emissions are produced 
(Weisser 2007).  The example of nuclear energy demonstrates that defining carbon in terms of 
ecological risk can still create tension within environmentalist frameworks utilized by many 
social movement actors.  
 
Carbon Innovation 
Perhaps the most common strategy used by political elites situates carbon as a focal point for 
innovation, simultaneously serving goals of environmental mitigation and economic competition.  
This framing revolves around issues of technological innovation which will benefit the US by 
extending their global advantage in hydrocarbon resources as well as adapting the national 
economy to future conditions of economic competition.  If energy consumers or citizens demand 
cleaner forms of energy, then optimists suggest that technological development lead the way 
toward environmentally friendly fossil fuels.  Senator Lisa Murkowski of Alaska made the 
following statement in 2006:  
 
We all know America is the Saudi Arabia of coal. Our half trillion tons of demonstrated 
reserves is the highest in the world. My state of Alaska has demonstrated reserves of 160 
billion short tons, that would place it second in the world in coal reserves, only behind all 
of the former Soviet Union—if Alaska seceded from the Union. (And if we did then we 
could develop ANWR far more easily). The problem with coal in the past has been its 
pollutants and in the future the issue likely will be the amount of carbon dioxide 
produced when it is burned. Both are solved through gasification of the coal, which 
readily allows you to separate out carbon dioxide for use or capture and which also 
allows the removal of pollutants from sulfur and nitrogen to mercury. This could be our 
biggest environmental boon. (emphasis added.) 
 
Likewise, Senator Voinovich made the following argument regarding the allocation of scarce 
funding resources in 2007: 
Unfortunately in this fiscal environment, many important programs are not being funded. 
It is clear that we must get serious about partnerships and strategies that maximize 
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Federal energy funding...For example, one area that requires further research is the 
development of technology to capture greenhouse gases and sequester carbon dioxide. I 
am hoping to hear some more about that today. We have to recognize, and I am glad that 
the Chairman does, that the United States is the Saudi Arabia in terms of coal, with a 
250- year coal supply. In my State, 85 percent of the energy is generated by coal. 
(emphasis added.) 
 
The US as “the Saudi Arabia of coal” is a popular phrasing among senators from states with 
heavy coal reserves.  Providing assistance for the innovative technological means of making coal 
“environmentally friendly” holds the subtext that developing such technology would allow for 
the exploitation of an immense natural resource reserve whose wealth is on par with all the oil in 
Saudi Arabia while avoiding externalities (and presumably opposition from environmentalists).  
This represents a compromise between the two previous framings of carbon, addressing the 
concerns of carbon emissions risk while creating a politically feasible path for the continued 
exploitation of coal resources.   
There is also a mindfulness of how global economic structures will affect future 
prospects of American competitiveness in the field of energy.  If the US does not devote 
resources to innovative technologies that either mitigate hydrocarbon emissions or develop 
renewable energy, they will miss out on market opportunities regardless of American 
commitment to reducing emissions according to international standards.  This perspective was 
captured by Senator Barbara Boxer of California during a 2007 hearing on green jobs: 
I believe the fight against global warming is a win-win. Why? We increase our energy 
efficiency. We increase our energy independence. We increase our global 
competitiveness, by creating clean energy technology which we can export to the rest of 
the world. The International Energy Agency estimates that the world will spend over $20 
trillion on new energy technology by 2030... 
 
These technologies can either be clean technologies that we create or dirty technologies. 
They can either be developed or made in the United States or elsewhere. Well, the world 
doesn’t want to buy dirty technology. The world has already decided that. It would be 
nice if our administration decided that as well. I certainly hope that we’re all moving in 
this direction, not in the way that I had hoped in terms of the speed with which people 
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come to grips with it, but I think there’s an inevitability that we can see right here in 
Silicon Valley. 
 
We can see where venture capital is going. It’s going into these energies these clean 
energies. By capping carbon emissions the way we have done here in California we will 
stimulate investment in these clean technologies…According to University of California 
Berkeley professor Michael Hanemann, who’s here with us today, carbon reduction can 
be a net boon to the economy. (emphasis added)  
 
Here the American economy is framed as embedded within global market forces that have 
determined “clean” rather than “dirty” energy as measured by carbon emissions will constitute 
future demand.  Those nations that can foster the development of innovative technology—
whether in terms of renewable energy or mitigating carbon emissions—will be poised to benefit 
from the estimated $20 trillion that will be spent on new energy technology over the next few 
decades.   
 
CARBON IDEOLOGY  
Analyzing the discourse around carbon governance also reveals the familiar patterns of market 
versus social variants of ideological liberalism, at times mediated by frames of justice.  Though 
elites sometimes seek compromise through technological innovation or even encouraging nuclear 
energy development, senators frequently expressed incommensurable ideological understandings 
of the state and markets through a discourse of carbon governance.  In 2007, Senator Larry Craig 
of Idaho conceded the desirability of clean technology, but insisted upon deregulated means of 
developing it:  
I have drawn the conclusion that anything we do now and into the future ought to be 
clean, and all of our technologies ought to be clean... Last week, we introduced 
legislation to set us on another course of clean transportation fuels or cleaner 
transportation fuels. I have drawn the conclusion that technology leads us there. 
Commanding and controlling an economy does not necessarily do that. It could in fact 
damage us severely. The rest of the world is struggling along behind us. They all 
complied with or attempted to, they ratified Kyoto, but none could comply, because they 
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found out they had to shut down their economies to comply. Many are even talking about 
getting off of it by 2012. That doesn’t excuse the reality that our globe is getting warmer, 
and that we ought to push ourselves aggressively toward the new technologies. (emphasis 
added) 
 
In this example, a market liberal ideology is on clear display arguing that technological 
innovation occurs most efficiently in a context of deregulated markets.  State intervention, such 
as “commanding and controlling” the economy, would only serve to inhibit the development of 
cleaner energy.   
 In contrast, while discussing the Department of Energy Loan Guarantee Program, Senator 
Jeff Bingaman of New Mexico expressed a clear role for state intervention in markets in order to 
produce desirable energy outcomes during a 2009 hearing:  
 
There are a lot of different challenges that we face related to our energy needs. Putting a 
price on CO2 will help. I believe policy such as renewable electricity standard will help. 
But we need to explore every possible option. Clearly putting in place an effective Loan 
Guarantee Program is part of that. 
 
We have many professionals in the Department of Energy who have seen any number of 
potentially world changing technologies both within our laboratories and other affiliated 
research institutions. The gap that seems to exist is in navigating those technologies 
through the so called Valley of Death to widespread commercial deployment. The Loan 
Guarantee Program we put in law in 2005 was designed to deal squarely with that 
problem.”     
 
While the innovative technology has already been developed with the assistance of public funds, 
entrepreneurs face a financial “Valley of Death” in attempting to raise funds that bring the new 
product to commercial markets, creating a disincentive for innovation if firms cannot recoup 
their investments in research and development.  Society may never benefit from technological 
innovations subsidized by public funding if markets alone determine the path to 
commercialization.  During the same hearing, Senator Murkowski of Alaska expressed 
skepticism of such state intervention while acknowledging the need for clean energy technology: 
90 
 
We have to ensure equitable treatment of the entire portfolio of clean energy 
technologies. We shouldn’t be sitting here now determining who the winners and the 
losers are. We all have our personal visions of the future and preconception of what is 
possible. But it’s the complex interaction of market forces and research and innovation 
that will determine the details of our energy future. Our job is to encourage the pursuit of 
the greatest diversity of options that are out there. (emphasis added) 
 
This type of framing both allows senators to advocate state involvement in the general pursuit of 
clean energy, yet argue against “picking winners,” such as favoring solar or wind but opposing 
coal gasification. This creates a space for fossil fuel interests to push against aggressive 
environmental reforms that seek to eliminate state subsidies for their industry.  
 One year later during a hearing on electric vehicles, Senator Byron Dorgan of North 
Dakota addressed the issue of “picking winners” through the following narrative regarding state 
intervention and the development of the hydrocarbon society: 
I believe it was in the World’s Fair in 1900 when Rudolph Diesel showed up. He had a 
new engine that would run on vegetable oil. A few years later, President Taft decided to 
get rid of horses at the White House and buy some cars. Among the cars he bought was 
the Baker electric car. So back a century ago, we were talking about a new engine that 
would run on vegetable oil and an electric car at the White House. Then a few years after 
that, Henry Ford developed the Model T and selected gasoline to run the internal 
combustion engine. 
 
This Congress, in 1916, as a result ofHenry Ford’s decision, said to the American people, 
if you are out looking for oil and gas, God bless you. We want to incentivize you to do 
that, talking about picking winners and losers. We would like to give you very significant 
tax benefits if you go out looking for oil and gas. That was almost a century ago and it 
continues today because Congress decided that is was what we wanted to do in this 
country… 
 
The President has talked about having a million electric vehicles on the roads by 2015 in 
this country. You know, there is this old saying, if you do not care where you are going, 
you are never going to be lost. That can be true with a country. It is true when referring to 
whether we want to set aspirations and way points in the future to decide where we would 
like to head. We did that when we decided that the internal combustion engine should be 
fed with gasoline. So let us provide very significant centuries’ worth of incentives for gas 
and oil. But in today’s era, there seems to be two issues. No. 1, national security. Our 
economic security is threatened by being as vulnerable as we currently are because of our 
dependence on oil, which we have little control. No. 2, the issue of climate change. 
(emphasis added) 
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This quote captures how the social liberal perspective recognizes that state intervention already 
structures incentives present in market activity toward goals defined as socially desirable.  After 
a century of developing an economy based on intense hydrocarbon use, climate change (as well 
as national security and the quest for energy independence) provides impetus for altering 
incentive structures to encourage new practices.  Through none of this are the legitimacy of 
capitalist markets themselves challenged; rather, the social liberal perspective seeks to secure 
their longevity.   
 
 GOVERNING CARBON FROM “WITHIN” AND “WITHOUT” 
That the same carbon/market strategies were sometimes used by senators with divergent goals 
suggests broader mechanisms that link these strategies.  I have suggested the governance of 
carbon “from within” and “from without” as linking mechanisms to understand divergent policy 
approaches that support very different types of state intervention without denying the existence 
of anthropogenic climate change.  The Kyoto Protocol and the APP represent two distinct 
approaches to carbon governance, where the former governs carbon “from without” and the latter 
governs carbon “from within.”   
 Returning to the debate between EM and the TOP, we can now consider what elite 
political regulatory discourse on carbon reveals about American climate mitigation and 
economic development strategies.  Flexible market mechanisms such as those found within the 
Kyoto Protocol exemplify EM theory’s argument about reflexive modernization in their 
utilization of price signals and financial incentives to efficiently manage carbon emissions.  
Further, political actors that recognize and commit to objective targets of emissions reduction 
operationalize their climate mitigation strategies within a framework that governs carbon “from 
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without.”  Yet as the world’s largest economy during the first decade of the twenty-first century, 
the US abstained from committing to such a commitment.  
Although it does not receive the popular or academic attention that the Kyoto Protocol 
has garnered, we might think of the APP as the embodiment of a treadmill strategy of climate 
mitigation.  The relative lack of attention can be explained in several terms.  One, it is more 
recent in development than Kyoto, with less experience upon which to judge it.  Two, though its 
state participants (Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, and the U.S.) oversee nearly half 
of the world’s population, it is much more geographically limited than Kyoto.  Three and most 
substantially, APP represents an approach to climate change and development that many 
environmentalists criticize as insufficiently ensuring measureable results.  This is because unlike 
Kyoto, which sets emissions reductions targets by “capping” a limit set in a future date, APP 
imposes no external targets in terms of emissions reductions upon participating member nations.  
Instead, it focuses upon furthering market integration, technology sharing, and financing clean 
energy development and sequestration technology.  Where the Kyoto Protocol represents a 
strategy of mitigating carbon “from without,” the APP represents a strategy of mitigating carbon 
“from within.”  This is the type of policy proposal expected by the TOP framework, as the APP 
attempts to mitigate emissions but fails to place rigid constraints to guarantee results nor does it 
do much to change the structural drivers of environmental degradation.  Rather than defining 
sustainability or renewable energy, “clean” energy can emerge under this framework through the 
advancement of carbon capture and sequestration technologies, allowing nations such as the U.S. 
or China to continue their consumption of coal reserves while claiming to address environmental 
concern.  
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From the perspective of those pursuing anti-reflexive modernization, the mitigation 
framework contained within the APP is favorable to Kyoto because it governs carbon “from 
within” rather than “from without.”  This allows hydrocarbon interests to exploit what they 
emphasize as the wealth-producing qualities of their energy resources.  Importantly, APP 
participants target “clean” rather than “renewable” energy.  Clean energy may be defined as any 
type of combustion that does not yield measurable GHG emissions, leaving open the possibility 
to include exhaustible alongside renewable energy resources in this category.  Technological 
innovation may even allow the mitigation of emissions to enhance the extraction of further 
resources.  For example, firms may make productive use of CO2 emissions by injecting them into 
depleted oil fields in order to increase pressure and enhance recovery (Gray et al 2004).  
Sequestering emissions in this fashion creates a potential symmetry in performance between 
clean and renewable energy under carbon regulatory structures defined by the release of GHG 
emissions into the atmosphere.  If such practices become widespread, they may also prevent 
environmentalists from coupling concerns over fossil fuel exhaustion with global climate change.   
 Of course, as a mitigation strategy, the APP contains serious flaws.  Rather than 
committing to internationally negotiated emissions reduction targets, participating nations get to 
self-define goals of GHG per unit of GDP intensity tailored to their economic circumstance.  
This places a great deal of faith in the development and diffusion of technological innovations 
that will assist in climate mitigation, leading some to characterize the APP push for clean energy 
as more reliant upon goodwill so long as it does not impose a price upon fossil fuel energy 
through emissions trading or taxes (Goers et al 2010).  Unlike Kyoto, climate mitigation is not 
necessarily the overriding goal of the APP.  Instead, economic growth, energy security, and the 
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reduction of local pollution associated with fossil fuels are all equally important goals (McGee 
and Taplina 2006; 2009).   
Even proponents of the APP within the US Senate acknowledge its flaws as a mitigation 
strategy.  However, they rely upon a justice frame to insist that it is the best (or only) option that 
is politically feasible, as seen in this 2006 statement from Senator Bond:   
I think the APP represents a very workable vision for the future. We know that any 
successful global warming strategy must include China and India. One of the reasons that 
the Kyoto Protocol was doomed to failure was because it didn’t include India and 
China... 
 
Western environmental moralism won’t feed billions. Precautionary principles won’t 
electrify villages…Just as we will not impoverish segments of our own society through 
job-killing energy cost-exploding plans, we can hardly expect India and China to prolong 
their own impoverishment in the name of global warming. 
 
Only affordable technologies that allow new growth, new jobs, new life will be accepted 
by the East.  Indeed, only affordable technologies will be accepted by America and 
Australia. Global warming solutions that call for the immediate restructuring of industrial 
economies are fantasy. They are impossible. Calls to replace payroll taxes with pollution 
taxes are fantasy… 
 
So with its Asian partners and its development of new affordable technologies, APP may 
not provide the solution to global warming fears, but it provides a direction and a sound 
basis to proceed. (emphasis added) 
 
A major goal of treadmill development is to ensure profitable returns on investment.  
Technological innovations that allow fossil fuel combustion to be interpreted more favorably 
under environmental rubrics give new opportunities for energy firms to engage environmental 
reform yet continue to exploit hydrocarbon resources.  Managing carbon energy at the “end of 
the pipe” may satisfy demands for climate mitigation as measured by GHG releases while 
simultaneously increasing the productivity of oil extraction.  Scholars debate whether pursuing 
this type of carbon capture could potentially “lock in” carbon energy paths or serve as a bridge 
technology to buy time during a transition to greater reliance on renewable energy sources 
95 
 
(Unruh and Carrillo-Hermosilla 2006; Vergragt, Markusson, and Karlsson 2011).   “Clean 
development” technologies such as this create new opportunities for treadmill development 
strategies to engage the policy discourse of environmental reform.  Clean development 
complements the TOP to the degree that it can redirect some additions toward the withdrawal of 
further resources.  In other words, we can understand clean development as a treadmill 
mitigation strategy to the extent that the objects of impact science are re-appropriated as the 
objects of production science, as in the case of making CO2 emissions profitable by utilizing 
them for enhanced oil recovery. 
Such technological developments capture all three framings of carbon noted above, 
underscoring how carbon contributes to the creation of wealth, is a risk to the environment 
whose emissions must be captured, and located at the site of technological innovation that serves 
both environmental and economic goals.  Allowing action such as carbon capture to define 
American environmental reform will draw opposition from some activists, scientists, and state 
actors, but nonetheless provides a space to converge dominant concerns expressed by political 
elites (as well as some activists).  Mitigating emissions absent a systematic pricing of carbon 
externalities connects rhetorical concerns regarding climate change espoused by conservative 
and moderate political elites—the emphasis on “clean” rather than “renewable” energy—with 
protecting the interests of fossil fuels.   
 
CONCLUSION 
Looking at discussions of hydrocarbon energy and carbon emissions in the US Senate reveals 
competing frames of carbon.  Defining carbon in terms of its ability to produce wealth, its danger 
of globalizing risk, or its ability to guide technological innovation facilitates particular types of 
96 
 
governing strategies.  In particular, problematizing carbon in terms of innovation appears to offer 
a compromise between conservative and moderate positions in global warming policy debates—
one that meets the goals of economic growth without placing a hard target on emissions 
reductions.  American involvement in the APP as well as senators pointing to the ability of 
carbon sequestration to enhance fossil fuel recovery demonstrates this point.  Understanding this 
debate in terms of governing carbon from within and without reveals a tension within 
environmental reform not captured by pitting command against market regimes, as both Kyoto-
style carbon trading and APP clean energy initiatives rely upon decentralized market-based 
engagements with climate mitigation.  
This analysis connects with prior research on the socio-political context of energy politics in 
the US, particularly how energy exploitation coalitions benefit more favorably from federal 
energy and environmental policy regimes than do GHG mitigation coalitions (Pollak, Phillips, 
and Vajjhala 2011; Wilson, Zhang, and Zheng 2011).  As this research is restricted to the 
regulatory discourse regarding carbon in the US Senate, it cannot offer a synthesizing conclusion 
on the broad debate between EM and treadmill perspectives.  However, it does add to the various 
criticisms of EM (Schnaiberg, Pellow, and Weinberg 2002; Carolan 2004; McCright and Dunlap 
2010; Bailey et al 2011; Foster 2012).  The industrial innovations incentivized through carbon 
governance suggest limited environmental improvement at best, instead prioritizing economic 
growth without substantially engaging the environment as a strategic concern (Murphy and 
Gouldson 2000).  This analysis also demonstrated the difficulty of transcending anthropocentric 
paradigms that assume technological advances insulate human societies from negative 
environmental change within an environmental regulatory discourse produced by elite state 
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actors, as this is bound up in the ideological divisions regarding state-market interaction that stay 
within human exemptionalist paradigms (Catton and Dunlap 1978).   
Yet even within the ideological divisions of human exemptionalism, we see carbon 
framed as energy in need of exploitation and environmental risk in need of technological 
management.  This naturalizes the faith placed on technological innovation and produces the 
political space wherein convergence between partisan positions may take place, constraining 
environmental reform within technological optimism (York and Clark 2010).  Perhaps we should 
expect that at an elite level of politics in the US, technological optimism will always prevail, as 
this serves powerful economic interests.   
The TOP remains entrenched at this level of politics, where negative externalities remain 
secondary concerns to economic growth and efficiency (Schaiberg and Gould 1994), articulated 
through the language of technological innovation.  We can expect conflict among elites over the 
multiple environmental trajectories of capitalist development, as there appears no definitive 
winner between those committed to further entrenching hydrocarbon society and those desiring 
to “green” capitalism (Pulver 2007).  Yet policy directions such as the APP indicate that “green” 
technology may assist further withdrawals of natural resources to the extent that extractive 
processes make productive use of additions (pollutants in the form of captured carbon 
emissions).   
Nowhere in the discourse of environmental reform within the U.S. Senate is there a 
political space to define carbon in terms of society.  Mitchell (2009) connected the development 
of democratic politics as based on a unique orientation toward a limitless future made possible 
by the promise of oil.   Interestingly, oil interests have situationally joined environmentalists in 
employing visions of limited growth in order to calculate the long-term costs of nuclear energy, 
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making it less competitive.  However, political interests have largely not done this with 
hydrocarbons, whose energy facilitates a much more versatile set of practices. Recognizing 
boundaries in the ability of carbon to continually produce a limitless imagination would 
constitute a first step in a counter-hegemonic project, one that could concretely call for reduced 
energy demand at a societal level (Rogers-Hayden, Hatton, and Lorenzoni 2011).   
At this point in the analysis, climate skepticism has been considered in terms of the 
publics that sustain it, the economic ideologies embedded within it, and how certain elites can 
satisfy ideological goals by framing carbon in parallel fashion to framing market norms.  The 
next chapter will then consider some of the consequences of climate skeptic discourse in terms of 
widespread attitudes among Americans.  It will explore some of the social structural and 
attitudinal correlates of environmental risk skepticism, demonstrating that climate skepticism 
stands apart from other forms of environmental skepticism in that is particularly driven by 
ideological polarization and correlates with conservative attitudes about wealth redistribution.  
This will demonstrate how unique climate change is among environmental issues.  Because 
mitigating global climate change requires fundamental reforms around energy and land use (and 
the lifestyles sustained by current practices), it is difficult to imagine solutions that do not require 
some form of state intervention given the contrast between the long-term process of climate 
change and the short-term process of business and consumer decision making.  Therefore 
confronting climate change will require a collective confrontation with the institutional rules 
governing market activity.  The outcome of this confrontation can hardly be prescribed 
universally across all contexts, but the risks presented by climate change imply a rejection of 
neoliberal orthodoxy in ways that other environmental issues may not.  For this reason, we 
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should expect to find political polarization around climate change in a way we may not expect to 
find it in other issues.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
The Predicting Climate Risk Skepticism Relative to  
Other Environmental Issues and Over Time 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 “Climate policy is used too often as a vehicle to advance special   
 interests and politically driven agendas that centralize more power in    
 Washington.  Science should be used as one tool to guide climate policy.    
 Moreover, our efforts to reduce pollution should yield measurable environmental   
 and health benefits.”19   
 
The above quote adorns the climate change webpage under the “Issues” tab at the Heritage 
Foundation website, one of the largest conservative American think tanks, currently headed by 
former Republican Senator and Tea Party leader Jim DeMint.  Although the scientific consensus 
on the anthropogenic drivers of global warming is well documented (Anderegg et al 2010; Cook 
et al 2013), widespread political polarization contextualizes popular climate skepticism in the 
United States.  Conservative political movements organize much of the discourse around climate 
skepticism (Dunlap and McCright 2011; Dunlap and Jacques 2013; Jacques, Dunlap, and 
Freeman 2008; McCright and Dunlap 2000, 2003, 2010; Oreskes and Conway 2010), while 
Americans expressing skeptic beliefs are much more likely to identify as ideologically 
conservative and Republican (Dunlap and McCright 2008; Hamilton and Keim 2009; Hamilton 
2011; McCright 2008, 2011; McCright and Dunlap 2011a, 2011b).  
 While scientists never produce knowledge within political vacuums (Gieryn 1999; 
Jasanoff 2005, 2010), the politics surrounding climate change in the US appear to take on a 
distinctly polarized character in terms of partisan and ideological divides.  Even though 
                                                 
19
 Quote taken from climate change issue page at Heritage Foundation, 5.21.13 
http://www.heritage.org/issues/energy-and-environment/climate-change 
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environmental politics do not always map neatly onto formal political divisions, American 
partisan polarization regarding environmentalism began in the 1970s and accelerated during the 
1990s (Dunlap, Xiao, and McCright 2001).  Focusing on climate change, this chapter asks two 
questions.  First, have the social bases for climate skeptic beliefs within the American public 
changed over time?  Second, how does climate skeptic beliefs compare to other forms of 
environmental skepticism? 
 In particular, this chapter explores whether recent climate skeptic attitudes are shaped by 
the current political context compared to the past, and what political fears may help account for 
these attitudes.  Additionally, this research will address the extent to which climate change is 
unique among environmental issues, or whether climate skepticism flows from a more 
generalized environmental skepticism. This study will analyze the social bases of climate 
skepticism in the American public over three points in time (1994, 2000, and 2010) and in 
contrast to attitudes regarding four other environmental issues (air pollution, pesticides, GMOs, 
and world population growth).  
 This research finds that skepticism toward the danger of global warming is unique among 
environmental issues and has intensified over time according to political orientation.  Within 
political orientation there is a predictive relationship between an individual’s belief about the 
dangers associated with global warming and their attitudes about wealth redistribution.  This 
suggests that the politics of popular climate skepticism may overlap with opposition to 
mitigating income inequality.  The linkage between climate skepticism and opposition to policies 
minimizing socioeconomic parity possibly demonstrates the success of free market think tanks in 
integrating climate denial with aspects of anti-statism.  As an environmental issue, global 
warming is set apart from other environmental issues both in the intensity of ideological 
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opposition and the correlation with attitudes about wealth redistribution.  This intensity has 
changed over time, and reflects the increased politicization of climate change in American 
politics.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Risk Perception 
When comparing attitudes across issues and over time, a common sociological interest is 
whether changes in attitudes are uniform or group specific.  Individuals are not immune to their 
physical environment when developing their attitudes toward global warming, as factors such as 
proximity to coastline (Brody et al 2008) or unseasonable weather (Hamilton and Keim 2009; 
Hamilton and Stampone 2013) can play significant roles in determining beliefs.   
 However, specific social characteristics consistently predict whether or not an individual 
will express beliefs consistent with climate skepticism.  In terms of gender and race, females and 
nonwhites are more likely to express concern over global warming and hold more scientifically 
accurate beliefs than their male and white counterparts (Malka, Krosnick, and Langer 2009; 
McCright 2008, 2010).  Intersecting with ideology, conservative white men are the single most 
likely American demographic to express climate skeptic beliefs (McCright and Dunlap 2011a).   
 This observation connects with research on the “white male effect” regarding risk 
perception.  This research was initiated by Flynn, Slovic, and Mertz (1994).  They found that 
white women perceived a variety of environmental and technological risks as more serious than 
white men, but that this gender difference was not replicated among nonwhites. White males 
stood out in perceiving risks as more acceptable than other groups.  Among white males, those 
with more education, income, and politically conservative attitudes reported the lowest levels of 
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risk perception.  Flynn, Slovic, and Mertz (1994:1107) provided the following to explain this 
pattern:   
 Perhaps white males see less risk in the world because they create, manage, control, and  
 benefit from so much of it.  Perhaps women and nonwhite men see the world as more 
 dangerous because in many ways they are more vulnerable, because they benefit less   
 from many of  its technologies and institutions, and because they have less power and  
 control. 
 
Satterfield, Mertz, and Slovic (2004) further explained this demographic pattern by examining 
the subjective experiences associated with this structural pattern of advantage.  They argued that 
risk perceptions result from perceptions of vulnerability, finding that the white male effect was 
substantially altered among those white males reporting a combination of high vulnerability and 
experiences of environmental injustice, to the point that these white males reported risk 
perceptions similar to those reported by nonwhites and females.   
 Drawing upon cultural theory, Kahan et al (2007) explained variance in risk perception 
by suggesting that individuals possess “motivated cognition” to protect the status of their group 
membership.  This identity-protective cognition deflects risks threatening those belonging to an 
in-group, particularly when such knowledge is projected by those perceived as belonging to an 
out-group.  Using the identity-protective cognition thesis, McCright and Dunlap (2011a) argue 
that American conservative white males identify scientists and environmentalists as an out-group 
through years of reinforcement through conservative media and thus perceive climate change 
science as threatening to the political economic systems within which their in-group enjoys 
structural advantage.  As white males still control a disproportionate amount of decision-making 
power within industrial capitalism, knowledge production threatening to intervene in this 
structure of decision-making through regulatory action is rejected as an attack on group status.   
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Conservative Opposition 
Conservative political movements have enjoyed success in leading the opposition to climate 
change policy and framing climate science as uncertain (McCright and Dunlap 2000, 2003, 
2010; Oreskes and Conway 2010).  This political opposition is replicated in the American public 
in terms of popular climate skepticism.  On a variety of measures, Dunlap and McCright (2008) 
found Democrats and Republicans increasingly polarized in reaction to the validity and 
seriousness of climate change from 1997 to 2008.  This partisan divide is also true in terms of 
ideology, and liberals are more likely to have views consistent with climate science than are 
conservatives (McCright and Dunlap 2011b; Wood and Vedlitz 2007).  The impact of 
conservative political orientation on climate skepticism is not limited to the U.S., as researchers 
have also discovered this pattern within the British public (Corner, Whitmarsh, and Xenias 2012; 
Poortinga et al 2011; Whitmarsh 2011).  
 Tracking attitudes about climate change from 2001 to 2010, McCright and Dunlap 
(2011b) found a sharp expansion in the gap between ideological and partisan identifications in 
recent years.  The percentage of conservatives reporting beliefs that the effects of climate change 
have begun dropped fifteen points (from about half to about 35%) from 2008 to 2009, and 
dropped an additional four points in 2010.  Brulle, Carmichael, and Jenkins (2012) conducted a 
time series regression analysis, finding Democratic Congressional statements and Republican 
roll-call votes as the most important factors influencing aggregating public opinion regarding 
climate change.   
 Information processing theory and the elite cues hypothesis provide two perspectives 
explaining why climate skepticism maps onto American political divisions.  Many scholars have 
questioned the efficacy of a purely information-based strategy when communicating about 
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climate change, as political orientation appears to play such a dominant role in determining how 
an individual reacts to scientific knowledge.  Information processing theory explains this by 
noting that many individuals lack the cognitive skills necessary to process all types of 
information they come across, instead processing information through experiential, social, and 
ideological filters (Wood and Vedlitz 2007).  In cases of ambiguity, people especially engage in 
information processing, relying on their predispositions (Jones and Baumgartner 2005).  Thus, in 
the case of processing information on climate change, we can expect an individual’s political 
values to play an important role in developing beliefs.   
 Rather than reacting directly to scientific information, people may also take cues from 
political elites they identify as trustworthy when forming opinions on controversial issues.  In the 
case of global warming, people who strongly identify with a political party are influenced when 
leaders take a position in debates (Krosnick, Holbrook, and Visser 2000).  Given that the two 
major parties have diverged for decades on environmental policy issues covering pollution, 
public health, and land use (Shipan and Lowry 2001), we should expect elite cues to result in 
polarization on environmental issues in general and not just climate change.   
 
Scientific Polarization, Education, and Ideology 
Another interesting aspect of a person’s political orientation concerns how it interacts with their 
scientific literacy while forming opinions on global warming.  Ideally, survey researchers can 
measure scientific knowledge by quizzing respondents on a range of questions assessing their 
objective knowledge on an issue (Malka, Krosnick, and Langer 2009).  However, many surveys 
instead ask respondents to report their understanding of a given issue (which may be measuring 
how tuned in an individual feels to a particular information source as opposed to their objective 
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knowledge).  Both types of research find that increased levels of scientific knowledge or self-
reported understanding predicts a smaller likelihood of climate skepticism for liberals and 
Democrats, but has either no effect or increases the likelihood of climate skepticism for 
conservatives and Republicans (Malka, Krosnick, and Langer 2009; McCright and Dunlap 
2011b).   
 Other research approaches the topic of scientific literacy indirectly through educational 
attainment.  This research finds similar patterns regarding climate skepticism, as educational 
attainment works differently for liberals and Democrats than it does for conservatives and 
Republicans.  At the regional scale, Hamilton and Keim (2009) and Hamilton (2011) found that 
increased levels of education were associated with lower levels of perception and concern 
regarding climate change.  Controlling for both ideology and party identification, McCright and 
Dunlap (2011b) confirmed the same pattern of political orientation moderating climate change 
concern.  
 This type of work can extend to scholarship on social cognition and political ideology.  
Exploring social cognition—how people know about the social world—Martin and Desmond 
(2010) argued that an individual’s self-placement along ideological spectrums represents an 
unmeasured social ontology.  In their argument, ideological measurements do not indicate a 
corresponding set of values applied to evaluation as much as they reflect how individuals 
perceive what is being evaluated.  Martin and Desmond distinguish social ontology (perceiving 
the nature of the social world) and political sophistication (understanding the constellation of the 
political field) as two forms of social knowledge.  Highly sophisticated ideologues (high-
information individuals with pronounced ideological orientations) are able to reinforce their 
extant worldview in light of new information because they perceive certain forms of knowledge 
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as associated with particular political programs.  In the absence of information on a specific topic 
or the introduction of information that directly contradicts worldviews, ideology serves to “fill-
in” the world by informing an individual about the ontological status of the case at hand.  In 
Martin and Desmond’s research, ideology served to inform people whether government aid was 
a system of redistributing wealth to undeserving racial minorities or a system that redresses 
social inequalities for deserving populations.  This is consistent with the information processing 
theory cited earlier in arguing that increased sophistication and information leads to more 
entrenched worldviews.  Gauchat (2012) used this framework to argue that increased education 
among political conservatives predicted greater levels of distrust in scientific authority.  
 
Affect  
Another area of research on climate change belief concerns how affective and associative 
processes impact judgments.  Understanding that affective (as opposed to analytic) processes 
inform beliefs helps explain why increased certainty in scientific knowledge has failed to move 
public opinion, as scientists tend to rely more exclusively on analytic reasoning to report their 
findings while laypersons are more influenced by association and affect (Weber and Stern 2011).  
This reveals a potential tension between affective “risk as feelings” and cognitive “risk as 
analysis” approaches to assessing climate change (Smith and Leiserowitz 2012).  
 Leiserowitz (2005) analyzed the affective imagery associated with climate change risks, 
prompting survey respondents to report the first thing they associated with climate change.  
Images of melting glaciers, generic heat waves, and impacts on nonhuman nature were the most 
commonly reported.  Interestingly, a majority of Americans (61%) provided geographically and 
psychologically distant affective image associations, helping to explain why many Americans 
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can recognize the reality of climate change without prioritizing it in terms of policy action.  This 
may help explain why public concern is consistently lower regarding global warming compared 
with other, less distant environmental issues such as water pollution (Nisbet and Myers 2007).    
 The affect approach to climate change beliefs helps connect the literatures on risk 
perception, political orientation, and climate skepticism.  Grouping affective associations into 
“interpretive communities,” Leiserowtiz (2005) found that “climate change naysayers” were 
predominantely white, male, and Republican, holding pro-individualism, pro-hierarchism, and 
anti-egalitarian worldviews.  This is consistent with the “white male effect” found in risk 
perception literature.   
 
Political Context 
If affective processes, social characteristics, and political orientation are important in developing 
beliefs about climate change, then we must consider recent developments in American politics as 
helping to explain the recent increase in ideological polarization regarding global warming 
concern.  As the Bush administration came to an end, Republican politicians suffered defeats in 
2006 and 2008.  However, a conservative resurgence occurred in the form of the Tea Party, 
leading to big political gains in 2010.  People identifying with the Tea Party movement are 
overwhelmingly white and over the age of 45, while 55 to 60% are male.  They also tend to be 
more educated and have higher incomes than average Americans (Williamson, Skocpol, and 
Coggin 2011; Zernike and Thee-Brenan 2010).   
 In their ethnographic research on Tea Party groups, Williamson, Skocpol, and Coggin 
(2011) argued against conceiving of Tea Partiers as monolithically anti-state.  As the latest 
manifestation of American conservative tradition, they found Tea Party participants focusing 
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their anger toward particular groups of people.  This anger revolves around a (heavily racialized) 
binary separating the deserving, productive members of society and the undeserving counterparts 
who—like Wall Street banks—receive “handouts” from the government.  Within this binary, it is 
therefore not a contradiction to support federal programs like Social Security or Medicare, as 
many citizens deemed as deserving benefit from such programs.  Instead, the primary threat on 
the minds of Tea Party participants lies in “perceived redistributions—and the threat of future 
redistributions—from the deserving to the undeserving” (2011:33).  Whether or not perceived 
redistribution—as part of affective associations—plays a determining role in climate change 
beliefs will be a key part of this chapter.   
 
DATA AND MEASUREMENTS 
Data for this analysis came from three collections of the General Social Survey (GSS)—1994, 
2000, and 2010—which provide questions about various environmental issues.  The GSS is an 
in-person survey administered by the National Opinion Research Center, and offers a 
representational sample of the non-institutionalized U.S. adult population.  Although this data is 
limited to a comparison across three points in time, the GSS contains extensive measures on 
demographic characteristics and political attitudes.  This allowed me to ask questions about 
political attitudes not considered in prior research.   
 
Measurement of Environmental Skepticism 
The GSS asked questions about three environmental issues across all three years and an 
additional two issues in 2000 and 2010 that provide dependent measurements in this analysis.  
The primary variable of interest—attitudes on climate change—gathered from a question in 2010 
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asking respondents, “In general, do you think that a rise in the world's temperature caused by 
climate change is extremely dangerous for the environment, very dangerous, somewhat 
dangerous, not very dangerous, or not dangerous at all for the environment?”  The wording was 
slightly different in 1994 and 2000, referring to “the greenhouse effect” rather than “climate 
change.”  While changes in question wording should always invite caution, all three wordings 
consistently focused on “temperature rise.”  Schuldt et al (2011) conducted a question wording 
experiment and found that Republicans were more likely to express skeptic views in reaction to 
“global warming” compared with “climate change,” while Democrats were unaffected by 
question wording.  This suggests that, if anything, 2010 results may reflect conservative 
measurements of Republican climate skeptic attitudes.   
 Four other environmental issues are also included as dependent variables, three of which 
use the same response scale of “extremely dangerous” to “not dangerous at all for the 
environment.”  Across all three years, these include “air pollution caused by cars” and 
“pesticides and chemicals used in farming.”  In 2000 and 2010, the GSS additionally asked about 
“modifying the genes of certain crops” and whether “the earth cannot continue to support 
population growth at its present rate.”  The question about population growth offered a five-point 
scale of strongly agree to strongly disagree.  In order to assess skeptical attitudes on these issues, 
I created dummy variables for temperature rise, air pollution, genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs), and pesticides (1 = not very dangerous or not at all dangerous), and for population 
growth (1 = disagree or strongly disagree).  Missing cases were deleted from analysis.   
 Altogether, these questions provide the best available proxies for measuring 
environmental skeptic attitudes contained within the GSS.  Although they do not probe 
respondents directly about the reality or cause of climate change and other environmental issue, 
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they do provide an assessment of the consequences of temperature rise, air pollution, pesticides, 
GMOs, and world population growth.  As such, answers to these questions provide indirect 
insights into how respondents assess their vulnerability to possible consequences contained 
within these environmental issues. 
 
Measurement of Independent Variables 
Since this analysis is particularly concerned with the political context of climate and 
environmental skepticism, I examine several political indicators.  In order to conduct group 
comparisons, a series of dummy variables were created.  In terms of political ideology, 
“Conservative” was coded as those identifying as “conservative” or “extremely conservative” on 
a seven-point scale.  For partisan identification, “Republican” was coded as those identifying as 
“weak” or “strong” Republicans, with those identifying as “other party” deleted from analysis 
(less than 3% of cases).   
 The GSS asks two questions concerning attitudes on wealth redistribution and 
government involvement in health care—both issues relevant to the values expressed within 
conservative movements.  First, regarding attitudes on wealth redistribution, the GSS asks, 
“Some people think that the government in Washington ought to reduce the income differences 
between the rich and the poor, perhaps by raising the taxes of wealthy families or by giving 
income assistance to the poor. Others think that the government should not concern itself with 
reducing this income difference between the rich and the poor.”  Respondents were asked to rank 
themselves on a seven-point scale, with 7 equal to “Government should not concern itself with 
income differences.”  A wealth redistribution variable was coded 1 = those answering 6 or 7 on 
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this scale.  This latent variable measures to what extent a respondent’s social cognition divides 
members of society into productive and unproductive categories.     
 The GSS also asks, “In general, some people think that it is the responsibility of the 
government in Washington to see to it that people have help in paying for doctors and hospital 
bills.”  Respondents were asked to rank themselves along a 5-point scale, with 5 = “people 
should take care of these things themselves.”  A health care attitude variable was coded 1 = those 
answering 4 or 5 on this scale.  While wealth redistribution attitudes tap into the values identified 
as central to the Tea Party movement, the purpose of including health care attitude measurements 
is to account for individuals who more directly express anti-state values, as medical bankruptcy 
cuts across class interests in a way that progressive tax codes do not.  This question does not 
differentiate between productive and unproductive, deserving and undeserving members of 
society as does the wealth redistribution question, but is instead focused solely on the role of the 
federal government in providing a service common in societies across the world.  Taking these 
two questions together will allow the analysis to differentiate whether climate and environmental 
skepticism is driven by anti-state attitudes in general or particular social ontological assessments 
about who are and are not productive members of society.  The influence of the latter value 
would indicate that the issue of climate change is associated with fears of meddling with the 
“natural” balance of resources between deserving and undeserving members of society.    
 Several demographic controls were also included in this analysis.  In line with the 
literature on risk perception, race was coded as a dummy variable for whites and gender was 
coded as a dummy variable for males.  Age ranges from 18 to 89 and older.  In order to maintain 
a consistent measurement of family income, I created a dummy variable measuring the bottom 
half of income distribution.  This included respondents whose family income was at or below 
113 
 
$30,000 in 1994, $35,000 in 2000, and $40,000 in 2010.  Respondents refusing to report their 
income were dropped from analysis, presenting a limitation in this research.  From a four-point 
scale of educational degree attainment (including high school or less, junior college, bachelor’s, 
and graduate), a College Graduate dummy variable was coded as those with at least a bachelor’s 
degree.  
 Three interaction variables were created to test whether education, income, and risk 
perceptions as embodied in the “white male effect” work differently according to political 
orientation in determining climate skeptic attitudes.  To create the first two interaction terms, a 
four-point educational degree attainment, income quintile, and seven-point ideological 
identification scale were used.  For the third set, a dummy variable for individuals who identified 
as both white and male was coded as 1, and the interaction was with the seven-point agreement 
scale to whether “Government should not concern itself with income differences.”  This scale 
was used in lieu of ideology in order to explore the depths of this particular conservative value in 
determining climate skepticism.   
 
ANALYTICAL STRATEGY 
As the dependent variables across environmental issues use binary outcomes, I used logistic 
regression to assess the relationship between skeptical attitudes and political orientations.  Odds 
ratios are reported in order to provide group comparisons in predicting skepticism.  Predicted 
probabilities of skepticism across environmental issues focus on political ideology as the 
covariate.   I used the delta method to compute predicted probabilities across political ideology 
using the PRVALUE command in Stata 11 (Xu and Long 2005).  Multiplicative linear regression 
models were used in order to test the interaction effects between education and income with 
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political orientation in predicting environmental risk perception.  All models used in this analysis 
had variance inflation factors below 1.6, indicating that collinearity does not present a problem in 
interpreting results.   
 For the interaction models, all constituent variables in the interaction terms were included 
in the regression models (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006).  In order to plot the interaction 
effects, I computed “simple slopes” (Preacher, Curran, and Bauer 2006) along exhaustive 
observed values of the variables used in the interaction term.  Rogosa (1980) referred to this 
technique as the “pick-a-point” approach to probing interactions.  I used the MODPROBE macro 
for SPSS statistical software for computation (Hayes and Matthes 2009).    
 
ANALYSIS 
Descriptive statistics for the three years of GSS data are presented in Table 5.1 (a correlation 
matrix for each year is included in the Appendix section).  The percentage of people reporting 
skeptic beliefs about temperature rise are similar between 1994 and 2010, just below one-fifth of 
the adult population, but dropped to about 13% in 2000.  Attitudes regarding air pollution and 
GMOs have remained consistent across available data, between 6 - 9% and about one-third of the 
population, respectively.  Compared with 1994, the percentage of people expressing skepticism 
that pesticides are dangerous for the environment was about 5% lower in 2000 and 2010.  The 
proportion of Americans believing the earth can support current population growth rates rose 
about 5% between 2000 and 2010, to about a quarter of the adult population.  About one-fifth of 
the sample across all three years has identified as conservative or extremely conservative, while 
the amount identifying as either a weak or strong Republican has dropped about 6% between 
1994 and 2010 to about 23%.  Those expressing negative attitudes regarding any state role for 
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reducing income inequality hovered just below a quarter of the sample across all three years.  
Views indicating that the state should have no role in helping defray medical costs for 
individuals has ranged between 17 – 21%.   
 
Climate Skepticism Across Time 
Table 5.2 shows the odds ratios from logistic regression predicting skepticism about the impact 
of temperature rise from global warming across the three data sets.  Many of the same factors 
determining climate skepticism are consistent across 1994 and 2010, though the level of their 
influence fluctuates.  In 2000, however, overall levels of climate skepticism dropped relative to 
the other two samples, and few of the significant factors in the other two years have an influence 
in this dataset.  Consistent with prior research, whites are more likely to possess skeptic attitudes 
than non-whites, though this was only statistically significant for 2010.  Likewise, males are 
about one-and-a-half times to twice as likely as females to report climate skeptic attitudes, 
consistent with research on risk perceptions.  Falling in the bottom half of family income or 
having a college education were not significant in determining attitudes.   
 The clearest trend is that of political orientation.  Across the three models, whether or not 
an individual identified as conservative was the strongest predictor of whether they would have 
beliefs consistent with climate skepticism.  In 1994 and 2000, conservatives were two to two-
and-a-half times as likely to have skeptic attitudes as non-conservatives.  This factor underwent a 
strong shift in predicting skepticism by 2010, however, as conservatives were more than five 
times as likely to report skeptic beliefs than non-conservatives in the control model—much 
stronger than past years.  Interestingly, when controlling for ideology, whether or not an 
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individual identified as Republican was not significant in determining whether they would report 
climate skeptic beliefs across any of the models.   
 Of particular interest is how the odds ratios of predicted climate skeptic attitudes change 
after controlling for specific conservative attitudes regarding wealth redistribution and medical 
help.  In 1994, both attitudes were statistically significant, with opposition to medical help 
predicting a greater likelihood of skeptic beliefs than opposition to reducing income inequality.  
This trend changed greatly by 2010.  Here we see the strength of income redistribution attitudes 
in predicting climate skeptic beliefs.  Individuals with this attitude were four times more likely to 
also have skeptical attitudes toward the dangers of temperature rise—a stronger predictor than 
conservative ideology.  Outside of the control models, income redistribution attitudes in 2010 
were the strongest single factor predicting climate skepticism.   
 We can also assess how political orientation determines climate skeptic beliefs by 
looking at predicted probabilities.  Figures 5.1 and 5.2 compare the predicted probabilities of 
climate skeptic attitudes by political ideology and party identification across 1994, 2000, and 
2010.  For both ideology and party identification, as individuals are more conservative or 
stronger Republicans, they have a higher predicted probability of expressing skeptical attitudes 
toward temperature rise resulting from climate change.  However, ideology accounts for a 
broader difference in attitudes than does political party identification.  Comparing 1994 with 
2010, we see a larger gap among ideological conservatives than we do Republicans.  This 
suggests that ideological rather than partisan leaders may be driving the current surge of climate 
skepticism.  Of course, some individuals may occupy both categories, as seen in the case of Jim 
DeMint, who was both a leader of conservatives in the US Senate and left politics for a position 
at a leading conservative think tank.  
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 The changing influence of income redistribution attitudes in determining climate skeptic 
beliefs over time is presented in Figure 5.3.  Predicted probabilities of reporting a climate skeptic 
attitude were calculated before and after controlling for attitudes about income redistribution, 
with the difference presented as it varies by ideology.  That ideology is strongly correlated with 
climate skepticism is well documented in prior research.  This demonstrates that over time, 
values specific to interventions into income inequality have greater influence in 2010 than in the 
past.  The impact of this value has changed very little for liberals and moderates, however.  Only 
as an individual identifies as more conservative has their attitude about income redistribution 
grown in influencing their assessment of the dangers associated with global warming.   
 
Skepticism Across Environmental Issues 
The odds ratios from logistic regression predicting skeptical attitudes for the three environmental 
issues available in 1994 are presented in Table 5.3.  The five issues available in 2000 and 2010 
are presented in Tables 1.4 and 1.5.  These results suggest that climate skepticism is not 
reducible to a generic environmental skeptic worldview.  Factors predicting climate skepticism 
do not always predict skepticism toward other environmental issues.   
 For a majority of the models, race does not appear to significantly predict skepticism.  
This is true of all eight environmental issues between 1994 and 2000.  In 2010, whites were 
twice as likely to be climate or air pollution skeptics as non-whites, but these results became 
statistically insignificant after controlling for conservative attitudes toward the state.  Males, 
however, were more consistent in expressing environmental skepticism across time.  In 17 of the 
26 models under consideration (significant at p < .10), men were 1.5 to 2.5 times as likely to be 
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skeptics.  Only on the issue of population growth did gender appear to be statistically 
insignificant in predicting skepticism across time. 
 The binary measurement used for income was not very predictive of skepticism either 
across issues or over time.  Whether or not a person’s family falls within the bottom half of 
national income earners was only significant (p < .10) in 7 of the 26 models.  It was not 
significant across any of the issues in 2010, and displayed an inconsistent pattern across 1994 
and 2000.  In 2000, for example, while those on the lower half of the income scale were more 
likely to be skeptics regarding pesticides, they were less likely to be skeptics regarding GMOs.  
Yet in 1994, they were less likely to be skeptics on the issue of pesticides.   
 While data was not available to test scientific literacy across all three years, we can assess 
this indirectly through whether or not an individual graduated from college made them more or 
less likely to express skeptic beliefs.  For almost all of the models, college education had no 
statistical significance when controlling for other factors.  However, in both 2000 and 2010, 
college graduates were about twice as likely as non-college graduates to express skepticism 
toward the claim that GMOs present environmental dangers.   
 One surprising result is that after controlling for ideology and other factors, Republican 
identification is not statistically significant in predicting skepticism for any of the environmental 
issues across all three years available.  Yet identifying as conservative significantly (p < .10) 
predicted environmental skepticism in 19 of the 26 models.  Relative to other issues, 
conservative ideology is most weakly correlated with skepticism toward GMOs.   
 Prior to 2010, redistribution attitudes were only significant in predicting skepticism in 
one out of eight models (climate skepticism in 1994).  However, we see evidence that 
environmental concern in general has been politicized in a different manner.  For all five issues, 
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strong opposition to state wealth redistribution significantly (p < .10) predicted environmental 
attitudes, making an individual two to four times as likely to express skeptic beliefs.  It was even 
a stronger predictor of climate skepticism than conservative identification, a very different 
dynamic than was present in 1994.   
 However, we see a very different pattern in the other conservative attitude under 
consideration – the more generally anti-state attitude toward health care.  Whereas in 1994 it was 
a stronger predictor of skepticism across issues than redistribution attitudes, it was only 
significant in predicting skepticism in 2 out of 10 models in 2000 and 2010.   
 Focusing more explicitly on political orientation and environmental skepticism, we can 
analyze the predicted probability of skeptic attitudes along an ideological spectrum across issues.  
Figures 5.4 and 5.5 include the predicted probability of skeptical attitudes according to 
ideological orientation (controlling for race, gender, age, income, education, and party 
identification) in 2010 for the issues of global warming, air pollution from cars, pesticide use, 
GMOs, and world population growth.  Similar relative patterns of predicted probability were 
present in the 1994 and 2000 data.  These figures visualize the unique ideological character of 
climate skepticism relative to other environmental issues.  While skepticism toward the danger of 
temperature rise in the sample was greater than air pollution or pesticides, it trails behind GMOs 
and population growth.  Yet along an ideological spectrum, conservative identification 
disproportionately predicts the probability of climate skepticism relative to the other four issues.   
 
Interaction Effects Predicting Climate Skepticism 
Three sets of multiplicative interaction models were analyzed in order to gain deeper insight into 
the effects of three variables as conditional upon values of political orientations:  education, 
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income, and the “white male effect.”  These models provide opportunity for greater insight into 
the impact of these factors in determining climate skeptic attitudes. 
 The predicted probabilities of climate skepticism from the education-ideology interaction 
models for all three years are presented in Figures 5.6 – 5.8.  These patterns confirm prior 
research, indicating that increased education moderates climate skepticism differently according 
to ideological orientation.  Specifically, as conservatives become more educated, they are more 
likely to express skepticism toward the dangers of global warming.  The gap in predicted 
skepticism between levels of education has narrowed over time, to the point that liberals and 
moderates display no difference in skeptic attitudes according to differential education levels.  
Conservatives continue to become more skeptical as they become more educated.  However, the 
slope coefficients for observed values of the education-ideology interaction term were only 
statistically significant in the model ran with 1994 data, but were not statistically significant in 
the 2000 or 2010 models.   
 Although scholarship has examined class and industry interests in climate change debates 
from social movement and political economy perspectives, research has not examined how 
ideology interacts with income at the level of determining individual beliefs about the dangers of 
temperature rise.  The predicted probabilities from these models are presented in Figures 5.9 – 
5.11 and demonstrate a very interesting movement over time.  In 1994, income had a moderating 
relationship to conservative ideology; for conservatives, increased income predicted a lesser 
probability of holding climate skeptic beliefs, with statistically significant slope coefficients for 
these observed values.  Meanwhile, for liberals, increased income slightly increased the 
probability of holding skeptic beliefs, though these slope coefficients were not statistically 
significant.  In 2000, the interaction was weak and non-significant.  By 2010, however, we 
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observe an inverse interaction compared to 1994.  While the interaction is still weak and non-
significant for liberals, increased income has a strong and statistically significant interaction with 
conservative ideology in predicting climate skeptic attitudes.  Conservatives in the top family 
income quintile were twice as likely as conservatives in the bottom family income quintile to 
disagree that temperature rise presents an environmental danger – a complete reverse from what 
was observed in 1994.   
 Lastly, interaction models were used to assess the white male effect as it interacts with 
attitudes about wealth redistribution.  Controlling for race, gender, age, income quintiles, 
education, and ideology, the predicted probabilities from the interaction of white-males and non-
white-males along an agreement scale about the state redistribution of wealth are presented in 
Figures 5.12 – 5.14.  Across all three years, the models predicted that individuals other than 
white males who express opposition to wealth redistribution had a probability of climate skeptic 
attitudes between 0.15 and 0.2.  For both 1994 and 2000 models, white males were only more 
likely than their counterparts to express skepticism if they also held oppositional attitudes toward 
the state minimizing income inequality.  While disagreement over redistribution increasingly 
predicted skepticism among white males in 1994, the interaction was very weak in 2000.  The 
interactions for all observed values were not significant for either 1994 or 2000 data.   
 The interaction between the white male effect and inequality attitudes are most 
pronounced within the political economic context of the Great Recession.  We see a very 
different trend in the model using 2010 data, with statistically significant slope coefficients for 
observed values within the interaction term.  Across all values of agreement regarding income 
inequality, white males were predicted as more likely than their counterparts to express climate 
skepticism.  This gap widened an individual increasingly disagreed about the state’s role in 
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minimizing income inequality.  Among those strongly disagreeing, white males were three times 
as likely as their counterparts to hold skeptical attitudes, and were more likely than not to be 
climate skeptics.  This predicted probability was the highest of all considered in any model used 
in this analysis.   
 
DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION 
Why does climate change among all the environmental issues under consideration here prompt 
individuals to react on the basis of cultural values, such as their attitudes toward the state 
mitigating income inequality? And why has this trend become more pronounced in 2010?  
McCright (2011) argued that climate skepticism maps onto societal divisions between those 
criticizing industrial capitalism and those defending it.  The results presented above extend this 
analysis by showing that these struggles map onto an ideological lens differentiating productive 
from unproductive factions within society.   
 Ideological values expose a social ontology—how individuals perceive the social 
world—structuring the assessments they make about the dangers associated with climate change.  
As reflected in the quote taken from the Heritage Foundation that began this chapter, climate 
skeptics may see the mitigation of global warming (perhaps like other progressive causes such as 
the War on Poverty or business regulation more generally) as the means by which the political 
left intervenes in free markets to “take from the makers” and “give to the takers.”  After all, a 
common theme criticizing the alternative energy industry is its reliance on state subsidy to bring 
its product to consumers at competitive rates relative to conventional energy.  We should 
consider the possibility that the prospect of climate mitigation cues a social cognitive assessment 
within individuals leading them to define scientific authorities as opponents within a political 
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field.  That climate skepticism has intensified according to ideological values over time indicates 
that climate change as a sociopolitical issue has crystalized among sophisticated conservative 
ideologues as a threat to their interests in recent years, leading them to associate climate 
mitigation with a host of values, actors, and programs of the political left.  
 The analysis contained in this chapter supports the claim within information processing 
theory that individuals form their beliefs in reaction to scientific information based upon prior 
value assessments.  To the extent that results indicate ideology and not party identification drive 
climate skepticism we can state that elite cues are taken from ideological rather than partisan 
leaders (though, as mentioned earlier, this can be a fuzzy distinction in the current political 
landscape).  Yet we do not see ideological polarization across all environmental issues, 
suggesting that these cues are either not present or not as effective regarding issues other than 
climate change.  
 This research also indicates that skepticism is driven by more than conservative values 
alone.  How these conservative values influence skeptic beliefs are contingent upon an 
individual’s location within social structures.  The conservative ideological lens only predicts a 
high probability of climate skepticism for individuals atop the income hierarchy.  Yet this trend 
is exclusive to the 2010 data, suggesting that only in more recent years (perhaps after Al Gore’s 
An Inconvenient Truth launched the issue of global warming into popular political 
consciousness) have higher-income conservatives interpreted the proposed reality of climate 
change as a threat to their material interests.  Considering Williamson et al’s (2011) 
differentiation between general anti-statism and anger directed at groups of people identified as 
“undeserving,” we can argue that the political context of 2010 has shaped not only climate 
change, but environmental issues in general, as focal points for ideological conservatives.  While 
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climate skepticism was the most pronounced outcome of redistribution attitudes, it appears that 
interventions into environmental issues in general were identified as paths violating conservative 
normative social orders, directing resources from the producers of wealth toward unproductive 
members of society.  
 Income is not the only salient social structural factor interacting with ideology.  Cavalier 
attitudes toward the dangers of temperature rise despite an established scientific consensus are 
disproportionately held by white men.  Research on risk perception and the “white male effect” 
argues that the control over economic and technological decision-making overwhelmingly held 
by white men leads allows them to feel less vulnerable to various risks.  The way in which social 
location influences risk perceptions are an important factor in understanding climate skepticism.  
In the research presented here, even among individuals strongly opposed to state interventions 
minimizing income inequality, we see evidence of the “white male effect.”  While strong 
opposition to income redistribution increases the likelihood of climate skepticism among females 
and non-white males, only among white males do these values disproportionately predict climate 
skeptic attitudes relative to the average American.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
125 
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
Conclusion:  Climate Skepticism and Carbon Capitalism 
 
 
 
 
Scholars have identified different interpretive communities sharing consensus views on the 
scientific knowledge and consequences associated with climate change (Leiserowitz 2005; 
Szerszynski and Urry 2010).  This dissertation started by identifying generic categories of the 
groups involved in the political discourse of climate change in the U.S.:  climate scientists and 
advocates of mitigation policy, climate skeptics, and climate moderates.  The preceding chapters 
primarily examined climate skepticism within the United States—the country that has most 
contributed to the anthropogenic drivers of climate change and continues to produce the most 
obstinate hurdles to international negotiations coordinating mitigation policy.  This doubtlessly 
results in part because of hydrocarbon energy interests that hold sway over national politics; 
perhaps more than many national contexts, a select group of industrial energy elites in the U.S. 
can create enormous amounts of wealth by maximizing the extraction of natural energy resources 
without environmental regulatory constraints.  Recognizing these political economic interests 
alone does not explain the entirety of American climate skepticism, however.  To gain a fuller 
understanding of the anti-scientific attitudes that currently pervade partisan politics and 
ideological cleavages, we have to consider the threat that regulating greenhouse gases present to 
worldviews committed to radical individualism.  As such, carbon capitalism encompasses more 
than the political economic interests of the conventional energy industry.  The right to produce 
carbon emissions without state oversight in economic activities symbolizes a normative balance 
between state and market as well as centralized expert opinion pitted against the wisdom of 
aggregate consumer desires.   
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 Unlike issues such as the regulation of nuclear energy or genetically modified organisms, 
the regulation of carbon concerns the very building blocks of industrial capitalism.  So long as 
environmental externalities are not built into the exchange value of energy, fossil fuels offer the 
greatest economic efficiency for the production of commodities.  Placing carbon dioxide and 
equivalent gases under the oversight of a regulatory regime constitutes a large reform in the 
human relationship to nature—a step towards the reflexive modernization discussed by various 
scholars (Beck 1992; Mol 1995; Mol and Spaargaren 2002; McCright and Dunlap 2010).  This is 
why systematic challenges to the scientific consensus on climate change are consistent with a 
conservative political project hoping to prevent the state from influencing the exchange value of 
commodities more generally.   
 Liberal approaches to climate mitigation in the form of carbon markets present a battle 
not over the legitimacy of capitalism per se, but a cultural battle over systems of regulation and 
consumption within capitalism.  For most Americans, scientific arguments explaining 
anthropogenic climate change as well as skeptic attacks on its evidentiary basis are too 
complicated.  Fluctuations in public opinion regarding climate change are instead formed via 
trust in authority, political mobilization, and economic anxiety (Brulle et al 2012; Leiserowitz et 
al 2012; Scruggs and Benegal 2012).  It is along these fronts that American climate skepticism 
can be understood as a battle for state-market balance sustaining carbon capitalism.  
 Given the Cold War rhetoric that often characterizes climate skeptic discourse, we might 
look upon a very old concept under new light to offer synthesizing meaning to the preceding 
chapters.  The systems of relations present in carbon capitalism rest upon a carbon fetishism.  
Current consumer culture routinely ignores carbon footprints or any kind of metric attempting to 
objectify the relationship between economic systems of consumption and alterations to global 
127 
 
carbon cycles that cause climate change.  Mainstream action on climate mitigation attacks the 
system of capitalist production not according to its unfair distribution or exchange, but according 
to the modes of consumption that it supports.  Liberal environmentalists seek to augment the 
carbon-intensity of commodity consumption, presenting a consciousness of carbon footprints 
into regulatory and consumer culture as a means of expanding new forms of energy production 
(and making practices of carbon energy use more efficient).   
 As commodities, fossil fuels reflect both the social components of labor as well as the 
carbon components of nature (as measured by greenhouse gas emissions).  Ignoring these aspects 
has implications for what type of expertise best defines the institutional boundaries of markets, 
and whether exchange values reflect the environmental impact of consuming hydrocarbons.  In 
other words, consciousness of the human relationship with nature can affect the social and 
economic relationships between individuals within capitalism, in that considerations of nature 
can challenge the determination of commodity exchange values solely through market forces. 
Denying the link between the consumption of fossil fuels and climate change parallels the denial 
of a link between the expansion of global capitalism and wealth polarization.  To retain a mode 
of capitalism that reflexively accounts for environmental impacts requires some amount of state 
intervention into market activity because pollution emissions have no inherent use value.  Carbon 
fetisihism is therefore inseparable from a mode of production reliant on deregulation and 
maximizing energy profits at the cost of environmental degradation.  
 Commodity fetishism is not reducible to ideology or perception and cannot be corrected 
by relying solely on rational discourse.  Fetishism results from the structure of everyday practice.  
We can even think of both liberal environmentalists and climate skeptics as participating in 
practices of “carbon fetishism.”  Like commodity fetishism discussed in Marx’s Capital, wherein 
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the social relationships between producers are misidentified as the economic relationship 
between things, a narrow focus on the carbon content of energy consumption can displace the 
truly social question present in climate change.  While liberal environmentalism recognizes the 
need for a reflexive form of modernization, policy proposals such as carbon markets offer 
modest reforms to reduce emissions outputs, creating equivalent units of tradable GHG 
emissions (MacKenzie 2009; Lohmann 2008).   These types of technocratic approaches to 
climate mitigation offer political practicality, and have successful records in past emissions 
reduction programs.  However, they do not begin to address the political question of social 
inequality characterizing vulnerability to global climate change.  Nor do carbon markets 
acknowledge the social context of energy production, instead standardizing greenhouse gas 
emissions into equivalent and tradable units, setting up an exchange of “CO2 values.”    
 Likewise, climate skeptics operate within a context of carbon fetishism, although in a 
very different way.  As displayed throughout the research presented in this volume, opponents of 
climate science are motivated in part by a concern with market exchange unencumbered by 
consideration of environmental externalities.  American climate skeptics routinely defend 
particular consumer lifestyles that constitute a node within a particular mode of production—
carbon capitalism.  While much of the developed world is at least willing to transition to 
reformed modes of green capitalism (making public investments in alternative energy or mass 
transit, e.g.), climate skeptics and American conservatives push an agenda of maximizing 
hydrocarbon energy production in order to supply consumers with the cheapest possible forms of 
energy, lending additional power to the moment of market exchange to determine relationships 
with the natural environment.   
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 As Marx outlined in Grundrisse, the dialectic between human relationships with nature 
and forces of production leads to the constant renewal of human needs (Marx 1973).  This back 
and forth between human systems and production and human relationships with nature facilitates 
changes in culture and communities, giving insight into environmental politics:  
  
 The preservation of the old community includes the destruction of the conditions on  
 which it rests, turns into its opposite.  If it were thought that productivity on the same 
 land could be increased by developing the forces of production…then the new order 
 would include combinations of labour, a large part of the day spent in agriculture etc., 
 and thereby again suspend the old economic conditions of the community.  Not only do 
 the objective conditions change in the act of reproduction, e.g. the village becomes a 
 town, the wilderness a cleared field etc., but the producers change, too, in that they bring 
 out new qualities in themselves, develop themselves in production, transform themselves, 
 develop new powers and ideas, new modes of intercourse, new needs and new language.  
 The older and more traditional the mode of production itself…the more constant will be 
 the old forms of property and hence the community generally.”  (1973: 494; emphasis 
 added).  
 
 
Marx focused more directly on how changes in the conditions of production can lead to changes 
in social relations.  The fears expressed through climate skepticism point attention to how 
changes in the conditions of consumption may also lead to changes in social relations.  An 
ambitious attempt at climate mitigation will require a change in consumer practices, the 
development of an ecologically conscious language, and a fundamental change in how exchange 
values are determined such that they incorporate the objective conditions of metabolic nature 
into the commodities of everyday consumption 
 What should be clear in the effort of carbon markets is that the attempted reforms to 
energy production and consumption are not radical.  No political leader suggests demolishing 
centralized energy grids or disrupting the land use patterns upholding suburban and exurban 
residence, for example.  Liberal approaches to carbon markets do not incorporate forms of neo-
communitarianism sometimes found on the political left.  However, liberal approaches to carbon 
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are a form of modernity that recognizes the dependence of human society upon nature as “an 
insurmountable material fact” (Foster 2008: 97).  The “green” mode of capitalism—liberal 
environmentalism outlined by Bernstein (2000; 2001) that attempts to reflexively mitigate 
environmental degradation but never at the cost of economic growth—is simply the political 
movement to recognize the metabolic limits of the global carbon cycle and reform economic 
practices in light of this knowledge.  In Marx’s dialectic, environmentally reflexive modes of 
“green” capitalism will have to create new language, new organizations of community, and new 
forms of consumption. 
 Looking back to the first chapter, we saw how the social structural variables that best 
predicted climate skepticism reflect social positions of privilege in the United States, moderated 
by ideological worldviews. The same people located within social structures that most easily 
ignore social exploitation are the most likely to dismiss environmental exploitation and deny the 
danger presented by climate change.  Moreover, those individuals most satisfied with the social 
distribution of benefits from free markets are the most likely to hold climate skeptic beliefs.  
Environmental exploitation within the global carbon cycle is intertwined with systems of social 
and economic exploitation – systems of modern capitalism rely heavily upon carbon energy to 
power the process of capital accumulation.  It is significant that skeptic beliefs are polarized 
along ideological lines for climate change but not other environmental issues, suggesting that 
these other environmental issues do not threaten the basic structure of social and economic 
relationships defended by the current conservative political movement.  
 Examining social location can only explain so much, however.  Analyzing the content of 
the climate skeptic message was necessary in order to understand how the climate skeptic 
mindset operates within the conservative ideological worldview.  Climate skeptics routinely 
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make connections between modest forms of carbon regulation and socialist interventions into 
market activities.  They frame any individual or group attempting to recognize that the exchange 
value of fossil fuel energy ignores human relationships with nature as conspirators hoping to 
capture dominant market positions that exploit consumers and taxpayers alike.  Fetishism of this 
sort makes climate skepticism consistent with other forms of conservative politics that ignore the 
social exploitation built into the exchange values of other commodities, or even how ideological 
visions of income tax rates ignore how individual incomes are facilitated by a host of collective 
efforts (physical infrastructure, education of the workforce, policing of criminal activity, etc.).  
Within this worldview, individuals exist as atomized entities whose success is determined by 
effort and talent.  Affecting their ability to maximally retain their economic compensation or 
satisfy their consumer desires are equally infringing upon their conception of human freedom.   
The presence of carbon fetishism within the intellectual culture of climate skepticism (and 
radical neoliberalism more generally)—manifested in terms of anti-scientific counterclaims—
facilitates a radical defense of market exchange as an institutional norm for carbon capitalism. 
 These same themes are found at elite levels of political discourse as well.  The third 
chapter examined how conservative political elites discuss the inherent qualities of markets and 
nature.  Even regulatory strategies that rely upon market mechanisms are attacked as institutional 
threats to free markets more generally.  In order to believe a solely meritocratic social system 
that rewards individuals according to their talent, effort, and ethic, conservatives must be 
confident that egregious behavior is not sustainable in market settings.  Fortunately, they can 
outline the self-regulating nature of free markets that punishes undesirable behavior while 
efficiently satisfying human needs and desires, ensuring fairness as a long-term outcome.  It is 
very interesting to note the parallel observed within this discourse to the inherent qualities of 
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nature: like markets, conservatives articulated nature as a self-regulating entity.  Nature provides 
the raw materials for wealth creation while markets efficiently distribute these products through 
commodity exchange.  If neither markets nor nature are limited by internal characteristics (the 
polarization of wealth under markets or the environmental consequences of natural resource 
extraction, for example), then state regulation can only serve to interfere with the rewards given 
to individuals and corporations.  Just as conservatives may justify the deregulation of labor 
markets by reference to the fairness of rewarding hard work while ignoring the social 
exploitation that underlies wages, they can justify the rejection of environmental regulation by 
reference to the limitless quality of natural resources while ignoring the dependence of economic 
activity upon ecological sustainability.  
 Fortifying the separation between subjective experience and the objective conditions of 
nature can also explain the social meaning attached to particular types of consumer lifestyles.  
The idea that the exchange values of consumer objects should be determined by decentralized 
consumer demand—and not from a consideration of environmental externalities externally 
imposed by a set of scientific experts—directly illustrates how climate skeptic politics rest upon 
commodity fetishism.  Chapter four provided an interpretation of how and why the politics of 
expertise matters so much for both climate skepticism and conservative politics in general, 
because lending normative status to experts shapes the distribution of objects and rewards within 
a given social system.  For example, consumers as experts will privilege commodities that satisfy 
short-term needs and desires while scientific experts may privilege commodities whose 
production is more consistent with the metrics of sustainable development.  Therefore, the 
material participation in carbon capitalism is very meaningful to climate skeptics because it 
reflects a larger struggle over who should determine the long-term outcomes of market activities.   
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 At the time of this writing, the International Panel on Climate Change has not yet 
released its Fifth Assessment Report.  Climate skeptics clearly focused their communication in 
accordance with the Fourth Assessment Report in 2007, and we should likewise anticipate a new 
wave of climate skeptic communication in the coming years.  Climate skeptic themes have 
remained consistent over time and flow directly from principles outlined in libertarian 
intellectual tradition that want to protect the liberty and freedom of autonomous individuals 
rather than equality and justice for social groups.   
 In many ways, climate skepticism and consumer cultures dependent upon the denial of 
environmental degradation present a social dilemma wherein the pursuit of individually-rational 
activities end up harming long-term collective interests.  The economic-libertarian influence 
within climate skepticism can be observed across other issues where other expert consensus is 
challenged.  These could include issues such as health care or financial regulation.  The 
organizations that employ climate skeptic writers also employ writers on these other topics, and 
they provide consistent strategy solutions across all of these areas that primarily rely upon 
deregulation to allow the exchange value of services be primarily determined by consumer 
demand.   
 In a post-war, post-New Deal America where wealth polarization accompanies the 
erosion of the traditional safety net, confronting climate change parallels the old political 
question of balancing collective interests with individual desires.  Reformist strategies that 
technocratically utilize carbon prices fetishize greenhouse gas emissions and occlude the social 
justice dynamics of climate mitigation.  Successful implementation of market-based carbon 
mitigation, seen in programs such as the Clean Development Mechanism under the Kyoto 
Protocol, has produced less than inspiring results both in terms of climate mitigation and 
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sustainable development.  This reveals the enormous challenge of climate mitigation in the 
United States, as even reforms that are modest in the face of global climate change are obstructed 
by the symbolic politics of protecting free markets.   
 While scientific expertise can serve as a key component of a coalition seeking to 
fundamentally change sociocultural and economic relationships with nature, the opposition 
presented by organized climate skepticism indicates the monumental political task awaiting 
climate activists.  Managerial approaches to climate change are politically susceptible to 
obfuscating attacks on scientific facts, limiting the success of informational strategies aiming to 
educate the general public.  However, climate skeptic organizations may provide blueprints for 
the types of communication necessary to connect climate politics with moral concern.  Skeptics 
consistently identify the goals of science with the failings of government and the nefarious 
interests of particular social, business, and state actors.  In doing this, climate skeptics effectively 
deliver a message that speaks not only about scientific information but about social and moral 
problems while promoting values of individual liberty and economic freedom.  Without 
attacking scientific institutions, climate change activists can articulate a message that connects 
environmental, social, and economic problems to questions of power, risk, and safety.  The task 
of building coalitions and moral consensus around climate mitigation is monumental precisely 
because it concerns the question of sacrifice in the twenty-first century and challenges the 
boundaries of individual autonomy.  While the institutions that define capitalism offer very 
efficient means of producing wealth, they offer poor guidance for environmental stewardship or 
society more generally.  Confronting climate change necessarily requires new institutional forms 
that can evaluate individual and collective behavior within larger contexts of national and 
transnational societies.  
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TABLES 
 
 
Table 3.1 -  Modified Coding Scheme Based on McCright and Dunlap’s (2000) Analysis of 
Climate Skeptic Counter-Claims.  
 
   N % 
Evidentiary basis of climate change is weak or wrong. 441 74.7 
1 – Scientific evidence of climate change is uncertain. 305 51.7 
2 – Mainstream climate research is “junk” science.   67 11.4 
3 – The IPCC intentionally altered its reports to create a “scientific consensus”  
      on global warming. 
  12   2.0 
4 – Climate change is a scare tactic produced by environmentalists and  
      bureaucrats. 
  51   8.6 
5 – Climate change is merely a political tool of politicians.   11   1.9 
Climate change would be beneficial if it were to occur.   35   5.9 
1 – Climate change would improve quality of life.     5   0.8 
2 – Climate change would improve human health.     7   1.2 
3 – Climate change would improve agriculture.   17   2.9 
4 – Climate change is good for the natural environment.   12   2.0 
Climate change policies would do more harm than good. 231 39.2 
1 – Proposed action would harm the economy. 198 33.6 
2 – Proposed action would weaken national security.      6   1.0 
3 – Proposed action would threaten national sovereignty.    21   3.6 
4 – Proposed action would harm the environment.   22   3.7 
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Table 3.2 -  Sub-themes Contained in Climate Skeptic Articles about the Economic 
Consequences of Regulatory Policy. 
 
Theme 
 
Description N (%) 
Market Qualities 
 
Markets characterized as self-regulating and 
generative of wealth. 
 
Identification of appropriate stewards of 
economic growth and environmental protection.  
 
101 (51.0%) 
Policy Outcomes  Discusses the consequence of environmental 
regulatory policy, including market-mechanisms 
such as carbon trading; also includes discussion 
of predicted costs of environmental regulatory 
policy 
 
  80 (40.4%) 
Morality of Markets and 
Regulation 
Emphasizes individual freedom, consumer 
choice,  and the socially regressive nature of 
regulation; Reference to specific consumer 
goods threatened by climate change policy 
 
  68 (34.4%) 
Regulatory Cartel Environmental regulation achieved through 
coordinated activity by cartels composed of 
scientists, bureaucrats, activists, and select 
corporate interests. 
 
  45 (22.7%) 
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Table 3.3 - The Climate Skeptic Perception of Actors and Motives Involved in the “Climatism” 
Cartel.   
 
Actors Needs Problem Solution 
 
Impact scientists Funding for research and 
equipment (such as 
supercomputers); job 
security 
Work does not satisfy 
practical needs of the 
consumer economy 
Create a problem 
(climate change) in 
need of scientific 
expertise; conform 
to disciplinary norms 
in order to secure 
tenure 
 
Energy and 
financial 
corporations 
Market advantage Investments in low-
carbon energy projects 
not profitable unless 
scarcity imposed via 
regulation 
Support regulation 
that gives them 
competitive 
advantage over 
companies not 
investing in low-
carbon energy 
 
State bureaucrats Budget expansion; 
justification for existence 
State agencies (such as 
EPA) need to expand 
budgets during fiscal 
contraction 
 
Design regulatory 
schemes that need 
state oversight 
Environmental 
activists 
Self-preservation of 
organizations; funding; 
membership  
Public may lose 
interest in 
environmental issues 
Promote culture of 
fear through 
“environmental 
alarmism” as means 
of encouraging 
funding and action 
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Table 4.1 - Coding Scheme Used to Analyze Senate Hearings. 
 
Category Outcomes 
Definition of Carbon Driver of Economic Growth 
Source of Ecological Risk 
Preferred Tradition of Science Production Science 
Impact Science 
Representation of Nature Nature Too Complex to Comprehend 
Nature Knowable Through Scientific Expertise 
Representation of Markets Markets are Self-Regulating 
Market Failures avoided through State 
Regulation 
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Table 4.2 - Cultural Strategies of Positioning Carbon to Markets. 
 
  
Markets 
 
 
Regulatory 
Mechanisms 
 
 
Self-Regulating 
Institutions 
 
 
Carbon 
 
Risk 
 
 
Climate Leviathan 
 
Spontaneous Order 
 
Wealth 
 
 
Carbon Innovation 
 
Denial 
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Table 5.1 – Descriptive Data of Variables Used in the Analysis of Environmental Risk 
Skepticism - Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses)  
 
Year      2010     2000     1994 
Dependent Variables 
Temperature Rise (0-1)   0.196(.397)    0.128(.334)    0.182(.386) 
Air Pollution (0-1)    0.085(.279)    0.063(.243)    0.088(.283) 
Pesticides (0-1)    0.080(.271)    0.079(.270)    0.134(.340) 
GMOs (0-1)     0.305(.460)    0.320(.467)    -- 
Population Growth (0-1)   0.259(.438)    0.204(.403)    -- 
 
Independent Variables 
White (0-1)     0.758(.428)    0.786(.410)    0.830(.376) 
Male (0-1)     0.436(.496)    0.436(.496)    0.431(.495) 
Age (18 – 89)   47.97(17.68)  46.02(17.37)  45.97(17.05) 
Income (bottom half =1)   0.477(.500)    0.500(.500)    0.482(.500) 
College Graduate (0-1)   0.290(.454)    0.233(.423)    0.239(.427) 
Conservative (0-1)    0.200(.400)    0.189(.392)    0.202(.401) 
Republican (0-1)    0.227(.419)    0.244(.429)    0.285(.451) 
Income Redistribution (0-1)   0.240(.427)    0.219(.413)    0.238(.426) 
Medical Help (0-1)    0.210(.407)    0.166(.372)    0.207(.405) 
 
Interaction Model Variables 
Education  scale (1 – 4)   1.76(1.09)    1.62(1.01)    1.61(1.00) 
Income scale (1-5)    2.97(1.37)    2.88(1.36)    2.92(1.40) 
White male (0-1)    0.34(.473)    0.35(.478)    0.36(.481) 
Ideology scale (1 – 7)    4.08(1.46)    4.10(1.42)    4.17(1.39) 
Inc. Redistribution scale (1-7)      3.95(2.01)    3.83(1.94)    3.99(1.93) 
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Table 5.2 – Odds Ratios from Logistic Regression Predicting Climate Risk Skeptic Attitudes, 1994-2010a. 
 
Year 1994 2000 2010 
Model               1                   2              1                   2              1                     2 
White 
Male 
Income
b 
College Graduate 
Conservative 
Republican 
Income Redistribution 
Medical Help 
           1.60              1.39  
           2.07***        1.77**  
           0.91              1.00 
           0.80              0.68 
           2.52***        1.99** 
           1.39              1.12 
                                1.65** 
                                2.73*** 
           1.11              1.04 
           1.11              1.06 
           0.61†            0.65 
           1.09              1.09 
           2.21**          1.94* 
           1.24              1.13 
                                1.31 
                                1.63 
           1.99*             1.66 
           1.81**           1.53† 
           0.75               0.81 
           1.25               1.10 
           5.55***         3.34*** 
           1.43               0.98 
                                 4.10*** 
                                 2.07** 
 
† p < .10  *p < .05  **p < .01  ***p < .001 
 
NOTE: Controlling for age. 
a The 1994 and 2000 General Social Survey phrased temperature rise in relation to “the greenhouse effect,” while the 2010 survey 
referred to temperature rise in relation to “climate change.”   
b
 Income was coded as a dummy variable referencing the bottom half of family income distribution.  In 1994, this was families with      
  income below $30,000; In 2000, this was families with incomes below $35,000; In 2010, this was families with incomes below  
  $40,000.  
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Table 5.3 - Odds Ratios from Logistic Regression Predicting Environmental Risk Skeptic Attitudes across Issues (1994) 
 
 
† p < .10  *p < .05  **p < .01  ***p < .001 
NOTE: Controlling for age. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Issue Temperature Rise 
(N = 665) 
Air Pollution (cars) 
(N = 714) 
Pesticides 
(N = 729) 
Model    1                2     1               2     1                 2 
White 
Male 
Income (bottom half) 
College Graduate 
Conservative 
Republican 
Income Redistribution 
Medical Help 
 1.60          1.39 
 2.07***    1.77** 
 0.91          1.00 
 0.80          0.68 
 2.52***    1.99** 
 1.39          1.12 
                  1.65** 
                  2.73*** 
 0.79          0.73 
 1.64†        1.52 
 1.74*        1.79* 
 0.49†        0.45* 
 2.40**      2.14* 
 0.97          0.88 
                  1.19 
                  1.73† 
 1.00           0.93 
 2.26***     2.11*** 
 0.85           0.89 
 1.17           1.11 
 1.63†         1.43 
 1.01           0.93 
                   1.18 
                   1.63† 
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Table 5.4 - Odds Ratios from Logistic Regression Predicting Environmental Risk Skeptic Attitudes across Issues Issues (2000) 
 
Issue Temperature Rise 
(N = 597) 
Air Pollution (cars) 
(N = 646) 
Pesticides 
(N = 644) 
GMOs 
(N = 553) 
Population Growth 
(N = 619) 
Model    1                2     1               2     1                 2    1                 2    1               2 
White 
Male 
Income (bottom half) 
College Graduate 
Conservative 
Republican 
Income Redistribution 
Medical Help 
 1.11          1.04 
 1.11          1.06 
 0.61†        0.65 
 1.09          1.09 
 2.21**      1.94* 
 1.24          1.13 
                  1.31 
                  1.63 
 1.95          1.92 
 1.41          1.38 
 1.65          1.69 
 1.00          0.99 
 1.51          1.40 
 1.35          1.33 
                  0.86 
                  1.70 
 1.28           1.23 
 1.95*         1.87† 
 1.88†         1.98* 
 0.77           0.75 
 2.49**       2.24* 
 1.10           1.09 
                   0.73                                         
                   2.55** 
 1.60†         1.56 
 1.70**       1.65** 
0.69†         0.71† 
 2.07***     2.07*** 
 1.47†         1.35 
 0.96           0.89 
                   1.47 
                   1.09 
 0.81         0.81 
 0.97         0.97 
0.98         0.98 
 1.26         1.26 
 2.31***  2.33*** 
 1.22         1.20 
                 1.21 
                 0.80 
† p < .10  *p < .05  **p < .01  ***p < .001 
NOTE: Controlling for age. 
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Table 5.5 – Odds Ratios from Logistic Regression Predicting Environmental Risk Skeptic Attitudes across Issues (2010) 
 
Issue Temperature Rise 
(N = 597) 
Air Pollution (cars) 
(N = 621) 
Pesticides 
(N = 614) 
GMOs 
(N = 532) 
Population Growth 
(N = 592) 
Model    1                2     1               2     1                 2    1                 2    1               2 
White 
Male 
Income (bottom half) 
College Graduate 
Conservative 
Republican 
Income Redistribution 
Medical Help 
 1.99*        1.66 
 1.81**      1.53† 
 0.75          0.81 
 1.25          1.10 
 5.55***    3.34*** 
 1.43          0.98 
                  4.10*** 
                  2.07** 
 2.57*         2.09  
 1.98*         1.88* 
 0.98           0.97 
 0.93           0.85 
 2.41**       1.70 
 1.53           1.30 
                   2.30* 
                   1.52 
 0.92            0.67 
 2.65**        2.42* 
 1.03            0.95 
 1.09            1.08 
 3.90***      2.70* 
 0.69            0.49 
                    2.16† 
                    1.68 
 1.09           0.92 
 2.01***     1.89** 
 1.00           0.98 
 1.83**       1.84** 
 1.25           0.99 
 1.46           1.18 
                   1.69* 
                   1.43 
 0.59*        0.50**  
 1.28          1.14 
 0.79          0.83 
 1.09          1.04 
 2.22***    1.59† 
 0.89          0.70 
                  2.47*** 
                  1.53 
 
† p < .10  *p < .05  **p < .01  ***p < .001 
 
NOTE: Controlling for age. 
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FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 2.1 - Map of Co-Link Analysis among Climate Skeptic Organizations.  
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Figure 2.2 - Conventions and Carbon Publics in the United States. 
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Figure 2.3 – Image Taken from Climate Skeptic Literature. 
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Figure 3.1 – Frequency of Articles in Environment and Climate News about Climate Change by 
Year.  
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Figure 3.2 -  Proportional Emphasis of Themes in Climate Change Economic Articles in 
Environment and Climate News by Year.  
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Figure 5.1 – Predicted Probability of Climate Risk Skepticism by Political Ideology (1994-2010)a 
 
 
a
 Controlling for race, gender, age, income, education, and party identification. 
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Figure 5.2 – Predicted Probability of Climate Risk Skepticism by Political Party Identification (1994-2010)a 
 
 
a
 Controlling for race, gender, age, income, education, and party identification. 
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Figure 5.3 – Difference in Predicted Probability of Climate Risk Skepticism After Controlling for Attitudes on Wealth Redistribution.  
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Figure 5.4 – Predicted Probability of Risk Skeptic Attitudes by Political Ideology Concerning Global Warming, Air Pollution, and 
Pesticides (2010)
a
 
 
 
a
 Controlling for race, gender, age, income, education, and party identification. 
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Figure 5.5 – Predicted Probability of Risk Skeptic Attitudes by Political Ideology Concerning Global Warming, Genetically Modified 
Organisms, and Population Growth (2010)
a
 
 
 
a
 Controlling for race, gender, age, income, education, and party identification. 
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Figure 5.6 – Predicted Probability of Climate Risk Skeptic Beliefs by Interaction of Ideology and Education (1994)a 
 
 
a 
Controlling for race, gender, age, income, and party identification. 
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Figure 5.7 – Predicted Probability of Climate Risk Skeptic Beliefs by Interaction of Ideology and Education (2000)a 
 
 
 
a 
Controlling for race, gender, age, income, and party identification. 
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Figure 5.8 – Predicted Probability of Climate Risk Skepticism by the Interaction of Ideology and Education (2010)a 
 
 
 
a 
Controlling for race, gender, age, income, and party identification. 
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Figure 5.9 – Predicted Probability of Climate Risk Skeptic Beliefs by the Interaction of Ideology and Income (1994)a 
 
 
a 
Controlling for race, gender, age, education, and party identification. 
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Figure 5.10 – Predicted Probability of Climate Risk Skeptic Beliefs by the Interaction of Ideology and Income (2000)a 
 
 
a 
Controlling for race, gender, age, education, and party identification. 
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Figure 5.11 – Predicted Probability of Climate Risk Skepticism by the Interaction of Ideology and Income (2010)a 
 
 
a 
Controlling for race, gender, age, education, and party identification. 
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Figure 5.12 – Predicted Probability of Climate Risk Skeptic Belief by Agreement with “the government should minimize income 
differences” (1994)a 
 
 
a 
Controlling for age, income, education, and ideology. 
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Figure 5.13 – Predicted Probability of Climate Risk Skeptic Belief by Agreement with “the government should minimize income 
differences” (2000)a 
 
 
a 
Controlling for age, income, education, and ideology. 
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Figure 5.14 – Predicted Probability of Climate Risk Skeptic Belief by Agreement with “the government should minimize income 
differences” (2010)a 
 
 
a 
Controlling for age, income, education, and ideology. 
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APPENDIX A 
The hyperlink map in Figure 1 was created using Issue Crawler software (issuecrawler.net). The 
list of websites used to start the web crawl were taken from the “Common-Sense Environmental 
Directory” found in Environment and Climate News, a free-market environmental newsletter 
published by The Heartland Institute and distributed at the ICCC.  The homepage of each 
organization was visited, and sites that did not clearly engage the issue of climate change were 
filtered out.  Several others were defined as “weak” climate skeptic organizations and filtered out 
because they produced very little content regarding climate change or simply provided links with 
no original content.  A total of nineteen organizations were defined as “strong” skeptic 
organizations and utilized for the Issue Crawl.  This crawl was launched on February 5, 2013.  
Co-link analysis was conducted with default settings on methods, ceilings, and speed.   
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APPENDIX B – Zero-Order Correlation Matrix (1994) 
 
    1   2   3   4   5    6   7   8   9 10 11  
1.   Temperature Rise  
2.   Air pollution  .236. 
3.   Pesticides   .268  .229 
4.   White   .103 -.031  .053 
5.   Male   .162  .026  .129  .033 
6.   Age     .109  .022  .037  .091 -.056 
7.   Income  -.043  .052 -.037 -.113 -.084  .085  
8.   College graduate -.055 -.097  .027  .098  .038 -.059 -.276 
9.   Conservative  .181  .095  .085  .084  .041  .080 -.026  .024 
10. Republican   .082  .044  .065  .194  .010  .014 -.123  .093 .286 
11. Redistribution  .193  .030  .065  .146  .104  .064 -.119  .120 .225  .202 
12. Medical help  .255  .082  .090  .149  .150  .029 -.113  .068 .213  .188 .292  
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APPENDIX C – Zero-Order Correlation Matrix (2000) 
 
     1   2   3   4   5   6   7    8   9 10 11 12 13  
1.   Temperature Rise  
2.   Air pollution  .235  
3.   Pesticides   .255  .221 
4.   GMOs   .219  .087  .243 
5.   Population growth  .118  .089  .077  .021 
6.   White   .054  .005 -.012  .098 -.058 
7.   Male   .074  .049  .055  .149  .006  .055 
8.   Age    .089  .042  .002  .037  .003  .140 -.060 
9.   Income  -.079  .023  .021 -.133 -.024 -.139 -.138  .048 
10. College graduate  .027 -.033 -.052  .128  .029  .090  .056 -.033 -.259 
11. Conservative  .160  .059  .108  .077  .168  .062  .052  .084 -.063  .010 
12. Republican   .117  .030  .057  .100  .089  .203  .085  .042 -.155  .089  .310 
13. Redistribution  .132  .027  .028  .146  .069  .139  .109  .061 -.152  .090  .211  .243 
14. Medical help  .130  .061  .108  .094  .032  .110  .095  .024 -.149  .037  .212  .222  .304 
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APPENDIX D – Zero-Order Correlation Matrix (2010) 
 
      1    2    3    4   5    6    7    8    9   10   11   12   13 
1.   Temperature Rise  
2.   Air pollution  .319   
3.   Pesticides   .196  .252 
4.   GMOs   .238  .165  .200 
5.   Population growth  .197  .158  .118  .062 
6.   White   .137  .084  .022  .093 -.058   
7.   Male   .110  .101  .122  .170  .061  .031 
8.   Age    .084  .034 -.010  .055 -.020  .160 -.009 
9.   Income  -.128 -.085 -.021 -.097 -.044 -.193 -.081 -.042 
10. College graduate  .063  .017  .027  .142 -.003  .114  .025  .053 -.330 
11. Conservative  .306  .162  .097  .072  .147  .065  .053  .098 -.052 -.010 
12. Republican   .202  .131  .058  .138  .051  .187  .059  .067 -.139  .059  .369 
13. Redistribution  .399  .210  .132  .179  .185  .118  .137  .144 -.104  .091  .349  .325  
14. Medical help  .302  .197  .106  .131  .155  .187  .107  .105 -.120  .062  .302  .343  .411 
 
 
